tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-200228632024-03-08T07:29:23.477-08:00The Art of Conservatism"Soon the world will wake up and discover that conservatism is not only an economic and political doctrine, but it is also a way of life; an endeavor created to obtain a virtuous, noble cause based upon the beliefs and the ideals of free markets, free speech, and limited government... this is a lifestyle mankind could really get to like."CaptainAmericahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09916748348077335095noreply@blogger.comBlogger37125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20022863.post-58685854811477212902009-12-27T10:04:00.000-08:002009-12-27T10:16:52.906-08:00Sovereign Immunity: An Analysis of the Framers' Intent<div align="left"></div><br /><div align="left"> <strong>Introduction:</strong><br /><br /><br />“The law also ascribes to the King in his political capacity absolute perfection. The King can do no wrong” - Blackstone’s Commentaries Book III, Chapter 17 (1765-1769)<br /><br />In 1783, the Treaty of Paris successfully ended America’s Revolutionary War against the military behemoth Great Britain.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn1" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1">[1]</a> America, the victor of the war, was finally able to claim its independence from British rule. American political philosophers such as James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, and Alexander Hamilton were more than ready to rid the colonies from the yoke of British monarchy, and in turn craft a new independent system of governance. In many ways, Madison and company sought to distance this new creation of governance from any of the precepts that were consistent with the British government. Nobility, primogeniture, little representation, and hardly any governmental accountability included some of the negative aspects of Britain that our Founders so deeply resented. Our Founders greatly succeeded in the establishment of a government and Constitution that looked nothing like Britain; they had created a Republic. </div><br /><div align="left"><br />Interestingly enough, the Founding Fathers did not distance themselves from every aspect of English common law. A doctrine known as “sovereign immunity,” which has its basis in English common law, somehow remained intact in this new American government and in fact still remains today. Generally speaking, and for the purposes of this paper, sovereign immunity is essentially a legal privilege that asserts that the federal government and state governments cannot be sued by a private citizen in federal court without the government’s consent.<br /></div><div align="left">If one were to observe the historical underpinnings of how this republic was formulated, it seems rather peculiar how this doctrine of sovereign immunity could have been adopted by our Founders. How could the Founders have intended that the state or federal government could not be sued if they had done wrong to a private citizen? How could the Founders have believed and accepted a doctrine so antithetical to their belief system in government? Did the Founders even intend for sovereign immunity to remain as a legal concept and if so, why?<br /></div><br /><div align="left">Even though a literal interpretation of the text of the Constitution does not establish an affirmative doctrine of sovereign immunity, it can be inferred from the Founders’ writings, debates, letters, and from the silence itself that undoubtedly, the Founders never intended for a private citizen to be able to sue a sovereign state in federal court without that state’s consent.<br /><br /></div><br /><div align="center"><strong>Historical Basis of Sovereign Immunity</strong><br /></div><br /><div align="left">As previously mentioned, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is a legal concept derived from English common law. The original phrasing of this doctrine comes from the idea that “the King can do no Wrong.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn2" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2">[2]</a> As scholars have noted, this phrase has many possible meanings. One interpretation seems to suggest that when a wrong has occurred, someone else must have done it, since the King can do no wrong. Other interpretations suggest that perhaps it merely meant that because a King cannot do a wrong, a remedy must exist if harm has been done, or, that “the King must not, was not allowed, not entitled, to do wrong…”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn3" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3">[3]</a> While these interpretations may very well have had merit in the era and time of the Crown in England, certainly it can be said that the doctrine of sovereign immunity in American jurisprudence developed in such a way that meant to preclude suits against the sovereign.<br /></div><br /><div align="left">The historical roots of sovereign immunity come from Edward the First’s reign in England from 1272 to 1307.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn4" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4">[4]</a> The United States Supreme Court has also accepted the origin of sovereign immunity to come from the time of Edward the First.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn5" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5">[5]</a> Before Edward the First, some scholars have postulated that it had been possible for British citizens to bring the Crown into court as a defendant like a common person, although this is not entirely clear.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn6" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6">[6]</a> However, when Edward the First came to power after his father, it seems certain that thereafter the principle became fully established that the King could not be made a defendant in any court, and was not subject to the writs and process of the courts.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn7" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7">[7]</a> </div><div align="left"> </div><br /><div align="left">In Sir Edward Coke's Institutes, he states: "It is a maxim of the law that the King can do no wrong."<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn8" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8">[8]</a> A glimpse into the meaning of this doctrine was formulated by Sir William Blackstone, who postulated on the concept of sovereign immunity by stating:<br /><br />"This maxim is not to be understood as if everything trans-acted by the government was of course just and lawful, but means only two things: First, that whatever is exceptionable in the conduct of public affairs is not to be imputed to the King, nor is he answerable for it personally to the people. And secondly, it means that the prerogative of the Crown extends not to do any injury; it is created for the benefit of the people and therefore cannot be exerted to their prejudice… The King, moreover, is not only incapable of doing wrong, but even of thinking wrong: he can never mean to do an improper thing; in him is no folly or weakness.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn9" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9">[9]</a>(emphasis added)<br /><br />From this passage it is obvious that even the most prominent British scholars and jurists of the 18th century believed the King to be something above the law. Even though this archaic legal concept was prominent, English law eventually began to develop and draw away from the complete bar of suit upon the King.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn10" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10">[10]</a> In fact, if the case was not involving a tort claim, the subject could by petition to the King, obtain leave to sue.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn11" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11">[11]</a> This principle was eventually codified in statute and the remedy extended to any cause or complaint for “injury to or deprivation of property or the breach of contract made by or on behalf of the Crown.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn12" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12">[12]</a> It is unquestionably true that the precept of sovereign immunity was an established foundation in English law, and for better or worse, the legal concept found its way into American jurisprudence.<br /><br /></div><br /><div align="center"><strong>Article III, Section II Debate</strong><br /></div><br /><div align="left">During the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787, there is no evidence to suggest that there was any discussion regarding the concept of sovereign immunity.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn13" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn13" name="_ftnref13">[13]</a> Yet, the issue did arise in the state ratifying conventions, in particular, the Virginia Convention.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn14" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn14" name="_ftnref14">[14]</a><br /></div><br /><div align="left"></div><br /><div align="left">In the Federalist and Anti-Federalist debates, there was a rigorous dispute over the meaning of Article III, Section II. This provision of the US Constitution permits suit “between a State and Citizens of another State.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn15" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn15" name="_ftnref15">[15]</a> The Anti-Federalists were concerned that this provision allowed a private citizen of one state to sue another state in federal court. Two leading Anti-Federalists, George Mason and Patrick Henry, were very clear on the absolute rejection of this clause as they saw it taking away too much sovereignty from the states.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn16" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn16" name="_ftnref16">[16]</a> Mason, in interpreting Article III, Section II stated, “Claims respecting those lands, every liquidated account, or other claim against this state, will be tried before the federal court. Is not this disgraceful? Is this state to be brought to the bar of justice like a delinquent individual? Is the sovereignty of the state to be arraigned like a culprit, or private offender?”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn17" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn17" name="_ftnref17">[17]</a> Mason’s statement is significant in that it mirrors Sir Coke or Sir Blackstone’s steadfast contention that the sovereign must be protected from suits against private citizens. Of course in the American context, the sovereign implicated are the states that comprise the Union.<br /></div><br /><div align="left">The Virginia statesman and Anti-Federalist Patrick Henry was equally discontent about the language in Article III, Section II.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn18" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn18" name="_ftnref18">[18]</a> He too believed that, without a doubt, the language allowed a private citizen to sue a state in federal court.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn19" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn19" name="_ftnref19">[19]</a> Henry, in response to the argument that Article III only warrants a State to be a plaintiff and not a defendant, stated, “What says the paper? That it shall have cognizance of controversies between a state and citizens of another state, without discriminating between plaintiff and defendant.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn20" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn20" name="_ftnref20">[20]</a> Clearly, the philosophy of the Anti-Federalists was in direct conflict with Article III, Section II, and it is indeed apparent that the Anti-Federalists readily adopted the concept of sovereign immunity.<br /></div><br /><div align="left">The Federalists interpreted Article III, Section II quite differently from that of their counterparts. While some scholars argue that there was a division between the Federalists on the interpretation of Article III, Section II, there is very little evidence supporting this claim. Two Federalists, Edmund Randolph and Timothy Pickering are said to support the Article III interpretation which holds that states should and could be sued in federal court without their consent.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn21" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn21" name="_ftnref21">[21]</a> The scant evidence of Randolph’s support is based on a theoretical statement he made as a member of the Committee of Detail at the Constitutional Convention, in which he said, “I ask the Convention of the free people of Virginia if there can be honesty in rejecting the government because justice is to be done by it? Are we to say that we shall discard this government because it would make us all honest?”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn22" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn22" name="_ftnref22">[22]</a> This is hardly an endorsement of the idea that sovereign immunity should not exist for the states and that they could and should be sued by private individuals. Somehow, contemporary scholars interpret this statement to mean that Randolph wanted people who were wronged by the government to have an effective avenue to receive redress.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn23" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn23" name="_ftnref23">[23]</a> Simply put, Randolph’s statement is ambiguous at best on the interpretation of Article III, Section II.<br /></div><br /><div align="left">The other Federalist, Timothy Pickering, did in fact believe that the reading of Article III, Section II permitted private suits against states in federal court.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn24" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn24" name="_ftnref24">[24]</a> However, his main consideration was, assuming suits are allowed against states, they most certainly should be adjudicated in federal court rather than state court, for purposes of impartiality.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn25" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn25" name="_ftnref25">[25]</a> In interpreting Article III, Section II, Pickering stated, “…it seems to be a wise provision which puts it in the power of such foreigners and citizens to resort to a court where they may reasonably expect to obtain impartial justice.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn26" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn26" name="_ftnref26">[26]</a> While it seems as though he accepted the idea of suit against state governments, Pickering was only addressing the concern that, assuming suits were allowed, it is best they be adjudicated in federal court and not state courts. Again, this is not an all-out endorsement of the idea that states should be sued, only that impartiality is better determined in federal court.<br /></div><br /><div align="left">Most of the Federalists agreed with the views promulgated by James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Marshall. The essential argument was that Article III did not override state sovereignty and, notwithstanding the provisions, states could only be sued in federal court if they consented to be a party in litigation.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn27" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn27" name="_ftnref27">[27]</a> According to Alexander Hamilton, Article III, Section II was not intended to mean that any state would be subject to suit by a private citizen. Hamilton wrote in The Federalist 81,<br /><br />“It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general sense and general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every state in the Union. Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity, it will remain with the States.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn28" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn28" name="_ftnref28">[28]</a><br /></div><br /><div align="left">Hamilton believed not only in the idea that the individual states could not be sued in federal court because of their sovereign status, but also that it was implicit in the natural order of law.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn29" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn29" name="_ftnref29">[29]</a> While Hamilton is noted for his extensive adoration of certain British doctrines, he was not the only fervent supporter of states being precluded from suit by private citizens.<br />James Madison, often dubbed the “Father of our Constitution,” also accepted and endorsed the extension of the legal precept of sovereign immunity to the states.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn30" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn30" name="_ftnref30">[30]</a> </div><br /><div align="left"></div><br /><div align="left">During the Virginia ratifying convention, Madison addressed the arguments against the proposed Article III, Section II provision. Madison agreed with his Anti-Federalist adversaries that states were in fact immune from suits brought by private citizens.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn31" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn31" name="_ftnref31">[31]</a> At the convention, Madison exclaimed, “Jurisdiction in controversies between a state and citizens of another state is much objected to, and perhaps without reason. It is not in the power of any individuals to call any state into court.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn32" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn32" name="_ftnref32">[32]</a> (emphasis added) Madison’s intention behind the language of Article III, Section II was merely to allow states to serve as plaintiffs, not as defendants.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn33" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn33" name="_ftnref33">[33]</a> He further stated in his speech before the Virginia state ratifying convention, “The only operation [Article III, Section II) can have, is that, if a state should wish to bring a suit against a citizen, it must be brought before the federal court.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn34" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn34" name="_ftnref34">[34]</a></div><br /><div align="left"><br />On the same date at the same Virginia convention, John Marshall exclaimed, “I hope that no gentleman will think that a state will be called at the bar of the federal court.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn35" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn35" name="_ftnref35">[35]</a> Marshall then reinforced Madison’s interpretation of Article III, Section II by further stating, “It is not rational to suppose that the sovereign power should be dragged before a court. The intent is, to enable states to recover claims of individuals residing in other states.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn36" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn36" name="_ftnref36">[36]</a> While the Virginia convention was debating this provision of the Constitution, the New York convention recommended an amendment to the Constitution that cleared up this confusion.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn37" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn37" name="_ftnref37">[37]</a> New York wanted to include language which said the Constitution should not “be construed to authorize any suit to be brought against any state, in any manner whatever.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn38" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn38" name="_ftnref38">[38]</a> However, the amendment was never passed due to the fact that most considered it simply unnecessary.<br /></div><br /><div align="left">It is quite clear that Madison, Hamilton, and Marshall, all three giants in the creation, construction and interpretation of the Constitution, were of the same mind on this issue: Article III, Section II did not mean that citizens of a state could not bring suit against another state in federal court without that state’s consent. Further, an entire convention in New York voted to amend the Constitution to exclude suits against states altogether.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn39" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn39" name="_ftnref39">[39]</a> While the text does not explicitly limit and provide the restriction that states cannot be defendants, the Framers’ writings and debates provide clear, unwavering evidence that the provision was solely meant to be read in the way the Federalists intended it to be read.<br /><br /></div><br /><div align="center"><strong><em>Chisholm v. Georgia</em> & the<br />Ratification of the Eleventh Amendment</strong><br /></div><br /><div align="left">While it certainly seemed clear to the Federalists that Article III, Section II did not permit states to be sued as defendants, it wasn’t so clear for the Supreme Court. In 1793, the Supreme Court addressed the interpretation of Article III, Section II in a case entitled Chisholm v. Georgia. The issue before the Court was whether a suit could be brought against one of the American states by a citizen of another state.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn40" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn40" name="_ftnref40">[40]</a><br /></div><br /><div align="left">In 1777, the Executive Council of Georgia authorized Thomas Stone and Edward Davies, as commissioners of the state, to purchase goods from Robert Farquhar, a businessman in Charleston, South Carolina.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn41" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn41" name="_ftnref41">[41]</a> The goods were to be used for supplies in the Revolutionary War, and Georgia had contracted to pay Farquhar roughly $169,000 for the supplies.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn42" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn42" name="_ftnref42">[42]</a> The goods were delivered, but Farquhar never received payment from the Executive Council members.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn43" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn43" name="_ftnref43">[43]</a> Seven years later, still without having received payment on the supplies, Farquhar was knocked overboard from his boat and drowned after he was hit by a pilot boat coming into the harbor of Savannah.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn44" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn44" name="_ftnref44">[44]</a> One of the executors of Farquhar’s estate, Alexander Chisholm, decided to bring suit against the state of Georgia to recover payment that was never delivered, even though the obligations of Farquhar’s end of the contract had been completed.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn45" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn45" name="_ftnref45">[45]</a> Georgia rejected the complaint and claimed they were immune from suit because of sovereign immunity.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn46" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn46" name="_ftnref46">[46]</a><br /></div><br /><div align="left">Each of the five justices delivered their own opinion in the case, as was the customary rule in early Supreme Court cases. In a 4-1 decision, the Court decided to reject the views of Madison and Hamilton, and held that Georgia could act as a defendant in federal court when sued by a citizen of another state.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn47" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn47" name="_ftnref47">[47]</a> The Anti-Federalists concern about the wording of Article III, Section II had finally come to light. The Court in Chisholm based its rationale on the fact that Article III, Section II had fully abrogated the states’ sovereign immunity and essentially granted the federal courts to hear disputes between private citizens and states.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn48" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn48" name="_ftnref48">[48]</a> The lone dissenter, Justice Iredell, argued that the Judiciary Act of 1789 only authorized courts to issue writs “agreeable to the principles and usages of law.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn49" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn49" name="_ftnref49">[49]</a> His rationale was that under common law, nothing deviated from the tradition pertaining to the sovereign immunity of the King. Iredell claimed that this tradition excluded a non-consenting common law action to recover a debt from a state.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn50" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn50" name="_ftnref50">[50]</a><br /></div><br /><div align="left">The Chisholm decision was not received well by the rest of the country, largely due to the fact that private citizens were now filing suits against other states at high volumes.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn51" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn51" name="_ftnref51">[51]</a> Less than a year from the Court’s holding, a resolution was passed in the House of Representatives and Senate which sought to amend the Constitution.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn52" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn52" name="_ftnref52">[52]</a> The Senate passed the amendment by a vote of 23-2, and a couple months later the House adopted it by a vote of 81-9.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn53" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn53" name="_ftnref53">[53]</a> On February 7, 1795, North Carolina became the twelfth and final necessary state to ratify the Eleventh Amendment to the US Constitution.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn54" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn54" name="_ftnref54">[54]</a> The amendment was a byproduct of the reaction to Chisholm, and amazingly it took only one year for three-fourths of the state legislatures to ratify the Eleventh Amendment.<br />The Eleventh Amendment of Constitution states,<br /><br />“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn55" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn55" name="_ftnref55">[55]</a><br /></div><br /><div align="left">The language in the Eleventh Amendment has perplexed jurists and scholars today since it did not bar all suits against states in federal court. The Amendment specifically forbids suits brought by a private citizen of State A against State B, but does not preclude a suit brought by a private citizen in State A against State A. Thus, a literal interpretation of the Amendment would not preclude all suits against states in federal courts.<br /></div><br /><div align="left">However, Chief Justice Rehnquist has argued that there is a reasonable and understandable explanation for this discrepancy. In Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, (1996), Rehnquist argued “the text of the 11th Amendment dealt in terms only with the problem presented by the decision in Chisholm; in light of the fact that the federal courts did not have federal-question jurisdiction at the time the Amendment was passed (and would not have until 1875), it seems unlikely that much thought was given to the prospect of federal-question jurisdiction over the state.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn56" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn56" name="_ftnref56">[56]</a> When Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Act itself did not confer general federal question jurisdiction to the federal courts, but instead left remedies available in state courts with appeals to the Supreme Court if the claims were federal in nature.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn57" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn57" name="_ftnref57">[57]</a> As Rehnquist rightly points out, it was not until 1875 when the federal courts were finally vested with the broader judicial power to hear cases arising from a federal question.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn58" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn58" name="_ftnref58">[58]</a> </div><br /><div align="left"><br />Thus, the main justification for the discrepancy upon the literal interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment is due not to the fact that the Framers’ sought to allow suits against states, but rather only that it was inconceivable that a citizen could bring forth a claim in federal court on any other basis than diversity jurisdiction. It is without a doubt that the Framers would have curbed the power of a citizen to sue his own state if they had conceived of this federal question jurisdiction possibility.<br /></div><br /><div align="center"><strong><em>Cohens v. Virginia / Hans v. Louisiana:</em><br />Interpreting the Eleventh Amendment</strong><br /></div><br /><div align="left">One of then first Supreme Court cases that dealt with the idea of sovereign immunity was an 1821 case entitled Cohens v. Virginia.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn59" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn59" name="_ftnref59">[59]</a> Chief Justice Marshall delivered the majority opinion of the court and established that the federal court maintained no jurisdiction to hear a suit brought against the state of Virginia.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn60" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn60" name="_ftnref60">[60]</a> In support of this holding, Marshall keenly observed that the states had retained their sovereign status prior to country ratifying the Constitution and forming a Union.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn61" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn61" name="_ftnref61">[61]</a> Justice Marshall stated,<br /></div><br /><div align="left">“It is an axiom in politics that a sovereign and independent state is not liable to the suit of any individual, nor amenable to any judicial power, without its own consent. All the States of this union were sovereign and independent before they became parties to the federal compact: hence I infer that the judicial power of the United States would not have extended to them”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn62" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn62" name="_ftnref62">[62]</a><br /></div><br /><div align="left">Justice Marshall then went on to interpret the Eleventh Amendment much more broadly than what the language actually read. Marshall stated, “The case of a contest between a State and one of its own citizens, is not included in this enumeration; and, consequently, if the principle which I have advanced be a sound one, the judicial power of the United States does not extend to it…then it is the simple case of a contest between a State and one of its own citizens, which does not fall within the pale of federal judicial power.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn63" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn63" name="_ftnref63">[63]</a> (emphasis added) From Marshall’s opinion, it is quite obvious that in 1821, the federal courts were not to entertain suits brought by private citizens even if they resided in the state in which they brought a suit against, unless the sovereign state had consented. Chief Justice Hughes reiterated Justice Marshall’s sovereignty view some 100 years later in Monaco v. Mississippi.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn64" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn64" name="_ftnref64">[64]</a> Hughes stated, “There is also the postulate that States of the Union, still possessing attributes of sovereignty, shall be immune from suits, without their consent.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn65" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn65" name="_ftnref65">[65]</a> Justice Kennedy reinforced this view in the majority in Alden v. Maine as he stated, “The founding document specifically recognizes the states as sovereign entities… “[T]he States entered the federal system with their sovereignty intact.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn66" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn66" name="_ftnref66">[66]</a><br /></div><br /><div align="left">In an 1890 case entitled Hans v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court again addressed the possibility of the Eleventh Amendment precluding suits against states from their own citizens.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn67" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn67" name="_ftnref67">[67]</a><br /></div><br /><div align="left">The Hans case involved a suit filed by a citizen of Louisiana against the state of Louisiana after Louisiana had essentially repudiated the interest on state bonds held by Hans.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn68" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn68" name="_ftnref68">[68]</a> Hans then sued in federal court, arguing that the state's refusal to make the payments as required by the contract with the state violated the Contract Clause of the Constitution.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn69" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn69" name="_ftnref69">[69]</a> On the notion that his case arose under the Constitution, Hans filed in federal circuit court under the fairly new statute providing for federal question jurisdiction.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn70" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn70" name="_ftnref70">[70]</a> Louisiana argued that it was not subject to suit and cited the Eleventh Amendment and the broad doctrine of sovereign immunity to support its claim.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn71" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn71" name="_ftnref71">[71]</a> Naturally, Hans asserted that he was not obstructed by the Eleventh Amendment since it only precluded suits against citizens from another state.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn72" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn72" name="_ftnref72">[72]</a><br /></div><br /><div align="left">Justice Joseph Bradley delivered the majority opinion for the Court, and by a vote of 9-0, the Supreme Court held that because Louisiana had not consented to jurisdiction in the present case, the Court could not exercise jurisdiction over the matter even if there were legal grounds for the underlying suit.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn73" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn73" name="_ftnref73">[73]</a> Like Marshall had done in Cohens v. Virginia, the Court extended the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment to bar any and all suits against states in federal court without their consent.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn74" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn74" name="_ftnref74">[74]</a> Bradley suggested that the Amendment’s history was a clear repudiation of the decision in Chisholm, and that it stood to reject suits against states regardless of where the citizen resided.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn75" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn75" name="_ftnref75">[75]</a> The majority opinion in Hans gave constitutional weight to Iredell’s Chisholm dissent and to the vision of Madison, Hamilton, and Justice Marshall whose declarations during the ratification debates “expressly disclaimed, and even resented" any notion that "the judicial Power" authorized non-consenting suits by citizens against the sovereign states.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn76" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn76" name="_ftnref76">[76]</a><br /></div><br /><div align="left">While the Court did acknowledge that the letter of the Eleventh Amendment did not extend to Hans lawsuit, the Court based its holding on the historical intentions of the Founding Fathers.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn77" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn77" name="_ftnref77">[77]</a> The majority in Hans also pointed out that under the Articles of Confederation, states could not be sued by private citizens.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn78" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn78" name="_ftnref78">[78]</a> Bradley stated in his opinion, quoting Justice McLean, “Under the Articles of Confederation, a State could be sued only in cases of boundary. It is believed that there is no case where a suit has been brought, at any time, on bills of credit against a State; and it is certain that no suit could have been maintained on this ground prior to the Constitution."<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn79" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn79" name="_ftnref79">[79]</a> In essence, the Court simply found it inconceivable that the Framers would have allowed for federal question claims against the states.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn80" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn80" name="_ftnref80">[80]</a> Justice Bradley wrote,<br /><br />“Can we suppose that, when the Eleventh Amendment was adopted, it was understood to be left open for citizens of a State to sue their own state in the federal courts, whilst the idea of suits by citizens of other states, or of foreign states, was indignantly repelled? Suppose that Congress, when proposing the Eleventh Amendment, had appended to it a proviso that nothing therein contained should prevent a State from being sued by its own citizens in cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States: can we imagine that it would have been adopted by the States? The supposition that it would is almost an absurdity on its face.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn81" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn81" name="_ftnref81">[81]</a><br /><br /></div><br /><div align="left">Basically, the majority in Hans relied on the broader political context and the sentiments of the Framers’ era to infer a more expansive spirit than the Amendment's text could bear, and then applied that spirit over the letter of the Amendment.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn82" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn82" name="_ftnref82">[82]</a> Accordingly, future Supreme Court decisions have in fact credited Hans in establishing "Eleventh Amendment immunity" against federal question actions brought against a state by its own citizens.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn83" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn83" name="_ftnref83">[83]</a> As previously mentioned, the majority opinion also gave weight to the “shock and surprise” of the American populace after Chisholm was handed down in 1793, and the Court was fearful of another sort of reaction by the states.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn84" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn84" name="_ftnref84">[84]</a> Thus, the majority in Hans concluded that "the cognizance of suits and actions unknown to the law, and forbidden by the law, was not contemplated by the constitution when establishing the judicial power of the United States.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn85" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn85" name="_ftnref85">[85]</a><br /></div><br /><div align="left">Even though the Hans court did not abide by a purely textual interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, the Court nonetheless came down on the correct side of the intentions of our Framers. In looking to history and the circumstances of how the Eleventh Amendment was enacted and adopted, the Court in Hans, without a doubt, applied the appropriate methodology in its approach to the decision and reached the most rational and historically accurate legal conclusion.<br /><br /></div><strong><em></em></strong><br /><div align="center"><strong><em>Seminole Tribe v. Florida</em><br />Congress and Sovereign Immunity</strong><br /></div><br /><div align="left">In Seminole Tribe v. Florida, the Supreme Court held, by a 5-4 margin, that Congress lacks the constitutional authority, when acting pursuant to the Commerce Clause, to abrogate sovereign immunity afforded to the states under the Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn86" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn86" name="_ftnref86">[86]</a> This decision, while indeed controversial, was consistent with our Framers understanding of the necessity of sovereign immunity and the weakness of the Commerce Clause itself.<br /></div><br /><div align="left">In 1988, Congress passed the Indian Regulatory Gaming Act which was designed to restore to the states a role in regulating gaming operated by Indian Tribes.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn87" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn87" name="_ftnref87">[87]</a> The section of the Act at issue stated, “The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction over (i) any cause of action initiated by an Indian tribe arising from the failure of a State to enter into negotiations with the Indian tribe.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn88" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn88" name="_ftnref88">[88]</a> If the district court finds that the state failed to negotiate in good faith, then the Act allows the court to "order the State and Indian tribe to conclude such a compact" within sixty days.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn89" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn89" name="_ftnref89">[89]</a> The dispute between the Seminole Tribe and state of Florida occurred when negotiations broke down, and thereafter the Tribe sued the state of Florida and the Governor in federal court alleging that the defendants did not negotiate in “good faith.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn90" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn90" name="_ftnref90">[90]</a><br /></div><br /><div align="left">Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist stated that while Congress does have power to abrogate sovereign immunity under Section 5 of the 14th Amendment, it does not have the constitutional authority to abrogate under Article I’s grant of legislative authority.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn91" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn91" name="_ftnref91">[91]</a> Rehnquist essentially reaffirmed that Article III, Section II did not override the states’ sovereign immunity and that this principle was clearly established with the Eleventh Amendment specifically rejecting the Chisholm decision.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn92" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn92" name="_ftnref92">[92]</a> Not only did Rehnquist reaffirm the Hans interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, Rehnquist went further and overruled an earlier case entitled Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn93" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn93" name="_ftnref93">[93]</a><br /></div><br /><div align="left">In Union Gas, Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, had concluded that Congress did in fact possess Article I authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn94" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn94" name="_ftnref94">[94]</a> In overruling this conclusion, Rehnquist defended the idea that the Eleventh Amendment embodies a broader principle that “state sovereign immunity limited the federal courts jurisdiction under Article III.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn95" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn95" name="_ftnref95">[95]</a> From this premise, the Court held that allowing Congress to abrogate sovereign immunity of the states under Article I would contradict the fundamental principle that Congress cannot “expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts beyond the bounds of Article III.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn96" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn96" name="_ftnref96">[96]</a><br /></div><br /><div align="left">Writing for the dissent in Union Gas, Justice Scalia remarked on the general nature of the Eleventh Amendment, and invoked the precedent and rationale set forth in Hans.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn97" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn97" name="_ftnref97">[97]</a> Scalia stated, “What we said in Hans was, essentially, that the Eleventh Amend-ment was important not merely for what is said but for what it reflected: a consensus that the doctrine of sovereign immunity, for States as well as for the Federal Government, was part of the understood background against which the Constitution was adopted, and which its jurisdictional provisions did not mean to sweep away.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn98" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn98" name="_ftnref98">[98]</a><br /></div><br /><div align="left">Justice Souter, writing a dissenting opinion in Seminole Tribe, stated “There is almost no evidence that the generation of the Framers thought sovereign immunity was fundamental in the sense of being unalterable.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn99" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn99" name="_ftnref99">[99]</a> Here, Souter is essentially suggesting that since the Founding Fathers never specifically said that Congress could not abrogate a states’ sovereign immunity from the Eleventh Amendment, then clearly Congress should have that power under the Commerce Clause. Souter is unfortunately framing the issue incorrectly. The reason there is little evidence on the Framers interpretation of abrogation of sovereign immunity is simply because the Framers never even considered it a possibility. Sovereign immunity for the states was embedded in the minds of our Framers, and surely Madison would never have agreed that the Commerce Clause could abrogate a states’ sovereignty.<br /></div><br /><div align="left">As Justice Kennedy points out in the majority opinion in Alden v. Maine, “We believe, however, that the Founders’ silence is best explained by the simple fact that no one, not even the Constitution’s most ardent opponents, suggested the document might strip the States of the immunity…It suggests the sovereign’s right to assert immunity from suit in its own courts was a principle so well established that no one conceived it would be altered by the new Constitution.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn100" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn100" name="_ftnref100">[100]</a><br /><br /></div><br /><div align="center"><strong>Exceptions to Sovereign Immunity</strong><br /></div><br /><div align="left">Today, the concept of sovereign immunity has been limited and restricted in several different cases. Whether the Founders had intended that this concept be subject to restriction is most certainly unknown, most likely they would have supported these extensions for a state to be sued.<br /></div><br /><div align="left">The first and foremost exception to sovereign immunity is an exception that even our Founders espoused. This is the notion that a state can in fact waive its sovereign immunity and consent to jurisdiction in court. As the majority in Alden v. Maine point out, “Sovereign immunity bars suits only in the absence of state consent.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn101" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn101" name="_ftnref101">[101]</a> Consent can either be express or implied, and if a state brings a suit against an individual, countersuit is obviously a case of implied consent.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn102" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn102" name="_ftnref102">[102]</a> Often, a state may consent to suit if it wishes to hold itself accountable for actions or perhaps to set a precedent for future actions.<br /></div><br /><div align="left">The second meaningful exception to sovereign immunity of the states is that state officers can be sued for prospective injunctive relief, or non-monetary relief. In a 1908 case entitled Ex Parte Young, the Supreme Court upheld an order restraining the state's attorney general from bringing suit under a statute alleged to trench on constitutional rights.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn103" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn103" name="_ftnref103">[103]</a> By authorizing suit in Young, the Supreme Court essentially established an implied cause of action for injunctive relief against state officials whose conduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn104" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn104" name="_ftnref104">[104]</a> Accordingly, the majority held that state officials who act in violation of the Constitution are taken out of their official capacity and, thus, they lose the protection of state sovereign status.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn105" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn105" name="_ftnref105">[105]</a> The Supreme Court in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v Halderman, further recognized the principle in Young as "necessary to permit the federal courts to vindicate federal rights and hold state officials responsible to 'the supreme authority of the United States."<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn106" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn106" name="_ftnref106">[106]</a> Two years later, in Green v. Mansour, the Supreme Court interpreted the injunctive relief of Young as "giving life to the Supremacy Clause" because “remedies designed to end a continuing violation of federal law are necessary to vindicate the federal interest in assuring the supremacy of that law.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn107" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn107" name="_ftnref107">[107]</a> Thus, sovereign immunity does not extend to state officials who enforce law that is in clear violation of the Constitution and are subject to suit in federal court.<br /></div><br /><div align="left">The third exception of sovereign immunity is suits which have been abrogated by Congress. As this paper has already mentioned, the constitutional authority of Congressional abrogation of sovereign immunity cannot and does not rest in Article I pursuant to the Commerce Clause.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn108" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn108" name="_ftnref108">[108]</a> However, the Supreme Court has held that Congress can abrogate the sovereign immunity of states when acting appropriately under power granted by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn109" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn109" name="_ftnref109">[109]</a> As an example of this abrogation, the Supreme Court held in 1976 in a case entitled Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, that the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the power to override a State's Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity for the purpose of enforcing civil rights on the States.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn110" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn110" name="_ftnref110">[110]</a> The Supreme Court in Fitzpatrick stated, “Congress may authorize private suits against non-consenting States pursuant to its Section 5 enforcement power.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn111" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn111" name="_ftnref111">[111]</a> It is more than likely the Framers would have considered this a valid abrogation of sovereign immunity since Madison and Jefferson both wrote Resolutions which considered nullifying federal law that was inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn112" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn112" name="_ftnref112">[112]</a><br /></div><br /><div align="left">These are the three most prominent and significant exceptions to sovereign immunity which the Supreme Court wholeheartedly accepts today. All three exceptions would most likely be viewed favorably by the Founders.<br /><br /></div><br /><div align="center"><strong>Conclusion</strong><br /></div><br />In conclusion, the concept of sovereign immunity was undoubtedly an English law precept that the Framers wished to carry over to American jurisprudence. The English jurists such as Blackstone and Coke both saw sovereign immunity and suits against the King as something instilled and embedded in natural law. From the ratification debates, it was clear that only a few individuals sought to interpret Article III, Section II as allowing private citizens to sue states as defendants in federal court. Madison, Hamilton, and Marshall all believed that this possibility was antithetical to the states’ retaining their sovereign status after the formation of the Union. Even though the Court in Chisholm held that states were not immune from suits, the Eleventh Amendment was quickly ratified to repudiate that very decision. In turn, the amendment was interpreted in Cohens and later in the Hans decision to bar all suits against states, even if the citizen resides in the state he seeks to sue. The spirit and historical intentions of our Founders were used to buttress these decisions. The Supreme Court limited Congressional abrogation in the Seminole Tribe decision, which further restricted Congress’ Commerce Clause reach onto the states. It can be said that the reason the Eleventh Amendment did not extend to all citizens was simply because the Founders never considered federal question jurisdiction, which came to light after 1875. The Supreme Court consistently acknowledged that the states retained their sovereign status after the formation of the Union, and in turn, retained the right not to be brought before a federal court by a private actor without its consent. Today, the major exceptions of sovereign immunity extend an avenue for a remedy to citizens that would not receive one if sovereign immunity was deemed absolute. Indeed it is not, and the Founders’ most likely would have agreed with these exceptions.<br /><br /><br />Sovereign immunity is a legal concept that the Framers clearly intended to keep intact when they structured the Constitution, and the historical debates, writings, and subsequent Supreme Court decisions prove this to hold true.<br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn1" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">[1]</a> Morris, Richard. “The Great Peace of 1783,” Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Third Series, Vol. 95 (1983) p. 29<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn2" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2">[2]</a> Chemerinsky, Erwin. “Against Sovereign Immunity.” Vol. 53 Stanford Law Review (2000-2001). pg. 1201<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn3" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3">[3]</a> Jaffe, Louis L. “Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity.” Vol. 77 No. 1 Harvard Law Review (1963). pg. 4<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn4" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4">[4]</a> United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882) citing Chief Barons Comyns, 1 Digest, 132 Action C.<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn5" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5">[5]</a> 106 U.S. 196 (1882)<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn6" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6">[6]</a> Barry, Herbert. “The King Can Do No Wrong.” Vol. 11 No. 5 Virginia Law Review (1925). p. 352<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn7" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7">[7]</a> Barry, p. 353<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn8" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8">[8]</a> Barry, p. 353 quoting Coke’s Institutes, 73.<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn9" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9">[9]</a> Blackstone, William. Commentaries on the Laws of England 6 (Chitty Ed. 1855).<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn10" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10">[10]</a> Barry, p. 355<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn11" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11">[11]</a> Barry, p. 355<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn12" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12">[12]</a> Barry, p. 355<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn13" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref13" name="_ftn13">[13]</a> Chemerinsky, p. 1206<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn14" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref14" name="_ftn14">[14]</a> Chemerinsky, p. 1206<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn15" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref15" name="_ftn15">[15]</a> “The Constitution of the United States," Article III, Section II.<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn16" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref16" name="_ftn16">[16]</a> Chemerinsky, p. 1207<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn17" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref17" name="_ftn17">[17]</a> Elliot, Jonathan. The Debates in the Several States Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, (1937). p. 526-527<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn18" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref18" name="_ftn18">[18]</a> Chemerinsky, p. 1207<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn19" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref19" name="_ftn19">[19]</a> Chemerinsky, p. 1207<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn20" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref20" name="_ftn20">[20]</a> Elliot, p. 543<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn21" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref21" name="_ftn21">[21]</a> Chemerinsky, p. 1207-1208<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn22" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref22" name="_ftn22">[22]</a> Elliot, p. 575<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn23" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref23" name="_ftn23">[23]</a> Chemerinsky, p. 1207-1208<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn24" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref24" name="_ftn24">[24]</a> Chemerinsky, p.1208<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn25" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref25" name="_ftn25">[25]</a> Chemerinsky, p. 1208<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn26" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref26" name="_ftn26">[26]</a> Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner, eds., The Founders’ Constitution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987) Document 12.<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn27" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref27" name="_ftn27">[27]</a> Chemerinsky, p. 1208<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn28" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref28" name="_ftn28">[28]</a> Alexander Hamilton, "Federalist #81," in The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York: New American Library, 1961)<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn29" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref29" name="_ftn29">[29]</a> Hamilton, “Federalist No. 81”<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn30" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref30" name="_ftn30">[30]</a> Manning, John. “The Eleventh Amendment and the Precise Reading of Constitutional Texts,” Vol. 113 No. 8 (2004) p. 1674<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn31" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref31" name="_ftn31">[31]</a> Chemerinsky, p. 1208<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn32" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref32" name="_ftn32">[32]</a> Elliot, p. 533<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn33" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref33" name="_ftn33">[33]</a> Chemerinsky, p. 1208<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn34" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref34" name="_ftn34">[34]</a> Field, Martha. “The Eleventh Amendment and other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part 1,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review Vol. 126 No. 3 (1978) p. 527<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn35" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref35" name="_ftn35">[35]</a> Field, p. 528<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn36" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref36" name="_ftn36">[36]</a> Field, p. 528<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn37" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref37" name="_ftn37">[37]</a> Field, p. 529<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn38" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref38" name="_ftn38">[38]</a> Field, p. 529<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn39" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref39" name="_ftn39">[39]</a> Field, p. 529<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn40" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref40" name="_ftn40">[40]</a> Mathis, Doyle. “Chisholm v. Georgia: Background and Settlement,” The Journal of American History, Vol. 54 No. 1 (1967) p. 19<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn41" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref41" name="_ftn41">[41]</a> Mathis, p. 20<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn42" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref42" name="_ftn42">[42]</a> Mathis, p. 20<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn43" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref43" name="_ftn43">[43]</a> Mathis, p. 21<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn44" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref44" name="_ftn44">[44]</a> Mathis, p. 21<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn45" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref45" name="_ftn45">[45]</a> Mathis, p. 21<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn46" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref46" name="_ftn46">[46]</a> Mathis, p. 21<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn47" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref47" name="_ftn47">[47]</a> Mathis, p. 25<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn48" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref48" name="_ftn48">[48]</a> Mathis, p. 25<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn49" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref49" name="_ftn49">[49]</a> Manning, p. 1679<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn50" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref50" name="_ftn50">[50]</a> Manning, p. 1679<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn51" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref51" name="_ftn51">[51]</a> Mathis, p. 25<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn52" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref52" name="_ftn52">[52]</a> Mathis, p. 26<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn53" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref53" name="_ftn53">[53]</a> Mathis, p. 26<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn54" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref54" name="_ftn54">[54]</a> Mathis, p. 26<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn55" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref55" name="_ftn55">[55]</a> “The Constitution of the United States," Eleventh Amendment<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn56" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref56" name="_ftn56">[56]</a> Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 69-70 (1996)<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn57" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref57" name="_ftn57">[57]</a> Warren, Charles. “New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789.” Harvard Law Review Vol. 37 No.1 (1932) p. 62<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn58" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref58" name="_ftn58">[58]</a> Warren, p. 62<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn59" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref59" name="_ftn59">[59]</a> Roark, Mark L. Our Sovereign Body: Narrating the Fiction of Sovereign Immunity in the Supreme Court. Smith Gambrell & Russell (2006). p. 8<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn60" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref60" name="_ftn60">[60]</a> Roark, p. 8<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn61" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref61" name="_ftn61">[61]</a> Roark, p. 8<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn62" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref62" name="_ftn62">[62]</a> Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 53 (1821)<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn63" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref63" name="_ftn63">[63]</a> Cohens, 19 U.S. at 54<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn64" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref64" name="_ftn64">[64]</a> Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934)<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn65" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref65" name="_ftn65">[65]</a> Monaco, 292 U.S. at 322<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn66" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref66" name="_ftn66">[66]</a> Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, (1999) quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, supra, at 71, n. 15; accord, Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991)<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn67" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref67" name="_ftn67">[67]</a> Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 21 (1890)<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn68" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref68" name="_ftn68">[68]</a> Manning, p. 1681<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn69" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref69" name="_ftn69">[69]</a> Manning, p. 1681<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn70" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref70" name="_ftn70">[70]</a> Manning, p. 1681<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn71" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref71" name="_ftn71">[71]</a> Manning, p. 1681<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn72" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref72" name="_ftn72">[72]</a> Manning, p. 1681<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn73" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref73" name="_ftn73">[73]</a> Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 21 (1890)<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn74" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref74" name="_ftn74">[74]</a> Hans, 134 U.S. at 18<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn75" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref75" name="_ftn75">[75]</a> Manning, p. 1682<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn76" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref76" name="_ftn76">[76]</a> Manning, p. 1682<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn77" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref77" name="_ftn77">[77]</a> Manning, p. 1683<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn78" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref78" name="_ftn78">[78]</a> Manning, p. 1683<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn79" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref79" name="_ftn79">[79]</a> Hans, 134 U.S. at 16<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn80" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref80" name="_ftn80">[80]</a> Manning, p. 1683<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn81" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref81" name="_ftn81">[81]</a> Hans, 134 U.S. at 15<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn82" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref82" name="_ftn82">[82]</a> Manning, p. 1683<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn83" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref83" name="_ftn83">[83]</a> Manning, p. 1683<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn84" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref84" name="_ftn84">[84]</a> Manning, p. 1667<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn85" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref85" name="_ftn85">[85]</a> Hans, 134 U.S. at 15<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn86" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref86" name="_ftn86">[86]</a> Meltzer, Daniel. “The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity,” The Supreme Court Review Vol. 1996 (1996) p. 2<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn87" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref87" name="_ftn87">[87]</a> Meltzer, p. 2<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn88" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref88" name="_ftn88">[88]</a> 10 Pub L No 100-497, 102 Stat 2374 (1988), codified at 25 USC 2701(d)(7)(A) et seq.<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn89" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref89" name="_ftn89">[89]</a> Meltzer, p. 4<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn90" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref90" name="_ftn90">[90]</a> Meltzer, p. 5<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn91" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref91" name="_ftn91">[91]</a> Meltzer, p. 6<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn92" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref92" name="_ftn92">[92]</a> Meltzer, p. 20<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn93" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref93" name="_ftn93">[93]</a> Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 64 (1996)<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn94" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref94" name="_ftn94">[94]</a> Manning, p. 1687 (footnote 92)<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn95" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref95" name="_ftn95">[95]</a> Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 64 (1996)<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn96" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref96" name="_ftn96">[96]</a> Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 65<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn97" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref97" name="_ftn97">[97]</a> Hovenkamp, Herbert. “Judicial Restraint and Constitutional Federalism: The Supreme Court’s Lopez and Seminole Tribe Decisions,” Columbia Law Review Vol. 96 No. 8 (1996) p. 2243<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn98" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref98" name="_ftn98">[98]</a> Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1989)<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn99" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref99" name="_ftn99">[99]</a> Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 706, 764 (Souter, J. dissenting)<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn100" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref100" name="_ftn100">[100]</a> Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 741 (1999)<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn101" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref101" name="_ftn101">[101]</a> Weiman, Theodore J. “Jurisdiction Stripping, Constitutional Supremacy, and the Implications of Ex Parte Young,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review Vol. 153, No. 5 (2005) p. 1695<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn102" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref102" name="_ftn102">[102]</a> Ferrara, Donna. “Insurance Issues Surrounding Sovereign Immunity and Employment Practices Liability,” Public Entity Risk Institute (2005)<br /><br /><br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn103" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref103" name="_ftn103">[103]</a> Meltzer, p. 33<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn104" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref104" name="_ftn104">[104]</a> Meltzer, p. 38<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn105" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref105" name="_ftn105">[105]</a> Weiman, Theodore J. “Jurisdiction Stripping, Constitutional Supremacy, and the Implications of Ex Parte Young,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review Vol. 153, No. 5 (2005) p. 1696<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn106" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref106" name="_ftn106">[106]</a> Pennhurst State School & Hospital v Halderman, 465 U. S. 89, 105 (1984)<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn107" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref107" name="_ftn107">[107]</a> Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn108" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref108" name="_ftn108">[108]</a> Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 65<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn109" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref109" name="_ftn109">[109]</a> Weiman, p. 1695<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn110" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref110" name="_ftn110">[110]</a> Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976)<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn111" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref111" name="_ftn111">[111]</a> Alden, at 756 citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976)<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn112" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref112" name="_ftn112">[112]</a> Adrienne Koch and Harry Amon. “The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions: An Episode in Jefferson’s and Madison’s Defense of Civil Liberties,” The William and Mary Quaterly, Third Series, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1948) p. 157CaptainAmericahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09916748348077335095noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20022863.post-13477540890610914672007-03-23T01:54:00.000-07:002007-03-23T01:58:03.523-07:00Part 3 of "Learn Some History!" Series: Why Italy fought with Germany in World War IIThe advent of World War II brought upon the major European alliance of Italy and Germany. The Rome-Berlin Axis formally began in 1936 and lasted until the end of the war in 1945. Benito Mussolini, the fascist dictator in Italy, had aligned with Adolf Hitler in Nazi Germany. This partnership was established because of minor ideological similarities, the geographical conditions of Europe (i.e. the position of Italy and Germany), the complete deterioration of international relations between France/Britain and Italy which in turn led Hitler to exploit Italy’s seclusion by giving them military and economic aid, the military collaboration of Italy and Germany in the Spanish Civil War, and the similitude of the expansive territorial goals each nation desired. While indeed many of these reasons are the main cause of the alliance between the two countries, they were not the reason, or immediate cause for Italy to fight with Germany. The most important motivating factor for Italy to fight alongside of Germany was not any of the above reasons. In fact, it was not until Germany had defeated the French in 1940 that Mussolini had finally decided to enter battle in conjunction with the Germans. Had the Germans lost the campaign against the French, or even still waged a war of attrition with little end in sight, Mussolini would have possibly declared neutrality. Of course, the other reasons for Mussolini aligning with Hitler were also very prominent in the construction of their alliance, yet the French defeat actually brought Mussolini out of his ‘neutrality’ thoughts and in to the battlefield.<br /><br />Understanding the historical significance of Hitler’s adoration for Mussolini is a crucial premise to the ideological factors of alignment. One must understand however, that by natural causes, fascism and Nazism did not necessarily have to align with one another. The ideological factors simply achieve a deeper understanding between the two sides. Hitler had admired Mussolini ever since he had come to power in 1922. The revulsion of Soviet Bolshevism displayed by Hitler ideologically aligned him with Mussolini and his corporative state. On one occasion, Hitler remarked to his entourage about Mussolini defeating Bolshevism “not by military force but by superior intellect, and we have to thank him by showing for the first time…that even in this twentieth century is it possible to recall a people to a sense of purely national pride.”1 Hitler also compared his regime progress to that of Mussolini as he said, “When I read the history of Fascism I feel as if I’m reading the history of our movement.”2 Hitler remarked in the 1930s, after he had total control over Germany, “…the Duce and I were both working in the building-trade. This explains that there is also a deep bond between us on a purely human level. I have a deep friendship for this extraordinary man.” The alliance between the two countries indeed seemed more masked in the friendship between the two individuals. Evidence of this can be seen when Hitler told his generals in 1939, “If anything happened to [Mussolini], the loyalty of Italy to the alliance would be no longer secure.”3<br /><br />The only other key aspect of the alliance in terms of assessing the ideological factor of Hitler and Mussolini was the doctrine of denying democracy; exactly what the Western Powers had afforded their people by this time. Mussolini had thought the Peace Treaties at the end of World War I were unfair to Germany. Mussolini recognized that Germans had been coerced to swallow the ‘Immortal Principles’ of western democracy which was not in harmony with German mentality or tradition. Mussolini said, “Fascism denies, in democracy, the absur[d] conventional untruth of political equality dressed out in the garb of collective irresponsibility, and the myth of "happiness" and indefinite progress.”4 Here we see evidence that indeed Mussolini was not a proponent of democracy. The dissatisfaction with the Peace Treaties also led Italy to sympathize with German opposition. Mussolini stated in 1931, “And how then can we not talk of European reconstruction if certain clauses of the Peace Treaties, which have driven whole peoples to the edge of the abyss and of moral despair, are not modified?”5 <br /><br />Also, Hitler had visualized an alliance between Italy and Germany in 1920 as he declared, “Our basic demand is: Off with the [Versailles] Peace Treaty! To this end we must use everything we can. Especially the differences between France and Italy, in order to win Italy over to our side.” 6<br /><br />Most of Hitler’s interpretation at the time was not that Italy was so perfect to align with Germany, but that France and Italy were in fact so opposite that Mussolini may have no other choice but to side with Germany. And in 1933, when Hitler came to power, ideology remained a backburner for this alliance. In fact, the ideological framework between the two countries did not make them born alliances. As much as Hitler made endearing remarks about Mussolini, there was a clear disconnect between the two leaders. As many perceptive observers noted at the time, the two men essentially lacked a real understanding and comprehension of one another.7 The only reality that lay within their personal bond was the fact that they both were supreme rulers of their respective countries.8 Also, there was a vast difference between the government of Hitler’s National Socialism and Mussolini’s fascistic government.9 When Hitler finally came to power, it proved very difficult for both men to initiate diplomatic relations since both were rampant nationalists, both with imperialistic ambitions.10 One of the most interesting ideological differences between the two leaders was their belief in the “Aryan” race. In 1934, Mussolini emphasized that German ‘Aryanism’ had many flaws and that their anti-Semitic policy was in fact a dangerous mistake that “played into the hands of international Jewry” which harmed Germany’s international reputation.11<br /><br />Even though it is important to get an understanding of the two dictators countries and rule being more similar to that of the Allied Powers, it would be a massive error to assume that these two powers aligned because of their ideological similarities. The ideological parallels played only a minor role, if any, in developing unity between the nation-states from the early inception of Mussolini and Hitler’s rise to power; it was not until France was defeated did Mussolini actually deploy troops to hopefully take an active part on the winning side of the war. <br /><br />The geographical composition of these two states also played a small part in the determination of this ‘Axis.’ Italy has the unfortunate location of having no free access to an ocean. The country is positioned by an inland sea which is only connected through the Suez Canal and Straits of Gibraltar, both of which were dominated by the British.12 Mussolini’s Italy was captive to the Mediterranean, and Corisca, Tunisia, Malta, and Cyprus were the “bars of the prison.”13 Mussolini remarked that the purpose of Italian foreign policy “has not and never can have as objectives continental European territory except Albania, is in the first place to break the prison bars.”14 Mussolini further posited that after they had broken these pillars, Italy would ‘march to the ocean.’ Yet Mussolini knew he needed an ally before he commenced such an operation. “To brave the solution of such a problem without having our backs secured on the Continent would be absurd.”15 The ‘security’ which Mussolini ultimately depended upon was that of Nazi Germany, but only after they had destroyed France.<br /><br />Mussolini wanted to secure an alliance with a strong land power so it could pursue and maintain its colonial conquests in the Mediterranean Sea and Northern Africa. The deep feel for Hitler to acquire Italian friendship was also prevalent in Mein Kampf as Hitler denounced the reclamation of South Tyrol to Germany. South Tyrol was a German-speaking province Italy had taken after World War I. Hitler stated, “All this fuss today is not made for love of the South Tyrol, which it does not help but only harms, but for fear of a possible German-Italian understanding.”16 The strategic placement of Italy and Germany within Europe was convenient in that Italy and Germany were not after the same territories for expansion. In fact, Hitler even acknowledged that Italy or Britain would be the ideal partnerships since Germany could focus on continental Europe, Britain would focus on its overseas imperial dominance, and Italy would stake claim in the Mediterranean. Hitler wrote, “In the predictable future there can be only two allies for Germany in Europe: England and Italy.”17<br /><br />Yet again, the geographical location of the two countries played only a negligible role in the development of Italy actually going to war alongside of Germany. In fact, it was there very geographical positions in Europe which almost caused them to go to war with each other. One notable historical event between the two countries dealt with the independence of Austria. Austria was located smack in the middle between Italy to its south and Germany to its north. The Austrian government, in 1933, began to model itself off of Italian fascism when Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss essentially dissolved the republic that had existed prior.18 Mussolini was very concerned about the independent Austria falling under the auspices of Nazi Germany at this time. In fact, Dollfuss began executing many Austrian Nazis for the sake of resisting German control.19 It was indeed in the interest of Italy to have Austria maintain their independence so that the country could serve as a buffer state between them and Germany.20 <br /><br />The first meeting between Hitler and Mussolini occurred on June 14th 1934 in Venice. Essentially it was a failure as Hitler demanded a new chancellor and new government in Austria and Mussolini demanded that the Nazi’s stop the terrorist methods of trying to overthrow Chancellor Dollfuss.21 Tensions were rising between the two powers after they met. Roughly one month later, Chancellor Dollfuss was assassinated by Nazi’s, and a coup tried to take over the government. Mussolini was outraged and subsequently sent Italian troops to Austria, the Brenner Pass, in a threatening anti-German gesture.22 After sending the troops to Austria Mussolini remarked, “We have defended and will defend the independence of the Austrian Republic.”23 Germany eventually backed down from this, and the relations became better with both countries after Germany was the only country that did not apply sanctions to Italy after they decided to invade Ethiopia.24 Thus, although Germany later did not share territorial ambitions to that of what Italy may have wanted, they still nonetheless almost warred against each other because of their very location in Europe. Geography could have well turned these two powers against each other which is the very reason why it was not the primary factor in their alliance.<br /><br />The relationship between France and Italy also, to a much larger degree then the previous two reasons, played a role in the development of a Rome-Berlin Axis. The relationship between the two countries was somewhat of a pendulum, where sometimes Italy was outspoken against France, and often they were in accordance with the French government. One of the crucial issues between the two countries rise to bitterness was that of Tunisia. In 1883, many thousands of Italians had migrated from Sicily to Tunisia. In 1896 a Franco-Italian agreement was signed which permitted the Italians to keep their own nationality, build their own schools and were afforded other privileges.25 However, after WWI in 1918 France decided to revoke this agreement and began treating the Italians poorly while passing regulations on their rights and requiring them to attain French citizenship.26 The discussions about Tunisia represented bitterness between the two powers as many Frenchmen began to think that this territory was on scope for Italy to acquire in their imperialist ambitions.27 Here is evidence that suggests the two countries had difficulty in diplomacy even since the closure of WWI. <br /><br />In the late 1920s, Italy was on shaky ground with its supposed allies of France. On September 17th, 1927 Count Carlo Nardini, Italian Consul in Paris, was murdered by an Italian Anarchist named Modugno. The court in Paris then sentenced Modugno to only 2 years in prison with a fine of 200 francs.28 This angered the Italian people as Mussolini stated in the Cabinet Council after the incident: “The whole nation has in the last few days been seriously outraged by the verdict of the Paris jury…The government understands the indignant emotion of the Italian people.”29 The relations between countries got better after the French began arresting anti-fascists that were going to kill Italian officials.30 Franco-Italian naval relations were tensing up as well. On March 1, 1931 an agreement was drafted by the British and Italians which maintained Italy’s right to parity in terms of naval rearmaments. France rejected the proposal and insisted that Italy agree to never build up a fleet which is the equivalent of France. The disarmament discussions between the countries dragged on without any definite conclusions.31 This is all not mentioning the fact that British and Italian aims were relatively similar thus producing conflict as well. For example, the Fascist objective of an Italian Mediterranean indeed contrasted sharply to British influence and interests in the region.32<br /><br />Yet while there was much disagreement between France and Italy, there was still an attempt on both governments to call for peace in Europe. One example of this would be the Briand-Kellogg Pact which called for providing for the “renunciation of <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War" target="_blank">war</a> as an instrument of national policy.”33 This pact was signed by France, US, Great Britain and Italy in 1928- to which later Russia adhered to this pact. After this pact was signed Mussolini gave a speech on December 9, 1928 saysing, “ We are all for peace. We have signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact.”34 Mussolini even addressed the American people on Janurary 1st of 1931 stating that “Neither I nor my government, nor the Italian people wish to prepare for war. I have fought in a war as a private soldier, I know what war means.”35 The French government led by Daladier also stated in 1933 that they wished to regain better Italo-Franco relations and requested just an agreement between those two countries.36 The Italians also tried to issue peace through a new pact entitled the Four Powers Pact. This was drafted by Mussolini in 1933 and was signed by, although a more diluted version than the original, France, Britain and Germany.37 Essentially the Four Powers Pact said the following: “a policy of effective co-operation between all powers with a view to the maintenance of peace.”38 This is evidence that Italy and France were not born and hated enemies, but in fact engaged in realist determinations of alliances and sought possible genuine peace in Europe. This all changed when Italy invaded Ethiopia.<br /><br />As stated, the tip of the iceberg was Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia, which was condemned by the League of Nations.39 Mussolini knew that he had to gain British and French acquiescence before he went and invaded Ethiopia. In fact, Mussolini was rather upset that Italy was condemned to be a second-rate power unless they acquired some colonial powers. Ethiopia was one of the few African territories that had not already been snatched up by other European powers, and since it proved to be rich in raw materials it proved to be a good agricultural industry for Italy.40 The international depression at this time was causing a stagnate Italian economy and colonial acquisitions seemed to be a quick fix in alleviating some of the economic pressures put upon the Italian economy. So by fall of 1933, the diplomatic relations in the Four Powers Pact had fizzled out and Mussolini was becoming restless with nonsensical talk of diplomacy.41 Finally on December 30th, 1934 Mussolini ordered an Italian invasion of Ethiopia.42 Mussolini attempted to downplay there invasion to Britain and France by sparking up heightened fears of a German rearmament and the taking of Austria.43 <br /><br />France and Britain were extremely upset about Italian action in Ethiopia and the League of Nations quickly acted against Italian aggression. They imposed the following sanctions on Italy: an embargo on arms and munitions, a ban on loan and credit, and a prohibition on the export of materials necessary for Italy’s ability to wage war.44 The crumbling of international alternatives for Italy paved the way for its acceptance into the German framework of being an ally. While Mussolini was now economically isolated from Europe, Hitler came along and supplied Italy with arms and materials. German goods were sent to Italy despite the Treaties sanctions.45 This proved to be an instrumental factor in a relationship between the two countries that did indeed last until 1945. However, as previously stated, just because Italy had justification to side with Germany did not ultimately mean they would fight alongside each other. The conquest did catapult the Rome-Berlin Axis in October of 1936 and also the cooperation of military support for Spain from both Italy and Germany. After the war however, Britain still tried not to alienate Italy from the Western powers, so that Mussolini would stay away from an alliance with Hitler. Britain actually lifted the sanctions which applied to Italy during the Ethiopian War by ending the Mediterranean Sea alerts and by withdrawing their warships to home-waters.46 This is important because it signifies that by the end of the Ethiopian War, Italy could have still sided with the Western powers of Europe as opposed to Germany.<br /><br />The advent of the Spanish Civil War in 1936 also fused these two regimes in a militaristic way. The Nationalists and the Republicans in Spain were battling a civil war which would ultimately determine the fate of their country and the allegiance to certain powers in Europe. The ‘caudillo’ of the Nationalists, Francisco Franco, asked Hitler and Mussolini for help in his struggle.47 Hitler and Mussolini subsequently aided Franco in his war against the Republicans and they solidified some military coordination in the meantime. With this war, Hitler successfully created a partnership with Mussolini when he sent troops to fight what he called "Bolshevism" in Spain alongside the Italians. Hans Frank, Hitler’s personal envoy, arrived in Rome in September to discuss the Spanish conflict with Mussolini. Frank assured Mussolini that the only reason Hitler was intervening militarily in Spain was not because of territorial or imperialist aims but because of respect for Mussolin. The Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Galeazzo Ciano stated about the meeting “the Fuehrer is anxious that we [Mussolini and Ciano] should know that he regards the Mediterranean as a purely Italian sea. Italy has a right to positions of privilege and control in the Mediterranean. The interests of the Germans are turned towards the Baltic which is their Mediterranean."48 The Italian government sent their air force along with 10,000 Germans who were airmen and gunners.49 Mussolini and Hitler’s actions in Spain were against international law at the time, especially against the wishes of the Non-Intervention Committee which was speaking out against action in Spain.50<br /><br />In the meantime, France was supplying the Republicans with arms. Guns, tanks, and planes arrived in Spain to combat the anti-Republican forces. Hitler convinced Mussolini to increase aid in Spain, and by the end of the war Mussolini had ordered roughly 72,000 Italian troops in Spain in conjunction with many German troops as well.51 Mussolini around the end of 1936 was beginning to see Germany as a formidable ally in international relations. He stated, in a conversation with one of Hitler’s aides, “Between Italy and Germany there is a common fate. This is becoming stronger and stronger. That it cannot be denied. Italy and Germany are congruent cases.” Here we see the alliance beginning to solidify, although again, Mussolini still had reservations with this alliance as he also was wanting to keep it a secret from the rest of Europe. He also said, “We cannot openly show France and England our position towards Germany. Not yet!”52 Interpreting this, Mussolini may not have wanted to induce France and England into thinking that he wanted to align with Germany for the simple reason that he was still open to diplomatic relations, at least to a small degree, with those two countries.<br /><br />The question of Austria still lingered during 1938. Hitler was exerting his expansionist policies towards the Austrian government, and even knowing that he could have taken Austria over without fear of Italian retaliation, Hitler wanted to remain on good terms with Mussolini so he subsequently asked for his approval. Mussolini approved the Anschluss as soon as he received it.53 Mussolini had no choice in the matter since most of his troops were in Spain at the time, much to the manipulation of Hitler’s aims. So it went that Hitler marched into Austria unopposed and annexed the country to its sovereignty of Germany.54 <br /><br />Yet, in 1939, in the midst of a solidifying alliance between the Axis powers of Spain, Italy, and Germany, Hitler decided to march into Prague, without forewarning Mussolini of his actions. The Italian government was infuriated by Hitler for not giving them an alert that this would be occurring.55 Ciano, speaking about the invasion of Prague remarked in his journal, “What weight can be given in the future to those declarations and promises which concern us more directly? It is useless to deny that all this worries and humiliates the Italian people.”56 Tensions between the two powers arose, and Mussolini then decided to counteract this move and invaded Albania, giving Hitler only one day warning.57 Also, after Hitler took Prague, Mussolini thought the German army would march and invade a weakened Yugoslavia. Thus, prior to Mussolini’s attack on Albania, he ordered the abandoned of the attack in preparation for Hitler’s attack against Yugoslavia.58 However, Germany assured Italy that the Balkans and the Mediterranean were clearly in their sphere of influence and that they had no intentions of disregarding this aspect of the pact.59<br /><br />During the Spanish intervention, only Germany remained as a potential ally for Italy after the war subsided. Hitler and achieved a somewhat necessary ally in Italy. By convincing Mussolini to intervene in the Spanish conflict, Hitler pulled Italy closer to Germany by exploiting Italy’s increasing economic dependence on Germany, as well as Italy’s seclusion from the Western European powers. In Germany’s and Italy’s pursuit of distinguishable spheres of influence, (i.e. German interest in Austria and Central Europe and Italian interest in Ethiopia and Spain) the context for cooperation was enhanced. The ‘Axis’ was thus secure in large part as an effect of the isolation of Italy from the West, and their separate ambitious territorial goals by each ruler.60 But again, this does not mandate that Italy would wage war for German support. Territorial expansion was also a very principal factor in the alliance of these nations. The insatiable desire for more territory by both leaders put led them into the same line of thinking. Although it has been implicit in the arguments prior, territorial expansion was the convenient scheme that unified Italy and Germany in terms of the motivations for attacking other countries and regions.<br /><br />The proposal of this paper rests upon the main assumption that all of the above reasons played a minor to major role in establishing the framework for which Italy and Germany came to align upon. However, the primary factor which pitted the two into war against Western democracies was in fact the fatal blow delivered by Germany to the French army. In 1940, Germany invaded France and desecrated their army within less than two months. Prior to the onset of the war in 1940 however, Mussolini wrote to Hitler, “The two European powers need a period of peace lasting not less than 3 years. It is from 1943 onwards that a war effort will have the greatest prospects of victory. Fascists Italy, although convinced that it is inevitable, has no desire to participate in a European War.”61 This is telling, because it signifies that Italy was not prepared to go to war when Germany invaded France. Also, Hitler had no intention of preparing for a major war, and at no time after 1940 did Hitler show any interest in cooperation with the Italian military in the event of a major war.62 The only thought Hitler ever really gave to Italy was that it would serve as a neutralizer to Western European powers in terms of intervention from the Mediterranean or North Africa. <br /><br />The actual outbreak of the war was completely uncoordinated between Italy and Germany. In fact, Hitler was so unconcerned with German-Italian relations by the end of 1939 that he signed a Nazi-Soviet Pact.63 The first invasion of the German army into Poland was not even laid out before hand with Mussolini and no consultation had been sought on account from Hitler. Mussolini thus declared Italy a “non-belligerency” and remained reluctantly neutral at the outbreak of the war.64 From the early onset of the war, all previous alliances between the Axis were really not solid and the real truth was that the Rome-Berlin Axis was more of a superficiality than an unyielding document with each state pursuing their own interests and their own protection of national security. The original timetable for Italian entrance into the war was 1942 or 1943, but it was all rendered useless after the German army had extremely successful campaigns in Norway and France, and the whole strategic situation had changed for Italy.65 A letter from an old guard member of the Italian Army, Farinacci wrote a letter to Mussolini stating what most of the individuals in the Italian government had believed. He said, “Naturally all those socialistoids, democratoids, and creotoids, are all beginning to say that if we intervene we should intervene on the side of France against Germany. This would be a grave misfortune for Italy since nobody would take us serious anymore and we would lose that prestige which you have secured for us in so many years of struggle.”66<br /><br />The reasons for Italy aligning with Germany were all there, but the motivation and result of the intervention of Italian troops was only because of the result of French defeat. Even when Hitler received word that Italy was joining the war alongside of them, he had no enthusiasm towards the news.67 Even when Mussolini got involved in the war, he wasn’t involved because of the great vision or outlook Hitler had for Europe after the war, yet rather only because he thought the German armies were invincible and he wanted to maintain and establish territorial conquests in Greece and Egypt after the war.68 Evidence of the lack of solidarity and agreement within the Axis powers was evident when Mussolini decided to not help support German troops against the British, but instead waged a “parallel war” to protect his own interests in Greece.69 Mussolini stated to Ciano, “Hitler always faces me with a fait accompli. This time I am going to pay him back in his own coin. He will find out from the papers that I have occupied Greece. In this way the equilibrium will be reestablished.”70 Hitler was outraged that Mussolini would do this, yet he dare not speak out against Mussolini because it would indicate weakness in the Axis power alliance. Mussolini and Italy essentially waged a war for their personal interests, riding on a German wave of domination that only held up so long. Had France not been defeated so quickly, Mussolini may have declared neutrality and ended up fighting alongside the Allied Powers for fear of losing international reputation and imperial ambitions after the war was over. Whatever the winning side was indicating, that was what it seemed most likely for Mussolini to join.<br /><br />Thus, in conclusion, factors regarding the alliance indeed weighed heavily upon the set of circumstances prior to the war. The history of ideological similarities, although not binding or perfect, at least opened up a dialogue of what two leaders ‘should’ be acting in accordance since they both looked upon the other as a resemblance of themselves (at least in Hitler’s case). The geographical location of the Italy and how the territorial conquests were in fact not what Germany wanted also played a large development in having Hitler not be belligerent towards Mussolini. The breakdown of relations and the isolation of Mussolini at the end of the 1930s almost made no choice for Italy but to form an alliance with Hitler. The Spanish Civil War which, ultimately led to European powers ostracizing Germany and Italy, aligning them closer together because of the lack of alternatives. Yet, while all of these have weight in determining the alliance, there is no question that the neutrality declared at the onset of the war, and the lack of coordination between the two powers, proved to all that the Axis powers were not bound militarily together. Mussolini was not consulted before Hitler’s attacks, and his army was clearly not ready to attack when they began the war as Hitler disregarded Mussolini’s requests for a war of attrition. The fall of France so quickly pushed Mussolini into the war, and the actions taken by Mussolini afterward, how he fought his own war of imperial aims, signifies that there was no ‘true’ alliance with Hitler, it was merely a way to get on the winning team and seek positive terms of agreement after the war was over. Mussolini fought alongside Hitler because of the effectiveness of blitzkrieg and the total collapse of the French army.CaptainAmericahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09916748348077335095noreply@blogger.com6tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20022863.post-14859188350661332502007-03-10T01:59:00.000-08:002007-03-10T02:04:07.513-08:00The Rise of American Conservatism: A Brief HistoryThe 1964 presidential election between Barry Goldwater and Lyndon Johnson put a new conservative philosophy in the limelight of public discourse. The Republican candidate Goldwater was running on a revolutionary ‘new’ conservative platform that sought to rollback many of the ongoing liberal policies of the last thirty years in government. At the time of the 1964 election, Goldwater’s views were seen by many as rather extreme and he was handed a crushing loss to Johnson in ‘64. However, Goldwater proved to be the pioneer that led the charge for a new conservative shift in the American populace which reached its zenith with election of Ronald Reagan in 1980.<br /><br />The principles of conservatism were articulated brilliantly in Goldwater’s essay entitled The Conscience of a Conservative. He argued that conservatism is based upon the principle that freedom is the ultimate maxim of human existence. Personal responsibility for one’s actions and the protection of individual freedom are the essential components of conservatism. Conservatism also argues that government should be as limited as possible, intervening only to keep maintenance and order of the society. Goldwater also believed that conservatives are not only economic beings but also spiritual beings. These beliefs laid the foundation for conservatism to gain its prominence by the late 1970s.<br /><br />The evolution of conservatism from this era allowed for presidential candidate Ronald Reagan to win the presidency in 1980 against incumbent Jimmy Carter. By the 1980s, conservatism was seen as more mainstream, as opposed to the radical nature of the philosophy in the 1960s. The principles of conservatism for Reagan rest in the calls for new economic policies which combated the Great Society of the 1960s. Reagan advocated a smaller federal government, de-regulation in the business sector, lower taxes, and a strong national defense against communism. For Reagan, Carter’s policies favored too much governmental control which he believed was the cause of the economic crisis in America at that time. Reagan proclaims, “We don’t need Carter’s eight-or 10-point programs to “fix” or fine tune the economy.”<br /><br />One of the new methods of conservative activism in 1980 was direct mail. One conservative activist stated in 1980, “Without the mail, most conservative activity would wither and die.” Direct mail enabled mobilization and allowed for funding, volunteering, and petitions to surface at the local levels. As Richard Viguerie stated, “Without direct mail, we might have no National Review, no Human Events, no Conservative Digest, no Conservative PACs…” Conservatism was essentially born from the usage of this mechanism which promulgated conservative information and support that allowed for the movement to sustain itself.<br /><br />Another facet of conservatism in the late 1970s early 1980s was the creation of single issue groups on a national level. After Roe v. Wade legalized abortion, many religious advocates came forth and began speaking out for the ‘right to life’ of an unborn child. Groups like the Right to Life, the National Rifles Association, and the Right to Work Movements all sprung up and mobilized conservatives to vote and elect candidates who adhered to their positions. The religious “awakening” that occurred within some movements of conservatism was mostly a reaction of the Roe v. Wade Supreme Court decision. One of the major religious opponents of this decision was Reverend Jerry Falwell. Falwell rallied fellow Christians to speak out against abortion as he stated about an abortion, “It didn’t matter if her human parents wanted her to live or die. God wanted her to live.” Goldwater’s libertarian ideas somewhat conflicted with that of the religious right and the issue of abortion. Many of these libertarian paleo-conservatives felt that abortion was a matter of personal choice.<br /><br />The New Right was breaking on the scene in the mid 1970s and it was a seemingly conscious reaction of the politics of the liberal 1960s. With the massive division within the Democratic Party in 1968, the Republicans were able to seize control of the White House with Richard Nixon, who had run on similar policies that Goldwater had advocated. Conservative think tanks began sprouting up as the battle for ideas became an all out war in the public discourse. Organizations like the Heritage Foundation, Young Americans for Freedom, the Leadership Institute all led the New Right movement with policy positions that influenced US domestic and foreign policy for the next decade.<br /><br />With the advent of this new conservative movement, tensions within the movement itself were very prevalent. For example, the traditionalists and supply-siders within the conservative movement were at odds at each others over the correct role of governmental economic policy. The supply-siders favored permanent tax cuts with a rising deficit while the traditionalists favored some tax increases to alleviate the burden of the rising deficit.The conservative movement solidified a break from New Deal/Great Society politics of liberalism and big government, to a more strict limited government.<br /><br />The conservative philosophy was brought to the center stage with Goldwater’s campaign in 1964 and it was finally achieved and realized with Reagan ascending to the presidency in 1980 (although some would argue Nixon followed Goldwater’s ideals as well). The conservatism of the 60s, 70s, and 80s was indeed a reactionary phenomenon from the liberal politics of the day; yet, it made its way to organization and structure with the coming of direct mail and single issue groups.CaptainAmericahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09916748348077335095noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20022863.post-1170847953449839182007-02-07T03:31:00.000-08:002007-02-07T03:32:33.453-08:00The DePaul Conservative Resistance: A Call for ChangeOver two weeks ago, conservative author David Horowitz came to DePaul to speak about the blatant disregard professors have in indoctrinating their students to subscribe to their political agenda. He came under the auspices of the DePaul Conservative Alliance (DCA), and as Vice-President of this organization, I can tell you that Horowitz was not just invited to stir things up at DePaul. Contrary to popular belief, the endgame for the DCA is not drumming up controversy by inviting speakers or hosting bake sales. Rather, we are calling for action to reform this educational institution into a bastion of high intellectual standards while tolerating and informing students of the many conservative ideologies that exist in the world. <br /><br />This call for change will often seem as though we are devoted to conflict and quarrel, but rest assured, the goals of our operation and existence are not to, in the words of Frederick Douglass, “agitate, agitate, agitate.” Our movement is in essence a reaction to the prevailing tenets and structures in place at DePaul. Like Newton’s Third Law of motion, for every action there is an equal an opposite reaction; only in this case, we hope to go beyond an ‘equal’ reaction. In any event, we are seeking change. The path to reform is never easy, and the DCA fully recognizes this fact. Our progress so far, at least in the last two and a half years, has made considerable headway.<br /><br />Two and a half years ago there was no DCA. Two and a half years ago the College Republicans were a group of about five people that maybe met once a month to discuss how Clinton should have been impeached and that the ‘weapons of mass destruction’ are still in Syria somewhere. Two and a half years ago, there was no conservative literature or newspaper distributed around campus. Two and a half years ago, conservatism was all but dead at DePaul.<br /><br />But then, the fraudulent Ward Churchill was invited by the Cultural Center to speak at DePaul on his ‘little Eichman’ college campus tour, and the closet-conservatives at DePaul had finally had enough. Students mobilized and came out in droves to protest the man who said, “Innocent? Gimme a break.” in reference to the Americans who perished on 9/11. After Student Life banned us from protesting the event with posters, then College Republican President Joseph Blewitt found himself on ‘Hannity and Colmes’ discussing DePaul’s ridiculous “anti-propaganda” policy. The name ‘Ward Churchill’ quickly became the conservative rallying cry and catalyst for our movement.<br /><br />To be fair, the conservative movement had started much sooner than the beginning of 2005. In terms of planning and preparation, some of the conservative students at DePaul, including myself, were mobilizing at the end of 2004 in hopes of creating a conservative newspaper at DePaul. After several months of hard work, our mission was successful and in November of 2005 the Lincoln Park Statesman was born.<br /><br />The affirmative action bake sale is what put the DCA on the map. As a satirical attempt to protest the policy of affirmative action, the bake sale proved to open up discussion about the once taboo topic, and it also served as a recruiting tool for many conservatives to join our cause. Many called the bake sale ‘racist’ (the ‘McCarthyism’ of today) and in the face of adversity from the administration, the DCA fired back by gaining the media’s attention and threatening legal action with the help of the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE). <br /><br />Since its inception, the DCA has increased membership from roughly four to twenty-five active members. The College Republicans are now a legitimate organization at DePaul who are also seeking to make a difference on campus. After hearing Horowitz speak, the conservative movement is remided of why we need to subsist and why we must fight the academic status quo. The indoctrination from Lefist professors still permeates the college classroom. As Horowitz pointed out, a college student will go four years in the LA&S dept without ever reading Friedrich Hayek, a conservative and Nobel Prize winner. <br /><br />The ideological struggle is a difficult one indeed, but success is never achieved unless this struggle exists. The administration has somewhat accomodated our presence on campus, but more needs to be done in the classrooms. The conservative movement continues to grow at DePaul and we are still calling for change.CaptainAmericahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09916748348077335095noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20022863.post-1170847813739241532007-02-07T03:27:00.000-08:002007-02-07T03:30:13.753-08:00Abolish the minimum wageIt’s official. Nancy Pelosi and her Democratic cohorts have begun 2007 with a disastrous piece of legislation. The House passed a bill which will increase the minimum wage from the current $5.15 to $7.25 over the next two years. The vote in the House was 315-116, a testament that the 82 Republicans who voted for the bill would know the wrath of their constituents had they voted against it. Not only is raising the minimum wage detrimental to the calculus of the American spirit and founding, but simply having one to begin with is what I find most upsetting.<br /><br />An increase in the minimum wage is popular with the political masses; just ask the Democrats. This popularity is founded in the actual purpose of raising the minimum wage, not in its realization or practical outcome. Personally, I don’t want any American citizen to not have enough money to support a family, to not afford health care, or to not be able to pay their bills. There is a sense of altruism behind the policy of hiking the minimum wage, and just having one in the books is at least “good” in theory. Yet the theory is irrelevant if the pragmatic implementation of the policy has more negative than positive effects.<br /><br />Many supporters are in favor of the increase because they want low-income workers to make more money. Yet the statistics tell a different story altogether. The people earning minimum wage, as of 2005, represent only 2.5% of the hourly paid workforce in America. Of these 2.5%, about half of these people are under the age of 25, and a quarter of these workers are ages 16-19. In fact, the average household income for the teenage minimum wage workers is roughly $64,000 per year-well above the poverty level. This means that increasing the minimum wage would force employers to pay teenagers, most of whom are still in school and don’t really “need” the money to live off of, more money an hour. The principle of altruism has lost much of its steam once realizing these statistics.<br /><br />The negative aspect is not that kids shouldn’t be making more money or that they essentially should never receive money if they work for it. Rather, an increase in minimum wage either significantly increases unemployment, or increases the cost for the consumers. <br /><br />For example, pretend for a moment that you own a restaurant. Let’s say you need ten people to effectively run this small restaurant and you decide to pay them each $6.00 an hour. Yet, the federal government decides to get involved in the marketplace and subsequently raises the minimum wage to $7.25 an hour. As a business owner, you can do one of three things:<br /><br />A) You could keep all ten on staff and take a profit-cut for yourself, since the returns will be less now that you are paying your employers a significant amount more. (No capitalist or business owner takes this option, trust me)<br /><br />B) You could keep all ten on staff and increase the prices for the consumers to retain the same profits you were making when you paid your employers $6.00 an hour.<br /><br />C) You could fire 2 of your employees and still maintain the same profits as before.<br /> What do B and C, the only two practical outcomes, have in common? They are both negative effects on the economy. One option increases unemployment, the other option increases prices for the consumers. Minimum wage has this disastrous effect on the economy.<br /><br />Yet raising minimum wage is not the ideological culprit for libertarian minded thinkers. The culprit is the minimum wage itself. The market should be able to dictate the wages of the individual workers. Why does the government have a right to tell me how much I have to pay a certain worker for doing a certain job? The answer is that they should not be given that power. Minimum wage is a fanciful bi-product of government coming to the rescue in the marketplace, when the majority of problems can be solved by letting the marketplace rescue itself.<br /><br />If Wal-Mart were to open up a store and pay employees $2.00 an hour, what would happen? Nobody would apply and the business would collapse. Kmart would then take over the market by offering their employees much more for an hourly wage. Wal-Mart in return, understanding the market, would begin a competitive bidding process for labor if they wanted to keep their business intact. Since labor is a commodity, the competitive marketplace will position people into jobs that pay good, or else the worker can get up and become employed elsewhere. That is and should be the beauty of a free society.<br /><br />In the end, raising the minimum wage does nothing to help low-income workers and only brings unemployment and higher consumer prices. Even the supporters of minimum wage acknowledge that too large of an increase in the minimum wage will be harmful, otherwise why not raise the minimum wage to $15 or say $20 an hour? <br /><br />An abolishment of the minimum wage is necessary to reduce the role of government and to allow the market and business owners maximum freedom in investing their own money.CaptainAmericahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09916748348077335095noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20022863.post-1164047518745916312006-11-20T10:27:00.000-08:002006-11-20T10:31:58.773-08:00On the Role of Courts in Foreign AffairsThroughout American history, disputes between the executive and legislative branch, in regard to foreign affairs, have often been arbitrated by the federal court system. The established role of the courts in foreign affairs has been rather transient, where the majority opinion has often been determined by the prevailing ideology of that particular court. It is without question that the function of the courts is to determine the validity of the foreign action taking place by either the President or the Congress. The Framers did not textually outline the appropriate role of the courts in foreign affairs within the Constitution; the sole reason was because they were more focused on the proper relationship between the federal government and the state governments with respect to the individual. <br /><br />The Constitution does not apportion all foreign policy power into only the executive or only the legislative. Furthermore, there is no constraint on the role of courts within the Constitution. When the courts are called upon to adjudicate America’s constitutional role abroad, there is no established precedent in our founding document as to how the courts should react to these controversies. Hence, the role of the courts in foreign relations must be permitted to deviate from any and all precedent and they should be considered on a case by case basis. It seems that more often than not, judicial deference should have been ruled by court system. For when Congress and the President are in collaboration with the policy that is being pursued, it seems as though the role of the court should only be minimal. Judicial deference is pertinent to the American polity because it sustains the natural balance in the Constitution that the President and Congress are the sole proprietors of foreign relations. Yet, the one instance where judicial deference may never be applicable is when fundamental liberties of citizens are at stake.<br /><br />It is interesting to note that while the Framers may have wanted to create a system of governance intended to limit the role of the President’s authority, the courts have for the most part, decidedly acted in the President’s favor in foreign decision-making. Perhaps the Founding Fathers had intended for this when they scrapped the Articles of Confederation and instead adopted a Constitution which gave the executive branch a stronger role. The Constitution details the President’s clout as having “executive Power” and that “he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” <br /><br />The Prize Cases, decided in 1862, illustrates how the President first began to accumulate power in foreign affairs in the eyes of the Supreme Court. In April of 1861, President Lincoln ordered a blockade on the southern ports of states that had seceded, even though Congress had not yet issued a formal declaration of war. Four ships were then seized before July 13th, the day Congress formally recognized a state of war. The owners of the ships sued for redress claiming that in the absence of war, the President had no authority to issue a blockade. Justice Grier wrote for the majority opinion, “Whether the President in fulfilling his duties, as Commander-in-chief, in suppressing an insurrection…will compel him to accord them the character of belligerents, is a question to be decided by him.” <br /><br />The courts simply decided that the President ultimately has the final authority when it comes to the security of our nation. Even when Congress has not formally recognized the state of war between enemy belligerents, the Grier ruled that “The President was bound to meet it in the shape it presented itself, without waiting for Congress to baptize it with a name.” Here is evidence that the early decisions regarding the courts role in foreign affairs is one which abdicates most of the authority into the hands of the executive branch. In my estimation, the verdict was appropriate because Congress had authorized the President the authority to suppress insurrection in 1795 and in 1807. However, I would also go so far to say that the court had no jurisdiction in hearing this case. The ships seized were found with an enemy and belligerent insurrection of the state. The court should have issued judicial deference in this case and established a precedent that challenging the validity of a proclamation from a belligerency that attacked gives to much credence to those who have attacked. The dearth of a declaration of war from Congress was not relevant in this case because the President had an Act of Congress which allowed him jurisdiction in seizing the ships. <br /><br />In U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. (1936), the Supreme Court again ruled not only in the President’s favor, but also in the Congress’s as well. The defendants of the case, Curtiss-Wright Export Corp, sold arms to the Bolivian government after Congress passed a Joint Resolution which stated “it shall be unlawful to sell any arms or munitions of war to the countries now engaged in that armed conflict…if the [President] makes a proclamation to that effect…” The armed conflict in question was between that of Bolivia and Paraguay. President Roosevelt issued a proclamation supporting the Congressional Resolution therefore making the sale illegal. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. claimed that Congress had unconstitutionally delegated legislative authority to the executive branch. Justice Sutherland argued the majority opinion and claimed “It results that the investment of the federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution” In other words, the federal government has inherent or implied power in the realm of foreign affairs which is not expressly written in the Constitution. Indeed, I not only hold the belief that this decision was appropriate, but I also believe that judicial deference would have been in fact more fitting for this case. Under the circumstances prescribed, whereby the Congress has passed a Joint Resolution and the President, pursuant to the Resolution, issued a proclamation affirming it, the Supreme Court should have deferred the case and not have granted it certiorari.<br /><br />A comparable case to Curtiss was Hirabayashi v. U.S. (1943). After the United States entered World War II in 1941, President Roosevelt issued an executive order which authorized military commanders to have authority over particular military areas around the United States. Congress then passed legislation making it a crime to violate any order issued by the military commanders. Subsequently, General DeWitt issued a “curfew order” for all “alien Japanese, alien Germans, …” After this order, a University of Washington student, Kiyoshi Hirabayashi, was found to have violated the curfew law and was then convicted of a criminal offense. Here is an instance where the President and Congress have once again acted in joint cooperation to determine the rule of law within the United States. <br /><br />Applying the measures I have stated in the Curtiss case, it may seem that judicial deference would be the adequate role of the court in this situation. However, this case has two distinctive variables. First and foremost, Hirabayashi is an individual citizen that is arguing for fundamental liberties which our Framers intended us to have not restricted from the government. Second, the case in question revolves solely on the basis of national security during a time of war. Considering the weight of these two factors, the Supreme Court is obligated to hear the case in question. Even if this instance does affirm the government to lawfully convict this man, it is crucial to the sustenance of our republic that all personal liberties be processed accordingly through all three branches of government. Checks and balances are essential here so that not one branch may exert power and influence over the populace. The role of the courts is to not abstain, but to legitimize the other two branches of government by ruling in their favor. If the judicial branch were to defer in the controversy of restricting personal liberties during war, then the precedent set will inevitably expand the power and clout to within the executive and even legislative branches of government. <br /><br />Although the courts have ruled in favor of the federal government the vast majority of instances, particularly the President, there is the occasion where the President has lost some authority. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v Sawyer the Supreme Court ruled that President Truman could not seize the steel mills for national security purposes in the midst of the Korean War. In 1950, North Korea invaded the Republic of Korea. President Truman, without a declaration of war, authorized the deployment of troops and air strikes on North Korea for these actions, and received some support from the United Nations. At this time, a crisis and strike was fermenting amongst the steel workers in America. Truman, realizing a strike could hamper the war efforts, issued a seizure of all steel mills into the government’s directives under the guise of national security. <br /><br />Justice Black wrote the majority opinion and decided that what President Truman authorized was not stated in the Constitution or expressly granted from Congress. Therefore, Truman was unable to take control of the steel mills. Justice Black says in the majority, “The President’s power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act of Congress of from the Constitution itself.” Clearly, there is no act of Congress which permits the president to authorize these actions and there is also no provision in the Constitution which allocates this power to the President. While this case is not one which should be decided by judicial deference, it is one which should grant Truman the power to seize the steel mills. <br /><br />As Justice Vinson noted in his dissent, “But neither did [the Framers] create an automaton impotent to exercise the powers of Government at a time when the survival of the Republic itself may be at stake.” In short, the role of the court is to allow certain prudence into legal thought when our nation is at war. To rely on the text and statute alone would be to handcuff the President in defending this nation at all costs. The court needs to realize that the Framers could not have foreseen the extraconstitutional powers needed for the executive branch in a growing global world of interconnectedness. Thus, the Supreme Court ruled improperly in this decision, and was liable for the inadequate supplies abroad if our troops were fighting without the necessary components to survive.<br /><br />A well-thought out concurring opinion was delivered by Justice Jackson. He broke the authority of the President down into three categories: 1) Congress is in agreement, 2) Congress is silent, and 3) Congress is opposed. He believed that this case belonged in the third category. Justice Jackson says, “[The Fifth Amendment signifies] about all there is of the principle that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and that we submit ourselves to rulers only if under rules.” Jackson is correct in determining that the role of the court in foreign affairs is to adjudicate under existing rule of law, yet this absolutist viewpoint, as stated earlier, restricts even the most bizarre circumstances which can never be foreseen. It is in this regard that I disagree with Jackson and argue that the courts should allow for leniency and prudence when ruling on the President’s authority during wartime or national security crises. <br /><br />In Dellums v Bush the District Court under Harold H. Greene’s opinion made the correct decision in judicial deference. Fifty three members from Congress and one Senator requested that the court issue them an injunction forbidding President Bush to authorize an offensive attack on Iraq. Greene did not issue the injunction and argued that, “In short, unless Congress as a whole, or by a majority, is heard from, the controversy here cannot be deemed ripe; it is only if the majority of the Congress seeks relief from an infringement on its constitutional war-declaration power that it may be entitled to receive it.” By all accounts, this was not only the proper decision to make regarding the case, but it was a necessary one as well. Had the court issued the injunction, the legitimacy of the whole of Congress and the President’s authority to be “Commander-in-Chief” of the Armed Forces would be in jeopardy. In fact, roughly one month after the judge denied the injunction, Congress authorized the use of force in Iraq in conjunction with the UN Resolution. This authorization is exactly why Judge Greene did not usurp Congressional authority and deem it relevant when only 53 House Representatives and one Senator had come forth with the request. The judicial deference in this case was appropriate to the responsibilities of the court and upheld what the Framers had intended.<br /><br />In the instances where the government detains an enemy combatant during a time of war, the Supreme Court has the inherent right to determine the legality of the detainment. During the Civil War, Lambdin Milligan and four other individuals were accused of planning to steal Union weapons and free Confederate prisoners of war in Indiana. They were sentenced to hang from a military court but were able to bring their case to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court basically ruled that the suspension of ‘habeas corpus’ was legal, yet if there were civilian courts operating upon his detainment he could not be tried by a military tribunal. The role of the court in this case was intriguing. It seems as though they overstepped their boundary and authority by ruling that the suspension of habeas corpus was legal, considering Congress and the President had authorized it together. <br /><br />The Supreme Court was in fact in its proper jurisdiction when rendering the decision upon where Milligan was to be tried at. Justice Davis argues for the majority, “One of the plainest constitutional provisions was, therefore, infringed when Milligan was tried by a court not ordained and established by Congress, and not composed of judges appointed during good behavior.” Justice Davis is making the argument that a military tribunal is not apt for trial of a citizen when civilian courts are operating. This decision was exactly appropriate for the courts to decide as there was no statue given by Congress and there was no Constitutional provision for it giving the President the enumerated power. <br /><br />In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the role of the court was accurate in its decision to rule and negate judicial deference. Hamdi was a US citizen before being picked up in the battlefield in Afghanistan fighting for the terrorists. President Bush deemed Hamdi an “unlawful enemy combatant” and sought to detain him indefinitely. The Supreme Court held that Hamdi as a U.S. citizen could be held as an unlawful enemy combatant in indefinite detention. However, they also ruled that Hamdi be allowed to challenge the factual basis of his classification as an enemy combatant. Justice O’Connor argues, “Our opinion finds legislative authority to detain under the AUMF once it is sufficiently clear that the enemy is, in fact, an enemy combatant.” The Supreme Court could not have been more correct in its verdict. Establishing the authority for the president to suspend habeas corpus using an interpretive Congressional Resolution (a Resolution which could or could not be relevant to President Bush’s case) was in fact in the perfect jurisdiction for the court to rule a verdict upon. Judicial deference is impossible in this situation because of the differences of opinion in the actual legislative goal of the AUMF, as it was considered irrelevant by four other justices. <br /><br />The Supreme Court was also correct in establishing its presence in regard to Hamdi being able to challenge the authority of the President in a court of law. It is only solely up to the President when Congress has in fact ruled by statue that citizens’ cannot challenge the validity of their status as unlawful enemy combatants. Since this is not the case, the jurisdiction and role of the federal court system is to determine whether or not the President has the inherent authority to deny Hamdi a chance to refute his charge as an enemy combatant. <br /><br />Justice Thomas, a dissenter, argues “That is, although it is appropriate for the Court to determine the judicial question whether the President has the asserted authority, we lack the information and expertise to question whether Hamdi is actually an enemy combatant, a question the resolution of which is committed to other branches.” It seems as though Thomas is circumventing the outcome of the decision in which Justice O’Connor prescribed. The courts role is not whether to determine if Hamdi is in fact an enemy combatant, but rather to determine upon whether Hamdi can challenge this essential opinion of the federal government. It is a dangerous path to embark upon when the Supreme Court uses judicial deference in determining the outcome of civil liberties for US citizens. The other branches will still be determining Hamdi’s status, only they will be doing so in a court of law where Hamdi is to mount a defense for his actions. The idea of judicial deference in the Hamdi case is absurd and the Supreme Court acted with precise and accurate rulings.<br /><br />In conclusion, the role of the federal court system should be one based upon some restraint. While it is important to adjudicate controversies to maintain the checks and balances, the court should not assert its role as a foreign affairs dictator when Congress and the President have both granted the policy in collaboration. The Framers did not intend for the judicial branch to exert major foreign affairs decisions, and that is why the roles are distributed between the executive and legislative branch respectively. Judicial deference should play a bigger role in the realm of the judicial system, unless it is of extenuating circumstances of civil liberties that permit the court to mandate a decision and not abstain from granting it certiorari. Judicial deference is vital to preserve the Framers intention on government, and to allow the executive and legislative deal with foreign matters which affect our national security.CaptainAmericahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09916748348077335095noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20022863.post-1163437427520646842006-11-13T09:00:00.000-08:002006-11-13T09:04:47.403-08:00Marxism According to Stalin<strong>Historical Context:</strong><br /><br />With the abdication of Nicholas II and the successful Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, a new, radical government was emerging in Russia. Influenced on Marxian principles and led by a radical revolutionary named Vladimir Lenin, this vast empire would soon be known as the Soviet Union. Lenin’s brilliance was acknowledged by all who came in contact with him and he soon would reach the highest stature of integrity a leader could achieve with his fellow Russian people. Yet, his tenure as a leading figure in the creation of a communist state was short-lived, and just seven years after he instigated the revolution, he died of a stroke in the early part of 1924. This led to a series of political infighting in the Bolshevik Party, where ultimately one man emerged as victorious and sole leader of the party: Josef Stalin.<br /><br /><strong>Stalin’s ‘Revolution From Above’: Perversion of Marxism</strong><br /><br />Although Stalin claimed to be a Marxist, and indeed studied and wrote about Marxism in the years prior to the revolution, Stalin was anything but one. Through his programs and policies Stalin had managed to go against many of the aspects which contributed to the heart and soul of Marxist theory. Stalin’s Marxism consisted of a literal, somewhat distorted realization of this ideological philosophy in which his treacherous ambition clouded all rational judgment.<br /><br />The persona of Stalin portrays an interesting psychological component to Stalin’s interpretation and execution of his version of Marxism. Early on in Stalin’s life, Stalin had developed an idealized image of himself, an image which displayed his search for glory and his need to triumph over his enemies.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn1" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1">[1]</a> Stalin envisioned himself as the next Lenin, and even adopted the name “Stalin” because of its meaning “steel one.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn2" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2">[2]</a> For Marxist theory, the characteristic of a selfish hero amongst the proletariats was to its contrary. Indeed, Stalin’s vision for a new Russia came from his mentality of trying to “outdo” or “emulate” an exalted Russian hero of the past, whether it be Lenin or Peter the Great.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn3" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3">[3]</a> And as Stalin so notably makes clear to all, where Peter the Great had failed in his “revolution from above” Stalin would succeed. Stalin’s pretentious attitude and his own altercation of Marxism led him on a new project. This grandiose project which would ensue under Stalin’s self-idolatry reign was his “revolution from above.”<br /><br />When Stalin rose to power after Lenin’s death, Stalin quickly parted into the Right camp of the Communist Party. The main difference within the two camps in the Communist Party was the belief in the world revolution was the only way to bring about a successful socialistic state. The Left of the party, where Stalin’s archenemy Leon Trotsky ideologically lay, believed that future Communist revolutions were a “precondition for building a completely socialist society in Russia.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn4" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4">[4]</a> Yet Stalin offered a plan contrary to the Left of the Party. Stalin had believed that national modernization, not international revolution, was the primary objective of the Soviet Communist Party. He firmly believed that the Bolsheviks did not need European countries to ignite revolutions in order for Russia to have a successful proletariat revolution.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn5" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5">[5]</a> Trotsky and many in the Communist Party felt this was a betrayal of strict Marxist interpretation. In essence, Trotsky thought that the Old Bolsheviks were internationalists, and he began criticizing Stalin for having a dangerous sense of national chauvinism in Russia.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn6" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6">[6]</a> To almost any strict reader of Marx or Engel, Trotsky’ position seems to be most precise. In the Principles of Communism, Friedrich Engels proclaims “the communist revolution will not merely be a national phenomenon but must take place simultaneously in all civilized countries – that is to say, at least in England, America, France, and Germany. It will develop in each of these countries more or less rapidly…”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn7" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7">[7]</a> Here is evidence which suggests that even before Stalin was to come to power, his notion of “socialism in one country” was already contradictory of Marxist teachings.<br /><br />So it followed that in 1927, Stalin utilized his slogan of “socialism in one country” to enact his Five-Year Plan. This plan essentially sped up the industrialization and development of heavy industry, and also the collectivization of the agricultural sector of the economy. The prevailing justifications given by Stalin were to help the Soviet Union become self-sufficient; to help the Soviet Union to become adequately prepared to defend itself; and to help the Soviet Union straighten out its own backwardness.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn8" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8">[8]</a> According to Stalin, ridding the farms of the semi-private commercial economy under the New Economic Policy (NEP) enacted by Lenin was vital to the socialistic state which Marxists had soon hoped to achieve.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn9" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9">[9]</a> Yet, the strict interpretation of Marxist-Leninist theory falls directly contrary to this notion of fast industrialization and collectivization. From this Marxist perspective, the mass collectivization of farms came entirely too early. Lenin had envisioned a state which was much more advanced in its technological output capacity and a state that had transpired culturally through a theoretical “cultural revolution” of socialism and even further, communism.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn10" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10">[10]</a> Stalin defended his position against the Old Bolsheviks by taking a Lenin quote out of context, and began criticizing his opponents, such as Trotsky, saying they cared less about Russia than about Europe.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn11" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11">[11]</a><br /><br />The drive and rationalization for heavy industrialization could only silence the dissenting and opposing masses if Stalin instilled fear within the Russian people. This fear was based on Stalin’s fabricated theory of a looming global war, for which the Soviet Union must be prepared at all times to protect its people. In his 1928 Central Committee speech, Stalin asserted that it would be “impossible to uphold the independence of our country without having an adequate industrial base for defense.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn12" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12">[12]</a> The “war card” was only being used to exploit a political advantage over his foe Trotsky, and Stalin amplified this war scare over and over to all the people of the Soviet Union.<br />Again, we see a direct contradiction between the actions of Stalin and the writings of Marx. Besides the fact that Marx believed in no one man attaining absolute political power of the state, as Stalin was attempting to achieve, but Marx also was against the psychological manipulative part in which Stalin placed over the people. Marx pictured a state where there would be absent a ruler who seeks prey upon the masses only to place them under his control. Stalin completely threw Marxism out the window with his clever exploitation of the people for his personal gain and power. The exploitation was not one of labor, but of intelligence. The frame of reference for which Stalin sought to rule from existed only because of his ability to regulate his people to adhere to his word; this was the exploitation of the mind and heart of the people.<br /><br />The other aspect of Stalin’s Five-Year Plan was the collectivization of all farms. While this decision proved to be disastrous for the Russian peasants, the most interesting factor surrounding his rationale is his actual interpretation of Marxist theory. Stalin had believed that expropriating the land of the peasants must be done so by a use of coercion from the state itself. He had taken what Marx said literally, and many in the Party believed, including Trotsky and Lenin, that this was not true Marxist teaching.<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn13" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn13" name="_ftnref13">[13]</a> If we observe what Marx actually wrote on the subject, Stalin’s decision to collectivize the farms was indeed an aspect of Marxist teachings.<br />In the Communist Manifesto Marx proclaims “Of course, in the beginning, this cannot be effected except by means of despotic inroads on the rights of property…”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn14" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn14" name="_ftnref14">[14]</a> Marx goes on further and says “The proletariat will use its political supremacy…to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the State…and to increase the total of productive forces rapidly.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn15" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn15" name="_ftnref15">[15]</a> At first glance, it would seem that what Stalin actually did was exactly what Marx was preaching; that is, taking away private property which the NEP had given them and to centralize the production in the hands of the state, all the while attempting to rapidly overproduce heavy industry. However, if one were to take Stalin’s interpretation, it would mean one would have to ignore the foundation Marx had laid for this process to even come about. Prior to Marx declaring these statements above, he set the pre-requisite for this change to occur, which included the proletariat already in the position of the ruling class. Marx says “…the first step in the revolution by the working class, is to raise the proletariat to the position of the ruling class, to win the battle for democracy.”<a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn16" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftn16" name="_ftnref16">[16]</a> Not only had the Soviet Union not had a proletariat revolution, but the Soviet Union lacked the essential component in having one; they lacked an actual proletariat. For Stalin to being to collectivize and force the peasants off their private land, without the first step having been achieved in the transformation to a socialistic state, would mean disaster to any strict Marxist follower. Hence, it follows that Stalin had taken what Marx had said in the Communist Manifesto completely out of context; proof again that Stalin exploited the words and philosophy of Karl Marx.<br /><br />In conclusion, Stalin warped Marxist philosophy in many ways which proved detriment to the existence of the Soviet state. His lust for power and his idealized image of himself made Stalin believe that he was above the proletariat revolutionary state, and this would play out in his authoritarian tactics of deceit and ruthlessness. With his “socialism in one country” mantra, Stalin enacted his Five-Year Plan to bring about a better Soviet Russia with heavy industrialization and farm collectivization. The coercion used to kick peasants off their farms was premature for Marxist –Leninist teachings, and he misinterpreted Marxist writings for the purpose of his own personal gain. Exploiting the masses in his need to stabilize a war defense mechanism for the Soviet Union, Stalin manipulated the Russian people to adhere to his despotic principles, something Marx only referred to as a transitional process against the bourgeois. In the end, Stalin took no part in true Marxist teaching, and for that the Soviet Union began its path toward authoritarianism and repression for the people under Stalin. Stalin’s Marxism was anything but true Marxism and for that, the people suffered.<br /><br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn1" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">[1]</a> Robert C. Tucker, Stalin In Power: The Revolution From Above, 1928-1941 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990) 4.<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn2" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2">[2]</a> Robert C. Tucker, Stalin In Power: The Revolution From Above, 1928-1941 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990) 4.<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn3" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3">[3]</a> Robert C. Tucker, Stalin In Power: The Revolution From Above, 1928-1941 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990) 60.<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn4" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4">[4]</a> Robert C. Tucker, Stalin in Power: The Revolution From Above, 1928-1941 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990) 45.<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn5" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5">[5]</a> Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) 114.<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn6" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6">[6]</a> Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) 114-115.<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn7" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7">[7]</a> Friedrich Engels, “The Principles of Communism” Selected Works, Volume One, November 1847 http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1847/11/prin-com.htm (ACCESSED: October 26th, 2006)<br /><br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn8" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8">[8]</a> Robert C. Tucker, Stalin in Power: The Revolution From Above, 1928-1941 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990) 70.<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn9" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9">[9]</a> Robert C. Tucker, Stalin In Power: The Revolution From Above, 1928-1941 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990) 73.<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn10" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10">[10]</a> Robert C. Tucker, Stalin In Power: The Revolution From Above, 1928-1941(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990) 73.<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn11" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11">[11]</a> Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) 114-115.<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn12" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12">[12]</a> Robert C. Tucker, Stalin In Power: The Revolution From Above, 1928-1941 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990) 74.<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn13" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref13" name="_ftn13">[13]</a> Robert C. Tucker, Stalin In Power: The Revolution From Above, 1928-1941 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990) 57.<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn14" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref14" name="_ftn14">[14]</a> Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “Communist Manifesto” (1848) Marx-Engels Reader (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978) 490.<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn15" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref15" name="_ftn15">[15]</a> Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “Communist Manifesto” (1848) Marx-Engels Reader (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978) 490.<br /><a title="" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn16" href="http://www.blogger.com/post-create.g?blogID=20022863#_ftnref16" name="_ftn16">[16]</a> Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “Communist Manifesto” (1848) Marx-Engels Reader (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978) 490.CaptainAmericahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09916748348077335095noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20022863.post-1163044634911202802006-11-08T19:55:00.000-08:002006-11-13T10:02:27.856-08:00Democrats Win Defensive VictoryDemocrats win the House. Democrats are going to win the Senate. To many Republicans, defeat and sorrow has overcome the core of their well-being, and to many Democrats, victory and hope saturate their once disheartening mentality of continuing loss over the last 12 years. It doesn’t take an expert to understand that the voting public overwhelmingly voted for change on November 7th; a seemingly subconscious national referendum on Dubya, where voters gathered inspiration from their frustration of Bush to oust his Republican cohorts. Oddly enough, the credence granted to the Democrats in the House, and possibly the Senate, was only a defensive victory.<br /><br />The robust republic our Founders created made sure that a system of ‘checks and balances’ precluded any one branch from exerting too much power in the arena of federal government. Indeed, while the Democrats may have made major gains in both Houses, the Republicans should still be holding their heads up high. The presidential mandate given to Bush two years ago was not up for election, therefore the Democratic victory was marred by the fact that the Republicans still maintain the executive branch. Therefore, the only victory the Democrats inherited was a meager defensive victory; that is to say, a victory which simply disables the Republicans from passing legislation which adhered to their party principles (or what’s left of them). The offensive triumph for the Democrats can only be determined in the ’08 election where the executive branch will be up for grabs, presumably for Obama or McCain to seize.<br /><br />With Bush still at the helm of government, it is safe to say that the use of his veto power will without a doubt be much greater in these next two years of office. Democrats will not have near enough voting power to overturn any of their legislative goals in the Senate, therefore the Democrats will ultimately achieve nothing for the next two years. That is the nature of representative democracy. Divided government ensures nothing will ever get done, or if something does get done, there is a cosmic compromise made between parties. This is not necessarily a negative attribute of our American polity, but rather an inevitable one which ensures our political system is working. As Madison so brilliantly noted in “Notes on Confederacy,” division in government promulgates a healthy balance and sustenance for liberty and individual freedom to be upheld. That was one of the primary reasons Madison chose a republic over the ‘mobocracy’ tendencies of direct democracy.<br /><br />All in all this election established a definitive tone to the prevailing disposition of this country: change. The Democrats may very well deserve a mandate in legislating change, however this is not practical. The presence of Bush assures a Republican check on legislation coming from Congress and subsequently will obstruct the “new direction” Democrats so aspired to take America upon. Blocking the Republicans from putting through legislation is essentially all the Democrats got out of this election. This win is one which should come with some dissatisfaction, but don’t tell them that.<br /><br />So to sum up, cheer up Republicans, and go easy on the celebrations Democrats, the direction of the country is not going to change with a subtle defensive victory, no matter how big.CaptainAmericahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09916748348077335095noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20022863.post-1162920002643170012006-11-07T09:19:00.000-08:002006-11-07T09:20:02.663-08:00Election PredictionMy Prediction for the 2006 midterms:<br /><br />House: Democrats pick up 18 seats.<br /><br />Senate: Democrats pick up 5 seats.<br /><br />All in all, Democrats retake the House and just miss taking back the Senate.CaptainAmericahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09916748348077335095noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20022863.post-1160034953059797662006-10-05T00:54:00.000-07:002006-10-05T00:55:53.073-07:00Democrats Support Voter FraudWith less than a month before the Congressional mid-term elections, the Republicans are looking less than capable to sustain their dominance in the structure of the federal government. Keeping this in mind, the Republicans are now beginning to push through legislation that cracks down on illegal immigration. The response from the Democrats has been nothing new, as they continue to reject even the most moderate of immigration reform proposals from the Republicans. The most recent of these proposals was entitled the Voter ID Bill. The recent passage of the House Voter ID Bill shows to the entire country what the Democratic Party is truly in support of: voter fraud.<br /><br />The Voter ID Bill would merely require Americans to verify proof of citizenship in order to vote. It requires that every citizen show a photo ID before casting their ballot in the 2008 election. As a fellow libertarian myself, someone who neither identifies as Republican or Democrat, this seems like a pretty reasonable proposition. I figured that this legislation had passed rather easily through the House because of the practical components behind the bill. Yet, low and behold, I was proven wrong. The vote was almost directly party-line, with the Democrats voting against it and the Republicans for it, 228-196. Just when I thought the Democrats couldn’t get any weaker on the immigration debate, they go ahead and vote against a bill that protects every citizen’s right to vote. After all, a photo ID is not an unreasonable request whatsoever.<br /><br />When you go to the movies, you must provide a photo ID. When you go to the airport, you must provide a photo ID. When you apply for a job, or buy alcohol, or even cash a check, you must provide a photo ID. Why then is it so wrong to ask for a photo ID before you cast a vote in an election which could determine the future of the country? If the Democrats had their way, an illegal immigrant could more easily vote in our republic and corrupt our system of governance. So allowing illegal immigrants to vote in our representative democracy is not only wrong in principle, but it also damages the integrity of our beloved republic.<br /><br />Indeed, the sweetest irony of it all is the verbal outrage of the Democrats of voter fraud in past elections. They cried ‘voter fraud’ against the Republicans in 2000 and in 2004, yet now they vote against a measure which will help ensure that only citizens be allowed to vote. So who is engaging in the real apparent advocacy of voter fraud? To any rational being, it is the Democrats.<br /><br />The initial criticism against the bill came straight from the Democratic playbook of plastic surgery-princess Nancy Pelosi and company. They cried, “But what about the poor people who cannot afford ID cards!” This criticism was quickly silenced when they learned that the bill stipulates that states must provide the identification cards free of charge to those who can't afford them.<br /><br />So what is the real motivation behind the Democrats? It is that they want illegal immigrants’ votes to count, because they would most likely vote Democratic if given the chance. Wait, I thought the conventional wisdom taught that it was only the Republicans who would sacrifice the security and integrity of the state for their own personal interest and gain? It seems to me that the old cliché of ‘culture of corruption’ in the Republican Party has now been replaced with the Democratic Party and their ‘culture of contradiction,’ in reference to decrying voter fraud in one election, then propagating it for the next. The reprehensible actions of the Democrats are nothing but shameful and hypocritical.CaptainAmericahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09916748348077335095noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20022863.post-1159822256689680032006-10-02T13:48:00.000-07:002006-10-02T13:50:56.706-07:00Presidential Power in Foreign AffairsFrom its inception, the institution and role of the American presidency in conducting foreign affairs has been one of ambiguity. The founders created a system of governance in which the presidency was one branch of an intricate three branch federal government that also consisted of a legislative and judicial branch. The doctrine which served as the driving force behind its creation was famously titled “separation of powers”; a doctrine that enables each branch to be separate in its functions, but also enables each branch to provide a check on another branch’s functions. The appropriate role of the presidency in foreign affairs is an age-old historical question that establishes its relevance once again in lieu of the recent state of affairs around the world. The role of the presidency in foreign affairs should undoubtedly be one which protects the national interests of our people. What is written in the Constitution does not and should not entail the totality of presidential power, and it very well could violate the essential principle the president assumes by taking power; that essential principle is to ensure the safety and security of our country’s citizens.<br /><br />The notion that the presidency must only derive its absolute power from the existing language of the Constitution or from legislation is incredibly naïve and dangerous. One example of this reasoning can be observed from Justice Hugo Black in the Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer Supreme Court case in 1952. Justice Black argued that President Truman did not have the right to place the steel mills under governmental control because the power to make that order was not granted from Congress or expressly written in the Constitution. Even though Truman had argued that it was a necessity for the production of war materials to equip our soldiers with the supplies they needed in battle, it was of no importance to Justice Black. Here we can see an obvious dilemma amongst the belief that any power possessed by our president must comply with express consent from Congress or the Constitution. But as this universal principle may sound justified and reasonable, the circumstances surrounding every incident regarding American foreign policy can never be foreseen. Therefore, it is imperative that we must endow implied powers to the president which allow for some discretionary action upon a matter regarding national security. <br /><br />Another reason that this universal principle of presidential power is troubling is because even upon its premise, that power must be expressly written in the Constitution or legislated from Congress, there still inevitably will be room for interpreting the language of both. For example, in the Youngstown case mentioned earlier, the dissenting justices based their opinion on the power the Constitution gave to the president, while the concurring justices invoked the presidential power in the Constitution as well. Even when a justice outlines what they consider as a universal principle for the president’s role in foreign affairs, there is still an intrinsic, subjective and separate matter for interpreting the legislation and Constitution itself. As you can see, invoking universality of presidential power amongst those two components, the Congress and the Constitution, handcuffs the presidency to effectively ensure safety and security to its citizens, and still provides no established dictation of presidential power.<br /><br />The opinion delivered by Justice Sutherland in the U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. is almost directly on par with how I view the correct role for the presidency in foreign affairs matters. Justice Sutherland argued that the President has implied powers, powers not enumerated within the Constitution, regarding external affairs but not internal affairs. He says that the president has more knowledge than Congress on the conditions of foreign affairs which would enable the president a greater ability than Congress to conduct interaction in the global arena. During the opinion, Justice Sutherland seems to understand that there often is an instance where the Constitution does not permit for every circumstance, therefore it be necessary to ascertain a realm of power not expressly guaranteed by the president. This power, however, is limited to only foreign affairs, and not domestic affairs. <br /><br />The other opinion for which I base my opinion on is that of Justice Jackson, in the 1952 Youngstown case. He carefully outlines three separate scenarios which detail the boundaries of presidential powers. In his third scenario of presidential power, Justice Jackson argues that “Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.” This essentially says that when the president asserts his authority to use of force which is not granted to him by Congress or expressly in the Constitution, then he must be carefully watched by not only the other branches of our government, but also by the people within that government.<br /><br />In 1862, an important Supreme Court decision was delivered that ultimately altered the division of power for authorizing force abroad. The Prize Cases introduced an arduous challenge for the court, essentially because neither the Constitution nor Congress had ‘expressly’ written what was supposed to be done in the circumstances that were pending. President Lincoln ordered a naval blockade on the Southern ports before the Civil War began, and Congress had not yet declared war. Hence, Lincoln seized ships entering the port, and the ships owners took this to the Supreme Court arguing that the absence if Congressional declaration of war, the President had no right to issue a blockade. Justice Grier delivered the majority opinion and argued in favor of Lincoln exercising his right to use force. This was the first time in our nation’s history we went to war without a declaration from Congress, and throughout the twentieth-century we would observe more wars being waged without any Congressional declaration of war. <br /><br />Although it is true that Article I from the US Constitution says that “Congress shall have the power to declare war,” this does not specifically say that the president cannot go to war without a declaration of war. Furthermore, the Constitution specifically gives power to the president who “shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several states, when called into actual Service of the United States.” From this textual understanding of the Constitution, we can infer that the president not only has authority to go to war because Congress has not restricted him from doing so, but also because it explicitly states that the president has command over the military, and using force is a discretionary measure that be up to the president. In an instance where it may seem like the president overstepped his authority upon such matters of engaged conflict abroad, then it is the duty of Congress and the Supreme Court to provide a check upon the institution of the presidency. The authority to use force and commit US soldiers abroad should unquestionably be a decision initially up to the President, and if it deemed inappropriate or abusive, then Congress or the courts should intervene revoking this authority from the president. <br /><br />The deepest regret I reserve upon the idea that the president possesses no implied or inherent powers not within the Constitution, is that it fundamentally ignores the progression of ideas and of the changing nature of the world. To use the old cliché, the Constitution should be a living, breathing document, not a stagnate, irrelevant document. The justifications for the presidential use of foreign power without consent from Congress or the Constitution are present everyday. That is to say, the changing nature of the twentieth-century, and the closer interconnectedness of nation-states in trade, travel, and warfare has produced a necessity of American foreign policy to be quick, decisive, and effective. An individual cannot concede to be an individual of reason and competence if in fact they would deem it improper for President Roosevelt, if he had prior knowledge of Pearl Harbor, to stop the attack before the attack takes place. This idea is founded in philosophical principles. According to Justice Black’s theory, if President Bush had known about 9/11 prior to its occurrence, then he would not be authorized to shut down the World Trade Center activities for that day, simply because that power is not in the Constitution nor did Congress give him authority. As I stated earlier, this view is naïve and dangerous.<br /><br />This analogy of the WTC collapse and attack brings us to today’s heated struggle over the president’s ability to protect national security. The proper decision regarding the external affairs of nations should not just solely rest on the shoulders of the presidency, nor can it solely rest on Congress. However, there is a distinctive gray area in which the president should have mobility in conducting affairs abroad using his mandate from the election of the republic, and his capacity of knowledge from his cabinet members. If we look back through history, we find that although Congress often times did not declare war, they nevertheless passed resolutions which granted affirmation to the president to conduct a war if necessary. Yet, even swith these Congressional Resolutions, the public and others condemn the “abuse” of power by the presidency. How can one call something an abuse of power when that power was granted to the president from Congress? Was it not the Authorization of Military Force (AUMF) which Congress passed that gave President Bush all the necessary means to fight terrorism that seemed fit for him? It is in my assertion that Bush did not even need a Congressional Resolution for fighting a hybrid enemy of war; one that adheres to no rules and establishes no guise under a nation-state. Granted, citing Justice Jackson rationale, the Congress should scrutinize what the president does, as should the courts. However, citing Grier’s rationale, the president has implied powers in external affairs that transcend any absolutist theory or universal standard for expression of foreign power. <br /><br />If there is one universal truth available it is that there should be no fixed definition of the presidential power in foreign affairs. It should be subjective to the circumstances pending, and should allow for the natural changes that inevitably take place in a rapidly developing world. The institution of the presidency should have implied power that overreach Congress and the Constitution, so long that it be inspected by our other branches of government after the fact. The national security and subsistence of our state depends upon a mobile and flexible presidency in regards to national affairs.CaptainAmericahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09916748348077335095noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20022863.post-1159431735662849672006-09-28T01:19:00.000-07:002006-09-28T01:22:50.846-07:00Can Terrorism Be Defined? Part I: Terrorism as a Universal Principle: A Critique of Relativist Theory<span style="font-family:times new roman;"><br /></span>Pursuing truth in a realm of subjective idiom is fundamentally impossible. The modern day liberal intellectuals, who wish to ponder upon such subjectivity, accept the conventional wisdom that terrorism is merely a buzzword which transcends universal truth and falls within an aphoristic boundary of interpretation. But is this notion categorically true? In other words, are we correct in saying that invoking terrorism is only a matter of perspective and that we cannot and should not have a magnitude of difference within the word itself? The relativism of today’s world now seeks to prey upon the meaning of terrorism.<br /><br />It is in my opinion that relativism is prejudicial and undoubtedly propagates a societal breakdown upon three important structures. The first structure impaired is the essence of our moral compass. To investigate this further we draw upon an analogy of the idea that all civilizations and cultures are of equal value.<br /><br />It is a false predication to assume that all cultures are of equal worth. That is to say, a free society is always better than a slave society. A society that endows human rights is always better than one which seeks to violate them. A culture that deals in reason and rationale is better than one that deals in sheer force. From these differing inequalities of culture, man embraces a set of ideals which hold evident in this universal moral compass. If the relativism from terrorism can be applied to culture or civilization, who are we to judge then, as a culture or civilization, one which defies the basic interpretation of man’s moral compass.<br /><br />Suppose for a moment that a culture proclaims that it will enslave its masses because that is what their moral compass dictates them to do. According to the relativism doctrine, by all accounts and standards, the authorities in that civilization should have mandate to think and act that way, because of their normative theory on the existence of mankind. Under the guise of relativism, if the state can believe it wrong to enslave its citizens, then the state can also believe that it is right. What would one relativist say about the situation of enslaving African-Americans during the early to mid 19th century? If we do not adhere to a moral compass or some valued set of standards, there exists no justice in the world. Subsequently, humanity, in some civilizations, will be robbed of their subsistence. If it is beyond our capacity to project some universal truths amongst the basic rights of all beings, then the structure of our moral compass is lost. This denigrates not only our self-worth, but also threatens our very existence.<br /><br />The second structure impaired within the relativist framework is the consistency of ideas. The paradox relativists find themselves in is the order of compatibility with what they advocate. Is it not a universal truth, or principle, to signify, that “there is no universal truth?” The apparent contradiction amongst relativists is so obtrusive that the elemental premise for the application of their ideas is lost. That is to say, they admit then that there are universal truths by stating this absolutist objection to universal truth.<br /><br />The third structure significantly damaged is the mode of operation within the global community. Without a working definition of terrorism, in at the very least a broad sense, the international arenawould be an extremely difficult venue for two countries to effectively communicate with each other. This hampers the capabilities we have as a civilization to fight terrorism. Using a relativist’s interpretation of terrorism, the UN countries would be defining what the word means for their own standards of law. Without usurping too much of a nation’s sovereignty, the international community needs a definition of terrorism not just in terms for combating terrorism, but also to negate a struggle against two countries who would normally be allied in the fight. If Pakistan defines terrorism in a loose form different than that of the United States, any modes of operation or planning within that country which were applied or carried out in the United States would deem dangerous to the global stability of civilization. The United States would then sharpen its blade against Pakistan, and use a kind of ‘soft power’ to get the Pakistani government to crack down on their terrorist cells. This creates tension within two governments that could have been avoided by simply applying a universal principle upon a word such as terrorism.<br /><br />Our existence as a society needs a universal principle for terrorism, because if the relativists have their way, September 11th, 2001 can be justified. This is not something that we, as a free society, should stand for.CaptainAmericahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09916748348077335095noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20022863.post-1156304348783447842006-08-22T20:29:00.000-07:002006-08-22T20:39:08.806-07:00The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: A Case Law Opinion by Michael O'Shea<strong><span style="font-size:130%;">FACTS OF THE CASE IN QUESTION:</span></strong><br /><br />The four defendants are members of the Speluncean Society, an organization of amateurs interested in the exploration of caves. Early in May of 4299 they, in the company of Roger Whetmore, then also a member of the Society, penetrated into the interior of a limestone cavern of the type found in the Central Plateau of this Commonwealth. While they were in a position remote from the entrance to the cave, a landslide occurred. Heavy boulders fell in such a manner as to block completely the only known opening to the cave. When the men discovered their predicament they settled themselves near the obstructed entrance to wait until a rescue party should remove the detritus that prevented them from leaving their underground prison. On the failure of Whetmore and the defendants to return to their homes, the Secretary of the Society was notified by their families. It appears that the explorers had left indications at the headquarters of the Society concerning the location of the cave they proposed to visit. A rescue party was promptly dispatched to the spot.<br /><br />The task of rescue proved one of overwhelming difficulty. It was necessary to supplement the forces of the original party by repeated increments of men and machines, which had to be conveyed at great expense to the remote and isolated region in which the cave was located. A huge temporary camp of workmen, engineers, geologists, and other experts was established. The work of removing the obstruction was several times frustrated by fresh landslides. In one of these, ten of the workmen engaged in clearing the entrance were killed. The treasury of the Speluncean Society was soon exhausted in the rescue effort, and the sum of eight hundred thousand frelars, raised partly by popular subscription and partly by legislative grant, was expended before the imprisoned men were rescued. Success was finally achieved on the thirty-second day after the men entered the cave.<br /><br />Since it was known that the explorers had carried with them only scant provisions, and since it was also known that there was no animal or vegetable matter within the cave on which they might subsist, anxiety was early felt that they might meet death by starvation before ac [original page number 1852] cess to them could be obtained. On the twentieth day of their imprisonment it was learned for the first time that they had taken with them into the cave a portable wireless machine capable of both sending and receiving messages. A similar machine was promptly installed in the rescue camp and oral communication established with the unfortunate men within the mountain. They asked to be informed how long a time would be required to release them. The engineers in charge of the project answered that at least ten days would be required even if no new landslides occurred. The explorers then asked if any physicians were present, and were placed in communication with a committee of medical experts. The imprisoned men described their condition and the rations they had taken with them, and asked for a medical opinion whether they would be likely to live without food for ten days longer. The chairman of the committee of physicians told them that there was little possibility of this. The wireless machine within the cave then remained silent for eight hours.<br /><br />When communication was re-established the men asked to speak again with the physicians. The chairman of the physicians' committee was placed before the apparatus, and Whetmore, speaking on behalf of himself and the defendants, asked whether they would be able to survive for ten days longer if they consumed the flesh of one of their number. The physicians' chairman reluctantly answered this question in the affirmative. Whetmore asked whether it would be advisable for them to cast lots to determine which of them should be eaten. None of the physicians present was willing to answer the question. Whetmore then asked if there were among the party a judge or other official of the government who would answer this question. None of those attached to the rescue camp was willing to assume the role of advisor in this matter. He then asked if any minister or priest would answer their question, and none was found who would do so. Thereafter no further messages were received from within the cave, and it was assumed (erroneously, it later appeared) that the electric batteries of the explorers' wireless machine had become exhausted. When the imprisoned men were finally released it was learned that on the twenty-third day after their entrance into the cave Whetmore had been killed and eaten by his companions.<br /><br />From the testimony of the defendants, which was accepted by the jury, it appears that it was Whetmore who first proposed that they might find the nutriment without which survival was impossible in the flesh of one of their own number. It was also Whetmore who first proposed the use of some method of casting lots, calling the attention of the defendants to a pair of dice he happened to have with him. The defendants were at first reluctant to adopt so desperate a procedure, but after the conversations by wireless related above, they finally agreed on the plan proposed by Whetmore. After much discussion of the mathematical problems involved, agreement was finally reached on a method of determining the issue by the use of the dice.<br /><br />Before the dice were cast, however, Whetmore declared that he withdrew from the arrangement, as he had decided on reflection to wait for another week before embracing an expedient so frightful and odious. The others charged him with a breach of faith and proceeded to cast the dice. When it came Whetmore's turn, the dice were cast for him by one of the defendants, and he was asked to declare any objections he might have to the fairness of the throw. He stated that he had no such objections. The throw went against him, and he was then put to death and eaten by his companions.<br /><br />After the rescue of the defendants, and after they had completed a stay in a hospital where they underwent a course of treatment for malnutrition and shock, they were indicted for the murder of Roger Whetmore. At the trial, after the testimony had been concluded, the foreman of the jury (a lawyer by profession) inquired of the court whether the jury might not find a special verdict, leaving it to the court to say whether on the facts as found the defendants were guilty. After some discussion, both the Prosecutor and counsel for the defendants indicated their acceptance of this procedure, and it was adopted by the court. In a lengthy special verdict the jury found the facts as I have related them above, and found further that if on these facts the defendants were guilty of the crime charged against them, then they found the defendants guilty. On the basis of this verdict, the trial judge ruled that the defendants were guilty of murdering Roger Whetmore. The judge then sentenced them to be hanged, the law of our Commonwealth permitting him no discretion with respect to the penalty to be imposed. After the release of the jury, its members joined in a communication to the Chief Executive asking that the sentence be commuted to an imprisonment of six months. The trial judge addressed a similar communication to the Chief Executive. As yet no action with respect to these pleas has been taken, as the Chief Executive is apparently awaiting our disposition of this petition of error.<br /><br /><strong><em>Question: As a presiding judge in the case, how would do you find the defendants?</em></strong><br /><strong></strong><br /><strong></strong><br /><strong>Judge Michael O'Shea's Opinion:</strong><br /><strong></strong><br /><em>In rendering my opinion and concurring with a justice presiding on the bench, I first must submit my own personal analysis of this complicated and horrific case. The circumstances surrounding this case are indeed extraordinary and further investigation is required to seek the largest amount of truth and justice granted to the defendants here in Court.</em><br /><em></em><br /><em>One of the main textual arguments presented by Chief Justice Truepenny is that the statue under scrutiny is not ambiguous and is plainly stated for applying the law rather than interpreting the law. The statue states, “Whoever shall willfully take the life of another shall be punished by death.” Truepenny’s argument has much strength which, at face value, can be applied to this case in question. First, the language of the statue applies directly to what the defendants did to Roger Whetmore. There is no question into the matter that the men on trial “willfully” took the life of Whetmore. However, let us reflect on another aspect of this peculiar case. Since it is under the testimony of the defendants that Whetmore was in concurrence with the decision to cast lots to determine his own fate, can this case not be cited within another statue of assisted suicide? If one “willfully” committed an act taking another’s life while the both parties consented to the benefit of such destruction, does this not beg the question of the personal philosophy of the person killed in this tragic case? Could Whetmore have been following the philosophy of utilitarianism, which is derived from obtaining the greatest amount of happiness to the greatest amount of people? If we judge that these defendants are in fact murders, does all accountability of Whetmore’s death reside in the defendants alone, or should Whetmore be partly responsible as well, since he initiated the plan and accepted his death? It is my assertion that to merely apply the statue on the grounds of the text is to ignore the basic foundation of why law has become law. If we cannot and should not use prudence when looking at each separate case, our man made laws become not only obsolete but also null and void. </em><br /><em></em><br /><em>In this regard, I agree with Justice Foster in presenting the argument that the Law of the Commonwealth is at stake if we try to textually apply the law in this case. It is under these circumstances we can push the textual argument aside, and look towards prudence as a form of influence upon the decision. </em><br /><em></em><br /><em>A more careful examination of the case leads me to another pertinent point. Justice Tatting writes a rebuttal to Justice Foster’s opinion rejecting the belief that these men were not in a “state of law” when they murdered Whetmore, rather a “state of nature.” I beg to differ with Justice Tatting for several reasons. First Tatting asks the question to Foster, when did the defendants actually enter upon the “state of nature”? The “state of nature” is not concurrent with positive law rather it is a part of natural law. It is only human nature which compels us to survive if survival is indeed at stake. While inside the cave, the defendants entered into natural law when they realized that they could not survive unless they ate the flesh of one of their group members. As it is unclear to Tatting why they are in that state, it is perfectly clear to me that the reason they encountered this “state of nature” was because survival was hopeless. This “state of nature” is essential to understand because as Justice Foster says “A man whose life is threatened will repel his aggressor no matter what the law may say.” It is clear here that these defendant’s lives were clearly at stake.Upon using prudence I shall now turn my attention to another reasoning which I can use to adjudicate this tragic case. When a man made law is enacted or enforced, there is always a reason why the law was constructed in the first place. Often times however, a man may break the letter of the law but not the spirit of the law. For example, in Commonwealth v. Staymore the defendant was convicted of leaving his car parked for more than two hours when the statue clearly states that that is a crime. However, if we examine the actual reasoning behind the defendant leaving the car parked for more then two hours we stumble across the fact he was prevented from doing so because the streets were obstructed by a political demonstration in which he took no part in. If we can use the same method of reasoning in that case as in this case then these defendants are not murderers in the slightest degree because the law shall not apply to extraordinary circumstances such as this situation.</em><br /><em></em><br /><em>Although I am reluctant to rule based upon “judicial activism” I must follow common sense in which many of these justices, such as Justice Keen and Truepenny have grossly overlooked. The mere fact that the justices have to hear about this case and the mere fact that they have to write an opinion on the case is brought into the light by these four men’s survival in the cave. If it were the case that all five men had died of starvation, a slow and miserable death, then would we not wish that at least four of the men inside that cave could still be alive today? It is my declaration that we should be celebrating the fact that these men survived a grueling wait in a cave for more then 30 days, and we should let them move on with their lives as they have already suffered enough. If the men had not acted in the destruction of one man’s life, we would be talking today amongst ourselves the tragic case of the five men who died in a cave from starvation. One must seriously reflect on this question and ask themselves if they truly would rather have one human dead or five humans dead, for this case seeks no other option. As a firm believer in the right to life, these men have only done what is necessary to survive where death seemed inevitable. The strong analogy posed by Justice Foster seems to be extremely telling in itself. Justice Foster explains that if a society is willing to risk the lives of ten individuals to save five, is it safe to say that we can risk one individual for the sake of four other individuals? The answer should be in the affirmative. </em><br /><em></em><br /><em>Justice Tatting brings in an analogy which is not apt to the situation at hand. Since we can use prudence as a form of reasoning, Tatting asserts that our logic, to remain consistent, must find a man innocent if he steals bread from a store because he is starving to death. This analogy has many problems. First, the dynamics behind a man who is free to other resources and the outside world is significantly different than men who have no other options or resources readily available. Since the man who stole bread at the store could just as easily go to a church service for food, or apply for welfare, or food stamps, shows us that him resorting to stealing was not a last and dire option. To reason with prudence when breaking the law, the defendant must expound that all other options were exhausted and that there was no possible way he could have survived had he not robbed the store for bread. For the typical thief I can safely assume that in Tatting’s analogy not all other options were sought to bring about comfort to this hungry man, therefore the act of stealing is wrong by nature. The defendants on trial today not only exhausted every means possible, but they were in such dire need for food that they ate one of their friends for mere survival. This fact in itself can show you that, since these men had no prior record to cannibalism, they were desperate for survival. </em><br /><em></em><br /><em>The question of self-defense can also play a vital role in making a decision based upon the circumstances in the case. Justice Keen presents the argument that since Whetmore never threatened the lives of the defendants then one cannot claim they were acting in self-defense. However, I disagree with Keen and find that Justice Foster is right on this issue. When one conforms to a law, there is always a purpose or motive behind why a law becomes law. If killing in self-defense was murder then it could never fully operate in a deterrent manner because it is human nature that we choose life over death. It is self-defense because without his death, the defendants would not be here in court today. The mere fact that Whetmore agreed to his death wouldn’t classify it as murder, but more so along the grounds of assisted suicide.</em><br /><em></em><br /><em>Although this is a tragic and devastating case, I must admit that I am not prepared to allow more death to ensue because our positive law was not in effect within their need for survival in the realms of natural law. I must rule that these defendants are innocent of any and all murder crimes brought against them today.</em><br /><strong></strong><br /><strong></strong>CaptainAmericahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09916748348077335095noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20022863.post-1150698147495149022006-06-18T23:21:00.000-07:002006-06-18T23:23:26.983-07:00Part 2 of "Learn Some History! series"- Finding James MadisonA long time ago, in an era far, far away, there lived a man of unprecedented levels of competence, versatility, virtue, and yes, brilliance. Often regarded as the “Father of the Constitution,” James Madison was considered the leading political theorist during his time on Earth; a time when our country was developing into the benevolent republic to which it hath become. Madison indulged himself into any book he could muster into his feeble hands (he weighed roughly 100 pounds!) and he constantly was researching history for practical theories of governance. His acumen transcended party affiliation and he remained America’s most principled Founding Father who fundamentally understood the system of government he wished to execute. As I gaze, dazed and confused, at the Congress of today, and the “great” politicians of today, I constantly ask myself a very unsatisfying question: Where the hell is the James Madison of today? Is it so beyond the realm of possibility that a man of great intentions, convictions, and standards who reads and understands political theory be in existence in the political arena of American politics today?<br /><br />Forget James Madison for a moment, and just observe the devolution of political minds throughout our nation’s history. We once had a government being run by a crew consisting of Madison, Jefferson, Hamilton, Henry, Jay, Adams, and Washington (although he was most notably known for his ability to govern and compromise). We are now in the midst of a government run by the ilk of Bush, Frist, Pelosi, Reid, Kennedy, Cheney, etc. The very thought of this comparison leaves me sickened. As cynical as I may sound, I do have hope for our beloved republic and the optimism in me believes that this great nation may produce another James Madison to run the country.CaptainAmericahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09916748348077335095noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20022863.post-1150231598886496702006-06-13T13:36:00.000-07:002006-06-13T13:47:51.506-07:00Part 1 of "Learn Some History! series"- Napoleon: Reclamation of the ThroneNapoleon Bonaparte was an early 19th century military commander of the French armed forces who later became Emperor of France from 1804 to 1814. The final days of Napoleon’s reign were rather dismal, as he solemnly observed the monumental empire he had fought for begin to fall into the hands of other European nations. As Napoleon abdicated from the throne, he was exiled to the island of Elba in April of 1814. However, less than a year later, Napoleon had once again reclaimed the crown as Emperor of France. How did Napoleon justify his return to power and reclamation of the throne in France? There were three major factors in which Napoleon justified his reclamation of the throne. First, the friendly and unsatisfying terms of the Treaty of Fontainebleau provided him the eventual means of coming back as the agreements within the treaty were not upheld. Secondly, the location of Elba, and the lack of oversight on the island paved the way for his escape. Thirdly, the environment in France at that time allowed for not only Napoleon’s return, but also allowed for his acceptance and consent of the people.<br /><br />On April 11th, 1814, Napoleon had formally abdicated from the throne as Emperor of France. The Allied European nations, Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, signed the Treaty of Fontainebleau which ultimately set the stipulations for the fate of Napoleon. The treaty stated that Napoleon was to be exiled to the island of Elba where he would attain the title of Emperor of Elba, he would receive two million francs annually, paid by the French government, and his wife, Marie-Louise, would receive the Duchy of Parma, a territory in Italy. The terms of the treaty itself were undoubtedly particularly generous to a man who had conquered half of Europe through force. Yet, the French and the other Allies reluctantly agreed to the proposal.<br /><br />Although Napoleon was depressed because of the abdication from his country, he requested in a letter written to then Commandant of the island of Elba, Count Dalesme, to “Announce this new order of things to the inhabitants, and tell them I have chosen the island for my residence because I know the kindness of their character and the excellence of their climate.” This is rather interesting because it shows that Napoleon was at least a little concerned about the consent of the people for his rule. Also, it portrays Napoleon as someone who took his title seriously, and that he was still capable of being an emperor in another country. These two components from this letter provide insight as to how Napoleon viewed his role in foreign affairs and how he viewed the consent of the people as something essential for his authority to be legitimately in power. His justification for coming back to power would never have been imposed on the French people had the French army not consented to Napoleon’s return.<br /><br />As Napoleon remained in exile, the Bourbons, who were now ruling France under King Louis XVIII, were not following through on their promise of compensating him two million francs. One main reason as to why Napoleon was to be granted this money was because he left behind over 160 million francs of property and real estate in France. Even though Napoleon had brought 4 million francs to the island, his funds were slowly depleting, and he was unable to pay for his expensive guard which was protecting him from Polish assassins. This not only angered Napoleon, but it also prevented him from sustaining a healthy state, as the money was not a luxury, but a necessity. As Napoleon demanded the money from the French government, the Bourbons proposed that Napoleon be relocated to the Azores, an island located in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean. This was something Napoleon would not stand for, so this played a very intricate part in his beginnings of plotting to escape the island of Elba and return to France. As we can see, Napoleon justifies part of his return for mere survival.<br /><br />Another source of extreme frustration with the terms of the treaty and the final decisions that were made came from Napoleon’s wife, Marie-Louise, and her decision to not join Napoleon on the island in exile. When Napoleon learned that his wife would not be joining him because she had wished not to go against her father’s wishes, he was devastated. While Napoleon was on Elba, he received news that his wife had married an Austrian general named Count Adam Albrecht von Neipperg, and Marie-Louise eventually bore two of his children, the first in 1815.9 Here were two very distinct reasons which forced Napoleon to return to the mainland: he needed money for survival, and he wanted revenge for his personal hurt. One could only imagine if these two reasons had been dealt with in Napoleon’s favor, that is to say if he were paid the money from the Bourbons and Marie-Louise had joined him in exile, he might not have sought a leaving the island to return to France.<br /><br />The Treaty of Fontainebleau was somewhat generous to Napoleon in two other aspects. The first is the actual location of where he was put, and the second is the specifications for his actual oversight and containment. The location of Elba was not too distant from the southern border of France as it was situated in the Mediterranean Sea roughly 240 miles from France. This is a crucial aspect to his actual means of getting to France because it physically enabled Napoleon to reach the island before he could be intercepted by British fleets. Had the Treaty of Fontainebleau been dictated by any of the other Alliance members, such as Britain for example, the terms would have been such that Napoleon would never have practical means of even coming back to France.<br /><br />The main allied country that was set in charge of Napoleon’s oversight on the island of Elba was the British. British Foreign Secretary Lord Castlereagh sent Sir Neil Campbell to accompany Napoleon to Elba where he assured everyone that Napoleon would not escape. In fact, the briefing Sir Neil Campbell received from Lord Castlereagh prior to his departure from France with Napoleon stated “Conduct yourself, as far as the circumstances will permit, with every proper respect and attention to Napoleon, to whose secure asylum in that island it is the wish of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent to afford every facility and protection.” Campbell recognized that these orders were vague and while living with Napoleon in July of 1814 he asked for more specific orders. The British responded that Campbell was a “British resident in Elba without assuming any further official character.” Campbell had in fact been absent ten days prior to Napoleon’s escape, and for the British and many others it was a clear “dereliction of duty.” Much of the blame for Napoleon’s escape was placed upon Campbell, yet nowhere in the initial briefing or specific orders did it say he was to remain on the island and guard Napoleon every day of the week. In fact, Campbell had left the island for a medical consultation, and the following day Napoleon ordered the ship Inconstant to be fixed for a voyage. The lack of oversight and location of Elba made the possibility of return, despite the justifications, very conceivable.<br /><br />The mitigating factors in Europe before Napoleon’s flight from Elba also played an important role in his decision to return. The Quadruple Alliance between the four powers that ousted Napoleon were starting to subtly quarrel with one another, and dissension was no the horizon. Within six months of these four powers signing the Treaty of Chaumont, which essentially said these four powers would ally for 20 years in case France ever got too powerful, they had formed alliances within the alliance. As Russia and Prussia wished to expand their territories, Austria, Britain, and even France became increasingly suspicious of their new prospects for more power. The tensions were so hostile that Austria, Britain and France signed a secret directed against Russia and Prussia. As Napoleon observed these events taking shape he realized that the Allies might be disconnected enough for him to regain power and continue his conquest through Europe.<br /><br />The primary factor for Napoleon’s reclamation of the throne was not necessarily the reasons to accomplish his goal, or even the dynamics of his actual escape; rather it was the atmosphere within France that allowed for Napoleon to actually regain the throne and lead with consent of the people. After Napoleon abdicated from the throne, the allied powers allowed for the restoration of the Bourbon dynasty and Louis XVIII was placed as the ruling King. The Bourbons had ruled France for nearly 200 years before they were overthrown by the French Revolution of 1792. The people of France did not take a liking to the restoration of the Bourbon dynasty in France. King Louis XVIII rejected one of the essential ideals of the Revolution which was the “idea of a contract between sovereign and the people.” He believed a king should rule by divinity, nothing more. To top it off, Louis XVIII changed the national flag from the tri-color blue, red and white flag of the Revolution to the white flag with yellow lilies. The legitimacy of the Bourbons was not recognized by the people simply because they were forced back to power under the guns of the allied powers. The French people saw this transformation of power to ignore the foundation and ideals of the French Revolution, something which Napoleon had represented symbolically. Napoleon was able to take back France because the people believed the Bourbons were too reactionary and were going to send France back into feudal darkness. The Official Report of Napoleon’s Return from the Island of Elba published in the Moniteur on May 23rd, asserts that the main justification for Napoleon returning to power was because Napoleon was informed “that the French people have lost all their rights…and his throne could guarantee the rights of the nation.”<br /><br />Although Louis XVIII did proclaim a “constitutional monarch” the situation was extremely bleak for most soldiers and peasants. In fact, thousands of military men who had been disbanded after Napoleon’s abdication were in the midst of monarchical corruption and they faced no jobs and no future. The King of France also engaged in nepotism by placing inexperienced officers in the higher ranks, and demoting veteran officers. The massive unemployment among the lower classes and peasantry produced a climate of disdain for the legitimacy of the Bourbon Restoration and paved the way for Napoleon to receive consent from the people.<br /><br />When Napoleon had finally escaped, he landed on the southern coast of France in Golf Juan with roughly 1,000 soldiers. As he marched through various cities of France on his way to Paris, the people of France rallied around him praising his return and consenting to his “liberation” of France. Upon learning of Napoleon’s return Louis XVIII ordered the military to arrest Napoleon and remain loyal to the state. As the French army sent by Louis XVIII met Napoleon and his soldiers in Grenoble, Napoleon proclaimed “Soldiers! If there is one among you who wishes to kill his emperor, he can do so. Here I am”; to which the military responded “vive l’emperour!” The massive disdain amongst the disheartened military towards Louis XVIII was quickly turned into action as the military and peasants, facing massive unemployment, decided to act upon their anger and side with their old emperor who embodied the ideals of the Revolution. Napoleon was a general that cared for his other generals and wished to gain support and legitimacy from them before them before he reclaimed the throne. Evidence of this can further be seen in Napoleon’s will, as he granted five families over 100,000 francs because their loved one was a general that perished under Napoleon’s reign.<br /><br />As word reached Paris of Napoleon’s return and rally towards the city, a series of anti-Bourbon riots ensued. Napoleon soon reached Paris and took back the city “without a shot being fired or any blood spilled.” On March 1st, 1815 Napoleon made a speech to the soldiers and peasants in France. Napoleon made a speech explaining to them that he has returned and now order and what the soldiers want will be acknowledged and kept. He also cleverly used phrases that appealed to the soldiers like “Soldiers! In my exile I have heard your voice.” Napoleon further proclaims “Put on the tricolor cockade; you wore it in our great days…then will you be able to claim the credit of your deeds.” Napoleon also made other proclamations asserting that “the throne of the bourbons was illegitimate.” The main theme behind his speech was to rally the troops and establish a military foundation with the troops and reveal the fact that he is back and that France will regain its prominence in Europe. It was produced to solidify the doubts in soldiers and generals heads that Napoleon was going to restore France with order and pride.<br />One must also keep in mind that the theory of nationalism was a new concept and the people of France were adhering to the belief of French superiority. As Napoleon pandered to the idea of nationalism in the speech, the people and soldiers rallied around his cries who then eventually consented to his authority. This speech marked the essence of Napoleon’s brilliance to appeal to the masses and ultimately led to his reclamation of the throne. By September 1st of 1815 he was able to gather a trained army of 800,000 men and his legitimacy was enormously greater than Louis XVIII.<br /><br />Although Napoleon would soon be ousted and sent to exile once again by the Allied powers, his return and escape from Elba was a great accomplishment nonetheless. Each of these dynamics are essential for understanding the major reasons as to how Napoleon came back as emperor. Napoleon’s exile to Elba was not enough to stop this overly ambitious military genius from restoring himself back to power. With the French government unable to fulfill parts of Treaty of Fontainebleau, Napoleon’s personal vendettas, the location of Elba, the lack of supervision on the island itself, and the surrounding ambiance of discontent among the French people for the Bourbon Restoration, Napoleon was able to escape from Elba and reclaim his throne and his legitimacy as rightful emperor of France.CaptainAmericahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09916748348077335095noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20022863.post-1149893163259362282006-06-09T15:35:00.000-07:002006-06-09T20:18:42.583-07:00Upon further Investigation...Marxism and CapitalismCapitalism and Marxism are two very distinct theories and societal philosophies that have one very common thread; they are both inherently built around a system of class structure and the acquiring of capital. From the inception of these competing philosophies these two theories have shaped politics, philosophy, history, economics, social structures, and systems of governance in more ways than man can even fathom. In this regard I will define the terms were are speaking with, attempt to explain the origins of each theory, explore the differing tenets and precepts of these two belief systems, distinguish between the social and economic variations of the two conjectures, while examining the morality of each position, and finally provide criticisms of both philosophies. (Although explaining Marxism is a critique of capitalism)<br /><br />It would be remiss of me to begin without defining both capitalism and Marxism in the broadest sense of terms, seeing as though there are schools of thought on both sides that project a certain magnitude to the actual belief systems. In Capitalism by David McCord Wright, capitalism is defined as "a system in which on average, much the greater portion of economic life, and particularly of net new investment, is carried on by private units under the conditions of active and substantially free competition, and avowedly, at least, under the incentive of a hope for profit." In short, capitalism presupposes that in an open society the ends are achieved by the individuals, or rather by voluntary organizations of individuals. Marxism is the reaction to such a system of capitalism, and advocates revolution of the proletariat in order to overthrow the capitalistic machinery of the state. Both systems have extreme complexities and components and each a reference point in history.<br /><br />Where and when did capitalism begin? The earliest forms of capitalism were widely known as "mercantilism", which could be defined as the distribution of goods in order to realize a profit. This practice gradually evolved into an economic theory called capitalism.<br /><br />Although the word itself did not come into existence until socialists coined it in the mid-nineteenth century, the principles of capitalism were first published in The National Gain, authored by Finnish parliamentarian Anders Chydenius in 1765, 11 years prior to Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations. However, Adam Smith is widely known as the founder of capitalism today. Smith used the phrase "economic individualism" rather than capitalism to describe this philosophy. Capitalism was seen as "the obvious and simple system of natural liberty" and it began under the idea that the state was built solely to protect individual rights and freedoms. The ingenious of Smith was that he had already written a rationale for the economic system of capitalism well before the industrial revolution had even begun. Smith had uncovered a set of principles which accepted man as the "self-starter" that was good for any productive society.<br /><br />The application of capitalism became present after the American Revolution commenced as the founders created a government built ideally for the economic system of capitalism. The government was there merely to protect the natural rights of man which were, "life, liberty, and property." After Smith died in 1790, the industrial revolution quickly swept America and Great Britain by storm, and the seeds of the early unfettered capitalism were taking shape. It was not until Karl Marx in 1848, with the publishing of Communist Manifesto that society had not seen such a serious and radical philosophical critique of capitalism.<br /><br />As stated before, Marxism was a philosophical and economic system which was promoted as a reaction to the unfettered capitalism of the early 19th century. Writing in London in 1848 Marx published the Communist Manifesto which served as the rallying cry and justifications as to why revolution of the proletariat should soon commence. Before this publication, French intellectuals were criticizing capitalism and advocating socialism, which goes to show many that the radical ideas against the system were flourishing. The drive for Marx to publish his ideas was heavily influenced by his deep disdain for the "anarchic" economy which capitalism perpetuates, and his desire to initiate a "planned economy" for the state.<br /><br />The history of Marxism does not translate into the wide misnomer of the history of communism; the system of government which failed in the USSR and China. Rather one must understand that Marxism was modified heavily by these two systems and arguably was distorted to the extremity of creating authoritarian monsters such as Stalin, Kruschev or Mao. The strictest interpretation of Marxism has really never been implemented thus there is no real empirical evidence to use to dispute Marxism as a theory of governance.<br /><br />So what are the basic tenets of the economic faction of these two philosophies? The basic foundation for the economic theory of capitalism is that the accumulation of the means of production is placed into the hands of a few individuals. This accumulated wealth is called "capital" and the people who possess the capital are "capitalists." The next step in capitalism involves the productive labor of the worker to be transferred into wage labor. That is to say that the value the worker creates will not be for the product they are making, but for the wages they are given by the capitalist. The division of labor then enables capitalism to increase productivity as it lowers the skill and wages of the worker. As an economic theory, capitalism embraces the free markets and the freedom of the capitalist to attain a profit by arguing that the worker has no inherent risk involved in losing money. The capitalist takes a risk with his money; therefore he is entitled to make the profit that is owed to him.<br /><br />Another support system for capitalism lies within the social philosophy and morality of such a theory. Wilhelm Ropke argues that the logic of capitalism is an intrinsically peaceful exchange between two consenting parties and because of this it is an exchange which exerts two moral parties. Within the free market, which capitalism embraces, people are able to put their ideas into practice and start a business if they wish, and it is up to the market if they succeed or fail. It promotes individual liberty and self-autonomy as the cornerstone of human existence. Capitalism offers the individual worker to attain high status in society and pursue their own goals and dreams with what they choose to make of their individual liberty. Robert Tracinski points out that "the fundamental characteristics that make capitalism practical, its respect for the freedom of the mind and for the sanctity of the individual, are also profound moral ideals."<br /><br />Marxism as an economic theory takes upon a rather different approach. To fully understand the theory of Marxism, it is required that we first must understand Marx’s view of history. Marx views history as dialectical. That is to say that Marx views history as a "process of change that took place through the coexistence of two contradictory sides, their conflict and their fusion into a new category." Capitalism was a synthesis of the bourgeois fighting against the thesis of feudalism and for the antithesis of mercantilism.<br /><br />Marxism argues that the value of a product being produced is nothing less than the amount of labor necessary for it to be manufactured. The capitalist in turn only pays the worker a wage and thus accumulates the surplus value, or profit, of what his laborer, according to Marx, has rightfully produced. This is the crux and main problem Marx has with capitalism; the class stratification produces an inequality amongst men and the bourgeois class is able to profit from the proletariat. For Marx, the accumulation of capital for some will often cause accumulation of poverty for many. Marx’s says the "accumulation at one pole is simultaneously accumulation of misery, work torture, slavery, ignorance, brutalization, and moral degeneracy at the other."<br /><br />According to Marxism, the evolution of capitalism would lead to a dismal state of unemployment and exploitation and a severe economic crisis would ensue. Since Marx was writing Das Kapital in London, he envisioned the most advanced capitalist society to be the first system to be taken over by the proletariat. In fact, Marx’s ideal place for revolution was no other place but London. The finality of Marxism was to have a "dictatorship of the proletariat" that "was to centralize all instruments of production into the hands of the state" that would then increase productivity at a rapid rate. The endgame of Marxism is a kind of social and economic utopian ideal between the state and the workers producing the goods in harmony. As a result Marxism hopes to create a classless society in which the doctor gets paid the same as the janitor.<br /><br />The interesting point about Marxism is that Marx’s himself never attempts to argue that capitalism is unjust. In fact, he even attempts to distance his scientific socialism with the utopian socialists of the day who argued that capitalism was unjust. Marx did however, use phrases such as "exploitation of the proletariat" which does have a connotative meaning of someone wronging someone else of their humanity. Yet Marx does acknowledge that "exchange is by no means an injustice." Thus many Marxists have argued that capitalism is simply not the best way for humankind to live, implying that humanity could be better served through a collective ownership that does not diminish freedom or abuse the men of society. The practice of such a society attempts to summon a utopian society where the synchronization of mankind is perfectly in tune and the eradication of poverty, unemployment, racism, sexism, and pollution will be the end result.<br /><br />Since I have already outlined a Marxist critique of capitalism, I will now address the many criticisms of Marxism itself. One criticism of Marxism says that the problem of Marxism’s idea of history is that in thinks in terms of the material world and not the world of ideas, which ultimately "disvalues the idea of democracy." Using this criticism, many say that Marxism has given rise to totalitarian states. It is interesting to note that the implementation of Marxism by Lenin in the 1917 Bolshevik revolution was merely one interpretation of Marxism. That is to say that Lenin ultimately viewed the application of Marxism as the "dictatorial seizure of power by an exclusively revolutionary vanguard party of the proletariat, and taking the bourgeoisie’s and aristocracy’s property by expropriation, the denial of their political power and rights, and subsequently their death." Although it is clear that Marx would not have supported this, it does say something about the interpretation of such philosophy, and that maybe the practical application of Marxism is something which is unattainable.<br /><br />If we examine Marxism from the Communist Manifesto’s perspective, we clearly see that Marx gives rather specific instructions as to how the dictator of the proletariat should govern the state. He says "the first step in the revolution by the working class is to raise the proletariat to the position of the ruling class, to win the battle for democracy." This is somewhat troubling for Lenin however. Lenin believes that since democracy was a state form, and Marx believed in the abolition of the state then democracy must perish as well. Thus a dictatorship of the proletariat commenced and soon gave rise to even more malcontent for the people then the system below. For example, the interpretation of Marxist thought has led to a restriction on personal freedom, expression of opinion, the free exchange of ideas only to achieve a utopian end of pure communism. With communism giving rise to dictators restricting these liberties, the application of Marxist thought is often seen as giving rise to a different form of dictatorship and oppression.<br /><br />There is also a very interesting critique of the way in which Marx views history. If one were to apply the theory of dialectics to Marxism, then we would thus assume that the Hegelian theory of history was the thesis and the Marxist theory of history was its antithesis. But if the Hegelian theory views history as a change in ideas, and Marx argues that he is ignoring class struggle and economic order, then where is the synthesis between these two theories? If Marx truly support his own theory of dialectics then all evolving theories and change must be a synthesis of two other forms, therefore this could negate him from even believing that pure Marxism is correct.<br /><br />In conclusion, capitalism and Marxism are philosophies which presuppose different tenets of human nature and from this they draw their differing conclusions as to how society should be run. Although they have much that is different, it is true to say that they have much in common with one another. Through the histories of each of these two concepts and the fundamental purposes for which they were composed, highlights, arguably, the two most influential philosophies of our day. Capitalism and Marxism are two theories that have stood the test of time in the relevance of intellectual discussion.CaptainAmericahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09916748348077335095noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20022863.post-1149583787468601452006-06-06T01:48:00.000-07:002006-06-06T01:49:47.480-07:00Socrates Was a BadassThe Trial and Death of Socrates authored by the “other great philosopher” Plato, has come under my recent inspection and inquiry after taking about a year off from my initial encounter with the book. Comprised of four distinct dialogues, Socrates protrudes the utmost courage and superiority within his grandiose dialectical method of examination accompanied by his interlocutors. In modern day language, by all accounts and understanding of the English idiom, Socrates would be considered no less than a swanky badass. A badass with words, with phrases, with quips and barbs, and most importantly, with convincing Plato that nobody ever prevailed against any of his contentions thus continually leaving the futile interlocutor walking away head down, disgusted and shamed. <br /><br />The first and second dialogues represent little importance to me than do the third and fourth dialogues. The first being Euthyphro, a dialogue in which Socrates plays upon one of his most infamous techniques in plastering the raconteur of the passage, Euthyphro, by invoking his Socratic irony. In the end, like all Hollywood movies, the good guy, Socrates, eventually makes the bad guy look like a fool. The second dialogue called The Apology, consisting of Socrates playing ignorant once again, casts all pretensions to human knowledge into uncertainty. As the wisest of them all, Socrates proclaims that he is posited better off the less he thinks he knows. This way he continues to foster discourse amongst truth and will not stop attaining knowledge as an indignant pretentious prick would. (Yes, I am talking about myself)<br /><br />Now, onto the reason I decided to write this less than amusing and less than interesting article. Hopefully, you have not fallen asleep at the title. The third dialogue, called Crito and starring Crito, is probably the most thought-provoking dialogue ever to be written by Plato. (There are a total of 32 Socratic dialogues) The entire dialogue takes place in Socrates’ prison cell, where he awaits his Athenian court death sentence. Crito comes upon Socrates cell and informs him that he has arranged for Socrates to escape from the prison and has planned his exile in a distant city away from Athens. After a plethora of arguments trying to convince Socrates to leave, Socrates seems to be unconvinced of Crito’s polemics and further questions if what Crito asserts is the right thing to do. <br /><br />Enter badass. Socrates charges into his elenchus and leaves Crito dumbfounded and without words in the end. Socrates says that he must stay to carry out the state’s sentence, because ultimately he has consented to the rules of the state, and leaving now because the rules inconvenience him, would be a dereliction of duty. He poses the absolutely brilliant question to Crito which is: “Do you imagine that a State can subsist and not be overthrown, in which <a name="312"></a>the decisions of law have no power, but are set aside and overthrown by <a name="313"></a>individuals?" In other words, if individual citizens decide to obey the laws of the city based solely on their private circumstances, then there can be no city and laws at all. Although he issues three other arguments in this discussion, this question is a tough question to answer if you support Crito’s proposition. Crito then concedes without further questioning Socrates’ supremacy and Socrates remains awaiting his fate.<br /><br />With Socrates accepting his fate, we now turn to his final conversations before his death in Phaedo. Here we can examine empirical evidence that remains consistent with my intellectually charged thesis that Socrates was indeed, nothing less than a badass. It is in this dialogue that we find out that Socrates was not repining death whatsoever. In fact, he even goes so far to declare that since death is merely the separation of the body and soul, that every philosopher, at Death’s doorstep, should gladly accept his fate. In other words, since the philosopher holds true the idea that the body corrupts the soul and that the body merely infringes upon the learning and knowledge of the soul, that the separation will free the mind and give the philosopher what he always has hoped to have. Socrates accepts death on the premise that the body has been a hindrance to his knowledge search thus death will enable him to further himself with merely his soul. <br /><br />A man who plays ignorance to defeat his cohorts in a Columbo style charade; a man who dabbles in innocuous fun by claiming to know nothing at all yet spreading more wisdom than Michael Moore spreads lies; a man who altruistically accepts death on the principle of keeping the state intact; and a man who willingly accepts death because his body has impeded himself from acquiring total reason and virtue, is nothing other than a mother fucking badass. Thank you, now go read some Nietzsche.CaptainAmericahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09916748348077335095noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20022863.post-1146753124361439912006-05-04T07:29:00.000-07:002006-05-04T07:32:04.376-07:00Illegal Immigrants Have No Rights, comprende?The other day, while watching the fair and balanced Fox News channel, an immigrant (presumably illegal) was giving an interview with a Fox News reporter in Los Angeles. The man vehemently insisted that illegal immigrants should have all the same rights as American citizens because of a two reasons. First, as he rattled off his apparent minimal knowledge of American history, he argued that when the Pilgrims came to America, the Native Americans never asked for legal documentation. Second, he said that illegal immigrants should have all the rights of American citizens because after all, they just come here to work. The media and left-wing politicians today do not seem to understand that ‘illegal’ should be in front of ‘immigrant rights’ as they attempt to equalize law-abiders and criminals.<br /><br />Now, sane-minded American citizens quickly realize the idiocy behind these two justifications. The first fails to recognize that there was in fact no institutionalized government or system of laws within North America when the Puritans came to this land. The Puritans furthermore did not reap health care and education benefits from the ‘tax-paying’ Native Americans. The second fails to acknowledge the sovereign right of a nation-state to deny citizenship to an illegal alien. It also usurps the Constitution, gives way to enhanced terrorist activity, and not to mention costs billions of taxpayers dollars. That’s right folks, according to the Center for Immigration Studies, illegal immigrants cost our government 10.4 billion dollars every year. Hardworking American citizens’ are funding illegals education and health care because they are criminals who choose not to come here legally and know that they will not have to pay taxes by doing so.<br /><br />So again, what is all this talk about illegal immigrant rights? Is the term not contradictory in and of itself? If I commit an illegal act in society, many of my rights will be stripped of me because I have broken the ‘social contract’ with the state. But wait a second; these illegal immigrants are not even part of our state to begin with. They are entitled to nothing in this country. Besides the fundamental human rights all individuals should be entitled to, which is essentially ‘life’, illegal immigrants are entitled to absolutely nothing according to the supreme law of the land, or the Constitution. Last I checked, the 14th Amendment dictates what is granted and guaranteed to the citizens of this great country, not to people who knowingly break a federal law by coming to America illegally.<br /><br />The protests calling for ‘immigrants rights’ and ‘amnesty’ are not only absurd, but they are also a great way for the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to arrest many of the illegal aliens in this country. When the government knows large numbers of illegal immigrants will be allocated into one rally in a major city, it is the federal government’s job to go out to the rally and ask these protestors for their legal documents. Besides, the illegal immigrants have absolutely no right to be protesting any American piece of legislation to begin with as they are clearly not American citizens.<br /><br />So what is the conclusion again of illegal immigrant’s rights in America? Aside from human dignity and respect of human rights, they should have nothing. Not a job, not education, not health care, and certainly not false documents. Businesses that hire illegal aliens should have sanctions and a heavy fine placed upon them. The illegal immigrants should be grateful that the US government is considering passing a guest worker program to allow these people to get on a path towards citizenship and work legally in America. But make no mistake about it, we are talking about people who broke US federal law; they deserve nothing from America.CaptainAmericahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09916748348077335095noreply@blogger.com6tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20022863.post-1145608490909082892006-04-21T01:32:00.000-07:002006-04-21T01:34:50.926-07:00Treatise on Individual Means and ProgressTo which man came to exist there followed upon subsistence for freedom. Divinity in its greatest formation cannot subsist within a world that masks freedom in the existentialist construct of mere existence. Placing the will of the individual separate and away from the guise of the statist realm persists as a logical configuration of a shadowing obstacle to equality. However, this equality is idealistic and dysfunctional altogether. How then can one move forward amongst the broken pillars of intervention when the purpose of survival is predicated amongst the decree of incentive and self-preservation? Denying the philosophy of coercion and compulsory organization of men gives rational cause to the individual means and progress to which therefore mankind is emancipated.<br /><br />The death of such progress is not originated from an anterior attack; rather the individual means of freedom dies from a statist regime in power no longer believing in independence or autonomy. Personal responsibility is the foregone conclusion in a healthy state of mind and of politics, thus perpetuating a desire for reason and exalted reveries. <br /><br />Statesmanship is the institution we so highly esteem our own right and self government, yet hardly are we to place judgment on corruption. We propose the supreme law of the land to hold certain instinctual liberations presupposed, yet the philosophy of government has disavowed this very natural order. The statist realm confounds to sway the masses between self-righteous endeavors of redistribution or egocentric petty minded greed. Do not adhere to this falsehood. It is worth not a pittance of intellectual stimulation to swallow the undesirable outlook of emotion over reason; of mendacity over veracity; of simplicity over complexity; of irrationality over rationality.<br /><br />Justice seeks to be done only for those who wish to seek justice. If the coercive doctrines of these deranged tactics seek to be capitulated, then the justice shall be done to the individuals of the state. Vigilant thinking and gravitational obstacles place a man to drive for the individual means of progress by creating a state free of subjugation; economically and philosophically. Rational cause must usurp emotion; to which it is done the tenets of the individual means and progress will thrive.CaptainAmericahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09916748348077335095noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20022863.post-1144964928828925782006-04-13T14:46:00.000-07:002006-04-13T14:48:48.863-07:00Problem with MarxismCapitalism and Marxism are two very distinct theories and societal philosophies that have one very common thread; they both are inherently built around a system of class structure and the acquiring of capital. In capitalism, the means of production are owned by the capitalist, or CEO, in today’s world. The workers who create value for that CEO are compensated duly for their work, even if they are not getting paid for their full value. The justification for the worker not getting paid full value is that there is an intrinsic risk involved for the CEO. If he invests 5 million dollars into a company, and at the end of the year he only gets 3 million back, then he has lost 2 million dollars investing in that company. The worker still gets paid, and this is why he will never be fully compensated for his work as a laborer; there is no risk for him at all.<br /> Marxism believes that since the worker creates the value of the product, that he should then in turn own the means of production. But I have trouble accepting his premise that ONLY the worker creates the value. If a car has all the proper components for it to run, with the exception of the engine, it cannot run. Just as a plot of land has all the utilities and arability to produce crops, the value cannot be produced unless a laborer plows the fields and creates the value, similar to an engine in a car. However, if the car has a flat tire, or the land is not arable, then the value cannot be produced, and even with an engine the car will not run well. Hence, the potentiality of a foreseen and good investment, or car, is, at its core, a skill. Although it isn’t a direct production of value, it is an indirect method of producing the value.CaptainAmericahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09916748348077335095noreply@blogger.com10tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20022863.post-1142554437607178162006-03-16T16:11:00.000-08:002006-03-16T16:14:49.473-08:00The Critique and Analysis of my 'Confronting Empire' courseThe false predication divulged throughout the class of “Confronting Empire” has circulated a wide misnomer of the actual meaning of ‘empire.’ From Winthrop to Horsley, this course has brought forth a very original and confounding hypothesis which essentially suggests that America has grown into its “imperial” place in history due to the seeds of “Christianity” and its divine mission for greatness. From Chris Hedges illuminating the malignant precepts of America’s imperial condition and its addiction to war, to David Harvey demonstrating the inevitable failure of the capitalist neo-liberal policies abroad, the conclusion of this course was reached before it began. That is to say not once in this course was their ever a goal to disseminate the growing need for the US policy abroad as it stands today. An empire, by nature, suggests negative connotations where one political entity dominates another political entity; a belief I do not hold about the United States. I believe fundamentally that we are in fact a global superpower, with vast influence beyond our borders.<br /><br />The moral structure of America can be traced back to when our country was first set in motion by the Puritans and the utopist ideals of John Winthrop. Yet what is the current state of affairs within America in terms of religion? While the current politicians in the White House actively seek to endorse and utilize religion as grounds for many domestic policies, I see no distinction in the framework of Bush’s foreign policies that have led me to believe we are embarking on a religious crusade in the Middle East. Even as our “national project” sets its course to determine the fate of some countries, is it not something which can be looked upon as altruistic, even if it does fail?<br /><br />My own understanding of liberal values falls in accordance with where our society is currently; a free market, representative democracy, while not perfect, yet exactly what our Constitution outlined our state to become. Who and when did people decide that the American situation looked bleak? Through optimism and a restriction on laissez-faire economics, we overcame the Great Depression, which at the time was spoken about as if it was the end of our republic. Today, Harvey is espousing this same nonsense, even when our country is in the process of attaining more and more amounts of wealth and higher percentages of GDP than any other country in the world (with possible exception of China). The alternative of this national project laid forth by Barbara Epstein is a nonviolent resistance to US policies and advocated for “peace, non-intervention, ecological preservation, feminism, and gay and lesbian rights.” She is described as being “driven by a vision of an ecologically balanced, nonviolent, egalitarian society, [that] engaged in political action through affinity groups, made decisions by consensus, and practiced mass civil disobedience.”<br /><br />Yet what are these resistant groups, like Epstein’s, essentially driving for? They are in essence driving a selfish political agenda, just as the politicians in power strive for their agendas, to shape or mold the world in their own moral clarity. In Epstein’s case, she seems to be confused that we do not live in a socialist country and that if she wanted to change anything, she would only be successful were she to overthrow the government in a violent manner. Tocqueville so eloquently distinguishes between these two philosophical systems as he states “while democracy seeks equality in liberty, socialism seeks equality in restraint and servitude." Whether or not you agree with the national project’s continuing goals and aspirations for promoting liberal values here and abroad, we all must agree that it is in fact a machine and the only way to take it down is by force. Non-violent resistance, as Professor Block proclaimed, is in fact almost completely hopeless.<br /><br />The moral lens which we propose for other countries to view through as well is a worthy attainable mission. The messianic and pretentious accusations of America’s liberal ideals proliferated throughout the globe is stale and unfounded. How has Bush justified Iraq based upon religious grounds? The basis of war was on moral superiority and a notion of a threat deemed imminent to the American people, which had garnered support and effective analysis from CIA Director George Tenet who claimed they did have WMDs. We will not go around setting up democracies in other parts of the world, with Wolfowitz out of the administration, Rumsfield wielding no power, and Bush leaving office in 2008 (not to suggest Bush is a neo-conservative, just that he is heavily surrounded and influenced by them in his cabinet).<br /><br />Tocqueville argues in “Democracy in America” that the US will eventually face a democratic despotism somewhere down the road. He also goes on to say “It would seem that if despotism were to be established among the democratic nations of our days, it might assume a different character; it would be more extensive and more mild.” It seems as though Tocqueville defines the very heart of what democracy is as the reason it will one day become despotic in rule over the people. He says “Such a power does not destroy, but it prevents existence; it does not tyrannize, but it compresses, enervates, extinguishes, and stupefies a people, till each nation is reduced to nothing better than a flock of timid and industrious animals, of which the government is the shepherd…” His analysis seems to overlook one major aspect of our Constitution; that no where in the supreme law of the land does it say ‘democracy,’ as we were founded upon a republic. In Federalist Paper #10 Madison proclaims “…democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths." If you juxtapose both of these statements it is clearly evident that they are strikingly similar.<br /><br />So how then can Tocqueville critique something which was never created and in fact dismissed by our creators themselves? The fact of the matter is that our country is not headed towards ‘democratic despotism.’ If we are merely sheep, as Tocqueville seems to conclude, then why do politicians seek re-election by pandering to the masses and taking positions due to public opinion polls? The evolution of our democracy has indeed generated a form of ‘imperial presidency’, yet I have a difficult time accepting that the American people do not dictate the policies of this country, in some form or another. Our moral liberalist standards are cohesive with a responsive government which establishes the will of the people and the notion of legitimacy through fair and equal elections.<br /><br />The model in which I have continued to argue is the sustaining status quo. America is not in an oppressed and oblivious state in my mind. Horsley’s Jesus and Empire confounds me in the deepest way. He’s main argument is that many Americans today think of us as the new Rome. According to Horsley this should be unsettling to Christians because Jesus was among those who the Roman Empire subdued. He traces the roots of America back to our founding and equates the covenantal principles with something that could be in accordance with Jesus’ covenant, and that we are steering from our path of social justice. What still bewilders me is his need for equating Rome to America. They are not even remotely the same, besides the fact that they are superpowers of their time. Horsley writes, “Since September 11, 2001, however, we can no longer rest comfortably with such domesticated pictures of Jesus. We can no longer ignore the impact of Western imperialism on subordinated people and the ways in which peoples whose lives have been invaded sometimes react." How can he say “subordinated people?” America does not acquire lands for the sole purpose of riches and territorial superiority. America does not subjugate and colonize overseas to enslave masses and culture. America does not shun away at a disaster half way around the world because it’s not in our interests; we give humanitarian aid, medicines, supplies, progress, technology, and higher economic standards of living with countries that open barriers of trade with us.<br /><br />One major reason why we are not like Rome can be seen in mere statistics. America spends roughly 4% of it’s GDP on military expenditures. The Roman Empire spent close to 25% on its military dominance. America does not have a culture which embraces the propagation effort of our ‘imperialism’ rather you have the antithetical sentiment coming from writers, actors, and musicians of our day. According to Horsley, just because the US has military bases stationed in another land for control of potential foreign threats, that we somehow are “imperializing” the nation we have a mere presence within. We do not dictate the policy of Japan, like Rome did to Macedonia. We do not rule Germany like Rome ruled Judea. It is beyond irresponsible then to compare and contrast these two empires without first, defining empire, and then distinguishing the natural differences.CaptainAmericahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09916748348077335095noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20022863.post-1142115840945609652006-03-11T14:22:00.000-08:002006-03-11T14:24:00.963-08:00The Little Democracy That Never CouldFor the past three years of my life, I have given my unwavering support for the Bush Administration in conducting its war in Iraq, which essentially was waged for national security purposes. Yet, a revelation today would lead me to not only become disenfranchised with the current situation, but also lead me to face a sad fact of reality in which I believe I was wrong for supporting democracy in the Middle East. Hear me loud and clear liberals, this is not a confession about Bush’s misguided foreign policy, but more of a cultural awareness which I believe many of my conservative colleagues should take note of in today’s political climate of Iraq.<br /><br />What has American foreign policy been advocating for the last two and a half years since its tenure in Iraq? It has been promoting a stable, democratic Iraq which holds true the freedoms and human rights of all people; a republican form of government that espouses ideals and principles of the civilized world. Unfortunately, this is not the reality of the situation. Iraq recently adopted and ratified a national constitution which has all the proper tenets of a theocracy. The dissolution of Saddam has created an Islamic state, something which the US does not endorse.<br /><br />The definition of a theocracy from wikipedia is thus: “a <a title="Forms of government" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forms_of_government">form of government</a> in which a <a title="Religion" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religion">religion</a> or <a title="Faith" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Faith">faith</a> plays the dominant role. Properly speaking, it refers to a form of government in which the organs of the religious sphere replace or dominate the organs of the political sphere.” Article II of the Iraqi Constitution says the following: “First: Islam is the official religion of the state and it is a fundamental source of legislation. A) No law that contradicts the established provisions of Islam may be established.” The clear evidence suggests to all around the world that Iraq is now an official theocracy.<br /><br />How can a country pride itself on democratic ideals and religious tolerance, when the Constitution itself proclaims that the legislature can use the Koran to dictate laws, and furthermore the Federal Supreme Court will now be able to adjudicate cases under Islam? Freedom of religious practices and an established state religion cannot ever be juxtaposed within a constitution. Those two components are fundamentally a paradox. Is the Supreme Court in Iraq going to mandate that a Christian woman living in Kirkuk must cover her face in public because it’s a law under the state’s official religion of Islam? Religious freedom and theocracy does not coincide, period. <br /><br />The cultural variation within this region is so drastically different, that a republican form of government, one in which the US prides itself on, is virtually unattainable. Unfortunately for Bush, his idealistic vision and commendable, altruistic foreign policy objectives will ultimately fail. This is not to say that the initial justifications of the war were unwarranted; only it is an observation and analysis of the results of intervention in Iraq. Is the world better off without Saddam? Of course it is. Yet why are we hearing President Bush use rhetoric such as “democracy” when in all reality Iraq is now the direct antithesis of such a form of government.<br /><br />What is the future of Iraq? The benign precepts of Islam have been soaked into the Constitution, thus creating a natural rift between those of Islamic faith and those who are not of Islamic faith. If this schism is not sorted out in the courts, or in the will of the legislature, then I fear the ultimate price for Iraq; a 21st century civil war between the Kurds and the Shiites. This hostility can only grow deeper unless this constitution is amended in some form or another. <br /><br />Theocracy in Iraq may be an evolutionary method of a form of hybrid form of democracy, but at its elemental core, it is not. A democracy was never, not once, achievable with the religious distinctions in the region; at least a democracy which adhered to Western principles. America now unfortunately may have created exactly what it wished to eliminate; a growing desire for legislating Islam in a state which was once secular. The future indeed looks grim for Iraq, and all the rest of the world can do is sit back and watch it unfold.CaptainAmericahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09916748348077335095noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20022863.post-1141608798209159372006-03-05T17:30:00.000-08:002006-03-05T17:39:34.146-08:00Who is Mike O'Shea?Since coming to DePaul University four years ago, my political beliefs have always been in accordance to basic conservative principles. I would characterize myself as a ‘philosophical conservative,’ which could be described as a hybrid form of classical liberalism. As a freshman in college, I was very much attached to the party lines of the Republican platform, yet soon discovered that ideology was more pure, and less hypocritical than party politics. For instance, I tend to be turned off by gotcha games in the political arena. I am more interested in assessing problems, debating, and writing or finding solutions to those problems; most solutions have nothing to do with government in my mind.<br /><br />I am currently the Editor-In-Chief of a new conservative newspaper at DePaul entitled the Lincoln Park Statesman. The transformation of ideology from thought to paper has broadened my conservative prose and has enhanced my arguments three-fold. I am a firm believer that research is the essential foundation for coming to acknowledge what you espouse politically. It is my assertion that if you are uninformed about a particular subject area, you not only should refrain from speaking upon that subject, but you also have failed your duty as an American citizen to participate in the fostering of debate; the indispensable groundwork for a democracy to remain intact.<br /><br />There are a number of different issues I feel relatively passionate about. First and foremost is my undeniable belief in personal responsibility. The bedrock of conservatism is founded upon this principle. Government intervention is almost never a good thing. It is my belief that the more a government adopts social programs or policies that regulate an entire industry, that the more you will see personal responsibility and individual freedom diminish significantly. Besides the fact that virtually all governmental programs are ineffective, the philosophy behind such intervention is faulty at its core. Why should government be able to take money out of my pocket and give it to someone who made poor, inadequate decisions early in life that ultimately disabled them from getting a job and making an honest living? The answer is that government should not have that authority. Government is here because as Madison claimed, men are not angels. Government is alive to protect its citizens from foreign threats and to protect individual liberty.<br /><br />Another doctrine I hold very close to my heart is the belief in a free trading world. Countries with a liberalized market show higher economic standards of living than do countries with protectionist policies that uphold hindering trade barriers. To put a restriction on someone from selling goods in a land where they didn’t manufacture the product or grow the commodity strips man away from the primordial aspects of survival. Besides the fact that it’s the “law,” what grounds does someone have to disable or restrict one to sell goods and services in a foreign land?<br /><br />I like to think I have a wide range of political knowledge, yet I am always eager and willing to learn more. I have an intense interest in history, as it is my other major, particularly presidential history. I truly believe that we are living in a moment in time that will never be forgotten. The litmus test for the success of the current implementation of freedom and democracy around the world will ultimately be in fact history.<br /><br />A quick run-down of my stance, a philosophical conservative, on current issues today: pro-Iraqi War (a strong defense is vital to a Republic which is under attack by not only terrorism, but by an ideology of Islamic-Fundamentalism), strongly against Affirmative Action, pro-gun rights (fully support the 2nd Amendment), support fiscal discipline (something which the Republicans and Bush are making a disgrace of currently), against welfare and social programs alike, support a laissez-faire economic policy, strong supporter of free trade and against trade barriers, somewhat “against” the Patriot Act (although the need for protection of liberty was essential at the time it was ratified, whether it needs to be renewed is a different story, still no documented cases of abuse have come from investigations), support strong immigration reform, pro-life, support privatization of Social Security, strong belief in a supreme being (yet should be absent of government rule), support a Palestinian state, support a flat tax (current code is too complicated and absurd), against the idea of hate crimes, support capital punishment, support school vouchers, and against gay marriage (pro-gay rights and benefits).<br /><br />I do not have a set political structure in life, but I do have a strong belief in personal responsibility and individual autonomy. These two ideas are the basis for my analysis of issues in today’s world, and are my guide to developing a solution to each of the issues. Hopefully this post will help you understand what I am all about.CaptainAmericahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09916748348077335095noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20022863.post-1141441468195674222006-03-03T19:03:00.000-08:002006-03-03T19:05:29.206-08:00DePaul Conservative Alliance backstabbed by 'concerned students' organizationOn Wednesday February 1st, the DePaul Conservative Alliance, along with SGA and the ‘concerned students’ at DePaul, held a town hall forum which revolved around the controversial affirmative action bake sale. The forum, as told to the DCA, was to consist of a debate around free speech, where a DCA student was to be presenting its right to have the bake sale, while the ‘concerned students’ presented their case as to why they have the right to override the Constitution and shut down the bake sale, because it offended some DePaul students.<br /><br />Naturally, the DCA was extremely skeptical of the impartiality of the forum when we received word two days before the event that the ‘concerned students’ had reached out to three DePaul professors, Valerie Johnson, Howard Lindsey, and Sumi Chou to serve as “expert references” on the panel discussion. An hour before the event began I met with the ‘concerned students’ and expressed my discontent with them being on the panel for fear that they would impose their own ideology and bias against the DCA. The representatives for the ‘concerned students’ assured me, to my face, that these professors would be in the audience just providing their “expertise” on questions from the students.<br /><br />Still cynical at the situation, the DCA went ahead with the forum after agreeing to the “experts” as being impartial and not on the panel. Yet the ‘concerned students’ backstabbed the DCA. Not only were they on the panel, but they also opened up the forum speaking out against our actions. The professors they had got were unanimously against the bake sale itself, and furthermore were in complete agreement that the discriminatory policy of affirmative action was justified. Valerie Johnson, from the Political Science Department, called me “troubled” and “ignorant” during this debacle. Most of the audience, with the exception of the DCA members, was extremely disrespectful throughout the forum, as they were laughing, bellowing, yelling, and making a mockery of the “intellectual” forum on free speech.<br /><br />The forum was supposed to be on free speech, yet I guess Prof. Lindsey didn’t get the memo, or the ‘concerned students’ backstabbed us. His opening remarks, which the professors were not supposed to get anyways, were about how Martin Luther King Jr. wanted affirmative action, and how he is the product of such a disastrous policy, and why it’s good for America today. Prof. Johnson echoed the same illogical rhetoric. Professor Chou came wandering in late, which shows her dedication to the actual forum, and began to spout nonsense of how the bake sale is not considered “free speech.” It seems to me that Professor Chou would be better suited living under Stalin in the 1940s with her idea of censorship and total oppression of thought. But what can you expect from DePaul’s professors, being a liberal who is against free speech is a pre-requisite at this school. Maybe Chou will actually attempt to read the 1st Amendment before she adds her two cents of blatant inanity to the next forum.<br /><br />The DCA was ambushed by the ‘concerned students’ “expert panel” and for that they should look at themselves as mere cowards. To be fair, we have already received an apology from one of the representatives of the ‘concerned students’ but we have yet to receive anything from the individual who actually reached out to these professors. The DCA will continue to spark political discourse on campus by encouraging free speech on campus. You can always count on us for leading the charge to reform this left-wing institution.CaptainAmericahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09916748348077335095noreply@blogger.com12tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20022863.post-1140680275114286042006-02-22T23:36:00.000-08:002006-02-22T23:40:20.816-08:00Constitutionalism Part III: The Case for African ConstitutionalismAs the West actively seeks to endorse and impose constitutions in countries around the globe, there lies a fundamental element of debate for application of a constitution in certain areas of the world. As the State Department notes, the biggest export of America is their constitution around the world; setting up free liberal democracies here and there while granting primitive tribal societies a sense of ‘universal rule of law.’ The African constitutional experience is far different than the European experience. Through my research however, I have concluded that African countries, although different from European countries, should still adopt some form of a constitution in order to 1) establish a framework for development and progress, through the rule of law, internally and externally, 2) improve the well-being of the state, and 3) appeal to the global community.<br /><br />One of the primary differences between European constitutions and African constitutions, opponents of adopting constitutions in Africa argue, is that the consent of the people or the pull of ethnicity is far greater in Africa than it is in Europe. While this may have some truth to it, the argument about this being a main reason for not adopting a constitution is faulty. The fact of the matter is that the US is the most diverse country, culturally and religiously, yet our Constitution remains in tact. The initial stages of implementation are difficult, yes, and blood may be spilled, but for the long haul the co-existence of a diverse population and a constitution is very practical indeed. The Europeans underwent an easier time adopting it, since they are all usually of one nationality, but this fact alone should not impede African countries from establishing one for itself.<br /><br />Opponents of my theory also argue that when constitutions are imposed, patrimonialism, which is essentially authoritarianism, exists in the African hierarchy and the rule of law is lost. But what can we say about this absence of the rule of law? Could it be a fracture on the actual constitutional-making process? If the state created an institution which provided checks and balances with a strong independent judiciary, the executive branch could not abuse his power. The framework thus created, enables these countries to develop a sense of national unity and national strength which is facilitated by grossing a GDP and accepting globalization as a form of enlightenment and necessity. The abuse of power can be curbed by reforming the process to a different way than the Europeans; perhaps a more gradual process. Internally they succeed and externally they can open trade with other nations as well.<br /><br />What of the notion that constitutions contribute to the well-being of the state? Author Yash Ghai states "…neither the substance nor the ideology of the rule of law is necessary to governments and their economic systems in Africa…" Yet more often than not, we find that the countries with unrestricted trade and constitutional governments enjoy higher economic standards of living. This is to say that most of the European countries that parted from communism enjoy great economic success because of the established supreme law of the land. Without this symbolic and literal document, the country is always up for a power struggle and the well-being of the state is decreased. In other words, Ghai fails to mention that without an economic system or rule of law, that sheer anarchy and absolute freedom will ensue, thus giving rise to violence, subjugation, and ultimately self-destruction.<br /><br />Although opponents make an interesting case for Africa’s self-reliant status apart from the rise of constitutionalism, they fundamentally fail to understand that in a growing, more interconnected world, it’s essential to have an economic system and a political ideology driving the formation of a country. Without a constitution, the well-being of the state, the internal and external structure, and the global community will all be neglected with severe consequences in return.CaptainAmericahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09916748348077335095noreply@blogger.com1