The advent of World War II brought upon the major European alliance of Italy and Germany. The Rome-Berlin Axis formally began in 1936 and lasted until the end of the war in 1945. Benito Mussolini, the fascist dictator in Italy, had aligned with Adolf Hitler in Nazi Germany. This partnership was established because of minor ideological similarities, the geographical conditions of Europe (i.e. the position of Italy and Germany), the complete deterioration of international relations between France/Britain and Italy which in turn led Hitler to exploit Italy’s seclusion by giving them military and economic aid, the military collaboration of Italy and Germany in the Spanish Civil War, and the similitude of the expansive territorial goals each nation desired. While indeed many of these reasons are the main cause of the alliance between the two countries, they were not the reason, or immediate cause for Italy to fight with Germany. The most important motivating factor for Italy to fight alongside of Germany was not any of the above reasons. In fact, it was not until Germany had defeated the French in 1940 that Mussolini had finally decided to enter battle in conjunction with the Germans. Had the Germans lost the campaign against the French, or even still waged a war of attrition with little end in sight, Mussolini would have possibly declared neutrality. Of course, the other reasons for Mussolini aligning with Hitler were also very prominent in the construction of their alliance, yet the French defeat actually brought Mussolini out of his ‘neutrality’ thoughts and in to the battlefield.
Understanding the historical significance of Hitler’s adoration for Mussolini is a crucial premise to the ideological factors of alignment. One must understand however, that by natural causes, fascism and Nazism did not necessarily have to align with one another. The ideological factors simply achieve a deeper understanding between the two sides. Hitler had admired Mussolini ever since he had come to power in 1922. The revulsion of Soviet Bolshevism displayed by Hitler ideologically aligned him with Mussolini and his corporative state. On one occasion, Hitler remarked to his entourage about Mussolini defeating Bolshevism “not by military force but by superior intellect, and we have to thank him by showing for the first time…that even in this twentieth century is it possible to recall a people to a sense of purely national pride.”1 Hitler also compared his regime progress to that of Mussolini as he said, “When I read the history of Fascism I feel as if I’m reading the history of our movement.”2 Hitler remarked in the 1930s, after he had total control over Germany, “…the Duce and I were both working in the building-trade. This explains that there is also a deep bond between us on a purely human level. I have a deep friendship for this extraordinary man.” The alliance between the two countries indeed seemed more masked in the friendship between the two individuals. Evidence of this can be seen when Hitler told his generals in 1939, “If anything happened to [Mussolini], the loyalty of Italy to the alliance would be no longer secure.”3
The only other key aspect of the alliance in terms of assessing the ideological factor of Hitler and Mussolini was the doctrine of denying democracy; exactly what the Western Powers had afforded their people by this time. Mussolini had thought the Peace Treaties at the end of World War I were unfair to Germany. Mussolini recognized that Germans had been coerced to swallow the ‘Immortal Principles’ of western democracy which was not in harmony with German mentality or tradition. Mussolini said, “Fascism denies, in democracy, the absur[d] conventional untruth of political equality dressed out in the garb of collective irresponsibility, and the myth of "happiness" and indefinite progress.”4 Here we see evidence that indeed Mussolini was not a proponent of democracy. The dissatisfaction with the Peace Treaties also led Italy to sympathize with German opposition. Mussolini stated in 1931, “And how then can we not talk of European reconstruction if certain clauses of the Peace Treaties, which have driven whole peoples to the edge of the abyss and of moral despair, are not modified?”5
Also, Hitler had visualized an alliance between Italy and Germany in 1920 as he declared, “Our basic demand is: Off with the [Versailles] Peace Treaty! To this end we must use everything we can. Especially the differences between France and Italy, in order to win Italy over to our side.” 6
Most of Hitler’s interpretation at the time was not that Italy was so perfect to align with Germany, but that France and Italy were in fact so opposite that Mussolini may have no other choice but to side with Germany. And in 1933, when Hitler came to power, ideology remained a backburner for this alliance. In fact, the ideological framework between the two countries did not make them born alliances. As much as Hitler made endearing remarks about Mussolini, there was a clear disconnect between the two leaders. As many perceptive observers noted at the time, the two men essentially lacked a real understanding and comprehension of one another.7 The only reality that lay within their personal bond was the fact that they both were supreme rulers of their respective countries.8 Also, there was a vast difference between the government of Hitler’s National Socialism and Mussolini’s fascistic government.9 When Hitler finally came to power, it proved very difficult for both men to initiate diplomatic relations since both were rampant nationalists, both with imperialistic ambitions.10 One of the most interesting ideological differences between the two leaders was their belief in the “Aryan” race. In 1934, Mussolini emphasized that German ‘Aryanism’ had many flaws and that their anti-Semitic policy was in fact a dangerous mistake that “played into the hands of international Jewry” which harmed Germany’s international reputation.11
Even though it is important to get an understanding of the two dictators countries and rule being more similar to that of the Allied Powers, it would be a massive error to assume that these two powers aligned because of their ideological similarities. The ideological parallels played only a minor role, if any, in developing unity between the nation-states from the early inception of Mussolini and Hitler’s rise to power; it was not until France was defeated did Mussolini actually deploy troops to hopefully take an active part on the winning side of the war.
The geographical composition of these two states also played a small part in the determination of this ‘Axis.’ Italy has the unfortunate location of having no free access to an ocean. The country is positioned by an inland sea which is only connected through the Suez Canal and Straits of Gibraltar, both of which were dominated by the British.12 Mussolini’s Italy was captive to the Mediterranean, and Corisca, Tunisia, Malta, and Cyprus were the “bars of the prison.”13 Mussolini remarked that the purpose of Italian foreign policy “has not and never can have as objectives continental European territory except Albania, is in the first place to break the prison bars.”14 Mussolini further posited that after they had broken these pillars, Italy would ‘march to the ocean.’ Yet Mussolini knew he needed an ally before he commenced such an operation. “To brave the solution of such a problem without having our backs secured on the Continent would be absurd.”15 The ‘security’ which Mussolini ultimately depended upon was that of Nazi Germany, but only after they had destroyed France.
Mussolini wanted to secure an alliance with a strong land power so it could pursue and maintain its colonial conquests in the Mediterranean Sea and Northern Africa. The deep feel for Hitler to acquire Italian friendship was also prevalent in Mein Kampf as Hitler denounced the reclamation of South Tyrol to Germany. South Tyrol was a German-speaking province Italy had taken after World War I. Hitler stated, “All this fuss today is not made for love of the South Tyrol, which it does not help but only harms, but for fear of a possible German-Italian understanding.”16 The strategic placement of Italy and Germany within Europe was convenient in that Italy and Germany were not after the same territories for expansion. In fact, Hitler even acknowledged that Italy or Britain would be the ideal partnerships since Germany could focus on continental Europe, Britain would focus on its overseas imperial dominance, and Italy would stake claim in the Mediterranean. Hitler wrote, “In the predictable future there can be only two allies for Germany in Europe: England and Italy.”17
Yet again, the geographical location of the two countries played only a negligible role in the development of Italy actually going to war alongside of Germany. In fact, it was there very geographical positions in Europe which almost caused them to go to war with each other. One notable historical event between the two countries dealt with the independence of Austria. Austria was located smack in the middle between Italy to its south and Germany to its north. The Austrian government, in 1933, began to model itself off of Italian fascism when Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss essentially dissolved the republic that had existed prior.18 Mussolini was very concerned about the independent Austria falling under the auspices of Nazi Germany at this time. In fact, Dollfuss began executing many Austrian Nazis for the sake of resisting German control.19 It was indeed in the interest of Italy to have Austria maintain their independence so that the country could serve as a buffer state between them and Germany.20
The first meeting between Hitler and Mussolini occurred on June 14th 1934 in Venice. Essentially it was a failure as Hitler demanded a new chancellor and new government in Austria and Mussolini demanded that the Nazi’s stop the terrorist methods of trying to overthrow Chancellor Dollfuss.21 Tensions were rising between the two powers after they met. Roughly one month later, Chancellor Dollfuss was assassinated by Nazi’s, and a coup tried to take over the government. Mussolini was outraged and subsequently sent Italian troops to Austria, the Brenner Pass, in a threatening anti-German gesture.22 After sending the troops to Austria Mussolini remarked, “We have defended and will defend the independence of the Austrian Republic.”23 Germany eventually backed down from this, and the relations became better with both countries after Germany was the only country that did not apply sanctions to Italy after they decided to invade Ethiopia.24 Thus, although Germany later did not share territorial ambitions to that of what Italy may have wanted, they still nonetheless almost warred against each other because of their very location in Europe. Geography could have well turned these two powers against each other which is the very reason why it was not the primary factor in their alliance.
The relationship between France and Italy also, to a much larger degree then the previous two reasons, played a role in the development of a Rome-Berlin Axis. The relationship between the two countries was somewhat of a pendulum, where sometimes Italy was outspoken against France, and often they were in accordance with the French government. One of the crucial issues between the two countries rise to bitterness was that of Tunisia. In 1883, many thousands of Italians had migrated from Sicily to Tunisia. In 1896 a Franco-Italian agreement was signed which permitted the Italians to keep their own nationality, build their own schools and were afforded other privileges.25 However, after WWI in 1918 France decided to revoke this agreement and began treating the Italians poorly while passing regulations on their rights and requiring them to attain French citizenship.26 The discussions about Tunisia represented bitterness between the two powers as many Frenchmen began to think that this territory was on scope for Italy to acquire in their imperialist ambitions.27 Here is evidence that suggests the two countries had difficulty in diplomacy even since the closure of WWI.
In the late 1920s, Italy was on shaky ground with its supposed allies of France. On September 17th, 1927 Count Carlo Nardini, Italian Consul in Paris, was murdered by an Italian Anarchist named Modugno. The court in Paris then sentenced Modugno to only 2 years in prison with a fine of 200 francs.28 This angered the Italian people as Mussolini stated in the Cabinet Council after the incident: “The whole nation has in the last few days been seriously outraged by the verdict of the Paris jury…The government understands the indignant emotion of the Italian people.”29 The relations between countries got better after the French began arresting anti-fascists that were going to kill Italian officials.30 Franco-Italian naval relations were tensing up as well. On March 1, 1931 an agreement was drafted by the British and Italians which maintained Italy’s right to parity in terms of naval rearmaments. France rejected the proposal and insisted that Italy agree to never build up a fleet which is the equivalent of France. The disarmament discussions between the countries dragged on without any definite conclusions.31 This is all not mentioning the fact that British and Italian aims were relatively similar thus producing conflict as well. For example, the Fascist objective of an Italian Mediterranean indeed contrasted sharply to British influence and interests in the region.32
Yet while there was much disagreement between France and Italy, there was still an attempt on both governments to call for peace in Europe. One example of this would be the Briand-Kellogg Pact which called for providing for the “renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy.”33 This pact was signed by France, US, Great Britain and Italy in 1928- to which later Russia adhered to this pact. After this pact was signed Mussolini gave a speech on December 9, 1928 saysing, “ We are all for peace. We have signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact.”34 Mussolini even addressed the American people on Janurary 1st of 1931 stating that “Neither I nor my government, nor the Italian people wish to prepare for war. I have fought in a war as a private soldier, I know what war means.”35 The French government led by Daladier also stated in 1933 that they wished to regain better Italo-Franco relations and requested just an agreement between those two countries.36 The Italians also tried to issue peace through a new pact entitled the Four Powers Pact. This was drafted by Mussolini in 1933 and was signed by, although a more diluted version than the original, France, Britain and Germany.37 Essentially the Four Powers Pact said the following: “a policy of effective co-operation between all powers with a view to the maintenance of peace.”38 This is evidence that Italy and France were not born and hated enemies, but in fact engaged in realist determinations of alliances and sought possible genuine peace in Europe. This all changed when Italy invaded Ethiopia.
As stated, the tip of the iceberg was Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia, which was condemned by the League of Nations.39 Mussolini knew that he had to gain British and French acquiescence before he went and invaded Ethiopia. In fact, Mussolini was rather upset that Italy was condemned to be a second-rate power unless they acquired some colonial powers. Ethiopia was one of the few African territories that had not already been snatched up by other European powers, and since it proved to be rich in raw materials it proved to be a good agricultural industry for Italy.40 The international depression at this time was causing a stagnate Italian economy and colonial acquisitions seemed to be a quick fix in alleviating some of the economic pressures put upon the Italian economy. So by fall of 1933, the diplomatic relations in the Four Powers Pact had fizzled out and Mussolini was becoming restless with nonsensical talk of diplomacy.41 Finally on December 30th, 1934 Mussolini ordered an Italian invasion of Ethiopia.42 Mussolini attempted to downplay there invasion to Britain and France by sparking up heightened fears of a German rearmament and the taking of Austria.43
France and Britain were extremely upset about Italian action in Ethiopia and the League of Nations quickly acted against Italian aggression. They imposed the following sanctions on Italy: an embargo on arms and munitions, a ban on loan and credit, and a prohibition on the export of materials necessary for Italy’s ability to wage war.44 The crumbling of international alternatives for Italy paved the way for its acceptance into the German framework of being an ally. While Mussolini was now economically isolated from Europe, Hitler came along and supplied Italy with arms and materials. German goods were sent to Italy despite the Treaties sanctions.45 This proved to be an instrumental factor in a relationship between the two countries that did indeed last until 1945. However, as previously stated, just because Italy had justification to side with Germany did not ultimately mean they would fight alongside each other. The conquest did catapult the Rome-Berlin Axis in October of 1936 and also the cooperation of military support for Spain from both Italy and Germany. After the war however, Britain still tried not to alienate Italy from the Western powers, so that Mussolini would stay away from an alliance with Hitler. Britain actually lifted the sanctions which applied to Italy during the Ethiopian War by ending the Mediterranean Sea alerts and by withdrawing their warships to home-waters.46 This is important because it signifies that by the end of the Ethiopian War, Italy could have still sided with the Western powers of Europe as opposed to Germany.
The advent of the Spanish Civil War in 1936 also fused these two regimes in a militaristic way. The Nationalists and the Republicans in Spain were battling a civil war which would ultimately determine the fate of their country and the allegiance to certain powers in Europe. The ‘caudillo’ of the Nationalists, Francisco Franco, asked Hitler and Mussolini for help in his struggle.47 Hitler and Mussolini subsequently aided Franco in his war against the Republicans and they solidified some military coordination in the meantime. With this war, Hitler successfully created a partnership with Mussolini when he sent troops to fight what he called "Bolshevism" in Spain alongside the Italians. Hans Frank, Hitler’s personal envoy, arrived in Rome in September to discuss the Spanish conflict with Mussolini. Frank assured Mussolini that the only reason Hitler was intervening militarily in Spain was not because of territorial or imperialist aims but because of respect for Mussolin. The Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Galeazzo Ciano stated about the meeting “the Fuehrer is anxious that we [Mussolini and Ciano] should know that he regards the Mediterranean as a purely Italian sea. Italy has a right to positions of privilege and control in the Mediterranean. The interests of the Germans are turned towards the Baltic which is their Mediterranean."48 The Italian government sent their air force along with 10,000 Germans who were airmen and gunners.49 Mussolini and Hitler’s actions in Spain were against international law at the time, especially against the wishes of the Non-Intervention Committee which was speaking out against action in Spain.50
In the meantime, France was supplying the Republicans with arms. Guns, tanks, and planes arrived in Spain to combat the anti-Republican forces. Hitler convinced Mussolini to increase aid in Spain, and by the end of the war Mussolini had ordered roughly 72,000 Italian troops in Spain in conjunction with many German troops as well.51 Mussolini around the end of 1936 was beginning to see Germany as a formidable ally in international relations. He stated, in a conversation with one of Hitler’s aides, “Between Italy and Germany there is a common fate. This is becoming stronger and stronger. That it cannot be denied. Italy and Germany are congruent cases.” Here we see the alliance beginning to solidify, although again, Mussolini still had reservations with this alliance as he also was wanting to keep it a secret from the rest of Europe. He also said, “We cannot openly show France and England our position towards Germany. Not yet!”52 Interpreting this, Mussolini may not have wanted to induce France and England into thinking that he wanted to align with Germany for the simple reason that he was still open to diplomatic relations, at least to a small degree, with those two countries.
The question of Austria still lingered during 1938. Hitler was exerting his expansionist policies towards the Austrian government, and even knowing that he could have taken Austria over without fear of Italian retaliation, Hitler wanted to remain on good terms with Mussolini so he subsequently asked for his approval. Mussolini approved the Anschluss as soon as he received it.53 Mussolini had no choice in the matter since most of his troops were in Spain at the time, much to the manipulation of Hitler’s aims. So it went that Hitler marched into Austria unopposed and annexed the country to its sovereignty of Germany.54
Yet, in 1939, in the midst of a solidifying alliance between the Axis powers of Spain, Italy, and Germany, Hitler decided to march into Prague, without forewarning Mussolini of his actions. The Italian government was infuriated by Hitler for not giving them an alert that this would be occurring.55 Ciano, speaking about the invasion of Prague remarked in his journal, “What weight can be given in the future to those declarations and promises which concern us more directly? It is useless to deny that all this worries and humiliates the Italian people.”56 Tensions between the two powers arose, and Mussolini then decided to counteract this move and invaded Albania, giving Hitler only one day warning.57 Also, after Hitler took Prague, Mussolini thought the German army would march and invade a weakened Yugoslavia. Thus, prior to Mussolini’s attack on Albania, he ordered the abandoned of the attack in preparation for Hitler’s attack against Yugoslavia.58 However, Germany assured Italy that the Balkans and the Mediterranean were clearly in their sphere of influence and that they had no intentions of disregarding this aspect of the pact.59
During the Spanish intervention, only Germany remained as a potential ally for Italy after the war subsided. Hitler and achieved a somewhat necessary ally in Italy. By convincing Mussolini to intervene in the Spanish conflict, Hitler pulled Italy closer to Germany by exploiting Italy’s increasing economic dependence on Germany, as well as Italy’s seclusion from the Western European powers. In Germany’s and Italy’s pursuit of distinguishable spheres of influence, (i.e. German interest in Austria and Central Europe and Italian interest in Ethiopia and Spain) the context for cooperation was enhanced. The ‘Axis’ was thus secure in large part as an effect of the isolation of Italy from the West, and their separate ambitious territorial goals by each ruler.60 But again, this does not mandate that Italy would wage war for German support. Territorial expansion was also a very principal factor in the alliance of these nations. The insatiable desire for more territory by both leaders put led them into the same line of thinking. Although it has been implicit in the arguments prior, territorial expansion was the convenient scheme that unified Italy and Germany in terms of the motivations for attacking other countries and regions.
The proposal of this paper rests upon the main assumption that all of the above reasons played a minor to major role in establishing the framework for which Italy and Germany came to align upon. However, the primary factor which pitted the two into war against Western democracies was in fact the fatal blow delivered by Germany to the French army. In 1940, Germany invaded France and desecrated their army within less than two months. Prior to the onset of the war in 1940 however, Mussolini wrote to Hitler, “The two European powers need a period of peace lasting not less than 3 years. It is from 1943 onwards that a war effort will have the greatest prospects of victory. Fascists Italy, although convinced that it is inevitable, has no desire to participate in a European War.”61 This is telling, because it signifies that Italy was not prepared to go to war when Germany invaded France. Also, Hitler had no intention of preparing for a major war, and at no time after 1940 did Hitler show any interest in cooperation with the Italian military in the event of a major war.62 The only thought Hitler ever really gave to Italy was that it would serve as a neutralizer to Western European powers in terms of intervention from the Mediterranean or North Africa.
The actual outbreak of the war was completely uncoordinated between Italy and Germany. In fact, Hitler was so unconcerned with German-Italian relations by the end of 1939 that he signed a Nazi-Soviet Pact.63 The first invasion of the German army into Poland was not even laid out before hand with Mussolini and no consultation had been sought on account from Hitler. Mussolini thus declared Italy a “non-belligerency” and remained reluctantly neutral at the outbreak of the war.64 From the early onset of the war, all previous alliances between the Axis were really not solid and the real truth was that the Rome-Berlin Axis was more of a superficiality than an unyielding document with each state pursuing their own interests and their own protection of national security. The original timetable for Italian entrance into the war was 1942 or 1943, but it was all rendered useless after the German army had extremely successful campaigns in Norway and France, and the whole strategic situation had changed for Italy.65 A letter from an old guard member of the Italian Army, Farinacci wrote a letter to Mussolini stating what most of the individuals in the Italian government had believed. He said, “Naturally all those socialistoids, democratoids, and creotoids, are all beginning to say that if we intervene we should intervene on the side of France against Germany. This would be a grave misfortune for Italy since nobody would take us serious anymore and we would lose that prestige which you have secured for us in so many years of struggle.”66
The reasons for Italy aligning with Germany were all there, but the motivation and result of the intervention of Italian troops was only because of the result of French defeat. Even when Hitler received word that Italy was joining the war alongside of them, he had no enthusiasm towards the news.67 Even when Mussolini got involved in the war, he wasn’t involved because of the great vision or outlook Hitler had for Europe after the war, yet rather only because he thought the German armies were invincible and he wanted to maintain and establish territorial conquests in Greece and Egypt after the war.68 Evidence of the lack of solidarity and agreement within the Axis powers was evident when Mussolini decided to not help support German troops against the British, but instead waged a “parallel war” to protect his own interests in Greece.69 Mussolini stated to Ciano, “Hitler always faces me with a fait accompli. This time I am going to pay him back in his own coin. He will find out from the papers that I have occupied Greece. In this way the equilibrium will be reestablished.”70 Hitler was outraged that Mussolini would do this, yet he dare not speak out against Mussolini because it would indicate weakness in the Axis power alliance. Mussolini and Italy essentially waged a war for their personal interests, riding on a German wave of domination that only held up so long. Had France not been defeated so quickly, Mussolini may have declared neutrality and ended up fighting alongside the Allied Powers for fear of losing international reputation and imperial ambitions after the war was over. Whatever the winning side was indicating, that was what it seemed most likely for Mussolini to join.
Thus, in conclusion, factors regarding the alliance indeed weighed heavily upon the set of circumstances prior to the war. The history of ideological similarities, although not binding or perfect, at least opened up a dialogue of what two leaders ‘should’ be acting in accordance since they both looked upon the other as a resemblance of themselves (at least in Hitler’s case). The geographical location of the Italy and how the territorial conquests were in fact not what Germany wanted also played a large development in having Hitler not be belligerent towards Mussolini. The breakdown of relations and the isolation of Mussolini at the end of the 1930s almost made no choice for Italy but to form an alliance with Hitler. The Spanish Civil War which, ultimately led to European powers ostracizing Germany and Italy, aligning them closer together because of the lack of alternatives. Yet, while all of these have weight in determining the alliance, there is no question that the neutrality declared at the onset of the war, and the lack of coordination between the two powers, proved to all that the Axis powers were not bound militarily together. Mussolini was not consulted before Hitler’s attacks, and his army was clearly not ready to attack when they began the war as Hitler disregarded Mussolini’s requests for a war of attrition. The fall of France so quickly pushed Mussolini into the war, and the actions taken by Mussolini afterward, how he fought his own war of imperial aims, signifies that there was no ‘true’ alliance with Hitler, it was merely a way to get on the winning team and seek positive terms of agreement after the war was over. Mussolini fought alongside Hitler because of the effectiveness of blitzkrieg and the total collapse of the French army.
Friday, March 23, 2007
Saturday, March 10, 2007
The Rise of American Conservatism: A Brief History
The 1964 presidential election between Barry Goldwater and Lyndon Johnson put a new conservative philosophy in the limelight of public discourse. The Republican candidate Goldwater was running on a revolutionary ‘new’ conservative platform that sought to rollback many of the ongoing liberal policies of the last thirty years in government. At the time of the 1964 election, Goldwater’s views were seen by many as rather extreme and he was handed a crushing loss to Johnson in ‘64. However, Goldwater proved to be the pioneer that led the charge for a new conservative shift in the American populace which reached its zenith with election of Ronald Reagan in 1980.
The principles of conservatism were articulated brilliantly in Goldwater’s essay entitled The Conscience of a Conservative. He argued that conservatism is based upon the principle that freedom is the ultimate maxim of human existence. Personal responsibility for one’s actions and the protection of individual freedom are the essential components of conservatism. Conservatism also argues that government should be as limited as possible, intervening only to keep maintenance and order of the society. Goldwater also believed that conservatives are not only economic beings but also spiritual beings. These beliefs laid the foundation for conservatism to gain its prominence by the late 1970s.
The evolution of conservatism from this era allowed for presidential candidate Ronald Reagan to win the presidency in 1980 against incumbent Jimmy Carter. By the 1980s, conservatism was seen as more mainstream, as opposed to the radical nature of the philosophy in the 1960s. The principles of conservatism for Reagan rest in the calls for new economic policies which combated the Great Society of the 1960s. Reagan advocated a smaller federal government, de-regulation in the business sector, lower taxes, and a strong national defense against communism. For Reagan, Carter’s policies favored too much governmental control which he believed was the cause of the economic crisis in America at that time. Reagan proclaims, “We don’t need Carter’s eight-or 10-point programs to “fix” or fine tune the economy.”
One of the new methods of conservative activism in 1980 was direct mail. One conservative activist stated in 1980, “Without the mail, most conservative activity would wither and die.” Direct mail enabled mobilization and allowed for funding, volunteering, and petitions to surface at the local levels. As Richard Viguerie stated, “Without direct mail, we might have no National Review, no Human Events, no Conservative Digest, no Conservative PACs…” Conservatism was essentially born from the usage of this mechanism which promulgated conservative information and support that allowed for the movement to sustain itself.
Another facet of conservatism in the late 1970s early 1980s was the creation of single issue groups on a national level. After Roe v. Wade legalized abortion, many religious advocates came forth and began speaking out for the ‘right to life’ of an unborn child. Groups like the Right to Life, the National Rifles Association, and the Right to Work Movements all sprung up and mobilized conservatives to vote and elect candidates who adhered to their positions. The religious “awakening” that occurred within some movements of conservatism was mostly a reaction of the Roe v. Wade Supreme Court decision. One of the major religious opponents of this decision was Reverend Jerry Falwell. Falwell rallied fellow Christians to speak out against abortion as he stated about an abortion, “It didn’t matter if her human parents wanted her to live or die. God wanted her to live.” Goldwater’s libertarian ideas somewhat conflicted with that of the religious right and the issue of abortion. Many of these libertarian paleo-conservatives felt that abortion was a matter of personal choice.
The New Right was breaking on the scene in the mid 1970s and it was a seemingly conscious reaction of the politics of the liberal 1960s. With the massive division within the Democratic Party in 1968, the Republicans were able to seize control of the White House with Richard Nixon, who had run on similar policies that Goldwater had advocated. Conservative think tanks began sprouting up as the battle for ideas became an all out war in the public discourse. Organizations like the Heritage Foundation, Young Americans for Freedom, the Leadership Institute all led the New Right movement with policy positions that influenced US domestic and foreign policy for the next decade.
With the advent of this new conservative movement, tensions within the movement itself were very prevalent. For example, the traditionalists and supply-siders within the conservative movement were at odds at each others over the correct role of governmental economic policy. The supply-siders favored permanent tax cuts with a rising deficit while the traditionalists favored some tax increases to alleviate the burden of the rising deficit.The conservative movement solidified a break from New Deal/Great Society politics of liberalism and big government, to a more strict limited government.
The conservative philosophy was brought to the center stage with Goldwater’s campaign in 1964 and it was finally achieved and realized with Reagan ascending to the presidency in 1980 (although some would argue Nixon followed Goldwater’s ideals as well). The conservatism of the 60s, 70s, and 80s was indeed a reactionary phenomenon from the liberal politics of the day; yet, it made its way to organization and structure with the coming of direct mail and single issue groups.
The principles of conservatism were articulated brilliantly in Goldwater’s essay entitled The Conscience of a Conservative. He argued that conservatism is based upon the principle that freedom is the ultimate maxim of human existence. Personal responsibility for one’s actions and the protection of individual freedom are the essential components of conservatism. Conservatism also argues that government should be as limited as possible, intervening only to keep maintenance and order of the society. Goldwater also believed that conservatives are not only economic beings but also spiritual beings. These beliefs laid the foundation for conservatism to gain its prominence by the late 1970s.
The evolution of conservatism from this era allowed for presidential candidate Ronald Reagan to win the presidency in 1980 against incumbent Jimmy Carter. By the 1980s, conservatism was seen as more mainstream, as opposed to the radical nature of the philosophy in the 1960s. The principles of conservatism for Reagan rest in the calls for new economic policies which combated the Great Society of the 1960s. Reagan advocated a smaller federal government, de-regulation in the business sector, lower taxes, and a strong national defense against communism. For Reagan, Carter’s policies favored too much governmental control which he believed was the cause of the economic crisis in America at that time. Reagan proclaims, “We don’t need Carter’s eight-or 10-point programs to “fix” or fine tune the economy.”
One of the new methods of conservative activism in 1980 was direct mail. One conservative activist stated in 1980, “Without the mail, most conservative activity would wither and die.” Direct mail enabled mobilization and allowed for funding, volunteering, and petitions to surface at the local levels. As Richard Viguerie stated, “Without direct mail, we might have no National Review, no Human Events, no Conservative Digest, no Conservative PACs…” Conservatism was essentially born from the usage of this mechanism which promulgated conservative information and support that allowed for the movement to sustain itself.
Another facet of conservatism in the late 1970s early 1980s was the creation of single issue groups on a national level. After Roe v. Wade legalized abortion, many religious advocates came forth and began speaking out for the ‘right to life’ of an unborn child. Groups like the Right to Life, the National Rifles Association, and the Right to Work Movements all sprung up and mobilized conservatives to vote and elect candidates who adhered to their positions. The religious “awakening” that occurred within some movements of conservatism was mostly a reaction of the Roe v. Wade Supreme Court decision. One of the major religious opponents of this decision was Reverend Jerry Falwell. Falwell rallied fellow Christians to speak out against abortion as he stated about an abortion, “It didn’t matter if her human parents wanted her to live or die. God wanted her to live.” Goldwater’s libertarian ideas somewhat conflicted with that of the religious right and the issue of abortion. Many of these libertarian paleo-conservatives felt that abortion was a matter of personal choice.
The New Right was breaking on the scene in the mid 1970s and it was a seemingly conscious reaction of the politics of the liberal 1960s. With the massive division within the Democratic Party in 1968, the Republicans were able to seize control of the White House with Richard Nixon, who had run on similar policies that Goldwater had advocated. Conservative think tanks began sprouting up as the battle for ideas became an all out war in the public discourse. Organizations like the Heritage Foundation, Young Americans for Freedom, the Leadership Institute all led the New Right movement with policy positions that influenced US domestic and foreign policy for the next decade.
With the advent of this new conservative movement, tensions within the movement itself were very prevalent. For example, the traditionalists and supply-siders within the conservative movement were at odds at each others over the correct role of governmental economic policy. The supply-siders favored permanent tax cuts with a rising deficit while the traditionalists favored some tax increases to alleviate the burden of the rising deficit.The conservative movement solidified a break from New Deal/Great Society politics of liberalism and big government, to a more strict limited government.
The conservative philosophy was brought to the center stage with Goldwater’s campaign in 1964 and it was finally achieved and realized with Reagan ascending to the presidency in 1980 (although some would argue Nixon followed Goldwater’s ideals as well). The conservatism of the 60s, 70s, and 80s was indeed a reactionary phenomenon from the liberal politics of the day; yet, it made its way to organization and structure with the coming of direct mail and single issue groups.
Wednesday, February 07, 2007
The DePaul Conservative Resistance: A Call for Change
Over two weeks ago, conservative author David Horowitz came to DePaul to speak about the blatant disregard professors have in indoctrinating their students to subscribe to their political agenda. He came under the auspices of the DePaul Conservative Alliance (DCA), and as Vice-President of this organization, I can tell you that Horowitz was not just invited to stir things up at DePaul. Contrary to popular belief, the endgame for the DCA is not drumming up controversy by inviting speakers or hosting bake sales. Rather, we are calling for action to reform this educational institution into a bastion of high intellectual standards while tolerating and informing students of the many conservative ideologies that exist in the world.
This call for change will often seem as though we are devoted to conflict and quarrel, but rest assured, the goals of our operation and existence are not to, in the words of Frederick Douglass, “agitate, agitate, agitate.” Our movement is in essence a reaction to the prevailing tenets and structures in place at DePaul. Like Newton’s Third Law of motion, for every action there is an equal an opposite reaction; only in this case, we hope to go beyond an ‘equal’ reaction. In any event, we are seeking change. The path to reform is never easy, and the DCA fully recognizes this fact. Our progress so far, at least in the last two and a half years, has made considerable headway.
Two and a half years ago there was no DCA. Two and a half years ago the College Republicans were a group of about five people that maybe met once a month to discuss how Clinton should have been impeached and that the ‘weapons of mass destruction’ are still in Syria somewhere. Two and a half years ago, there was no conservative literature or newspaper distributed around campus. Two and a half years ago, conservatism was all but dead at DePaul.
But then, the fraudulent Ward Churchill was invited by the Cultural Center to speak at DePaul on his ‘little Eichman’ college campus tour, and the closet-conservatives at DePaul had finally had enough. Students mobilized and came out in droves to protest the man who said, “Innocent? Gimme a break.” in reference to the Americans who perished on 9/11. After Student Life banned us from protesting the event with posters, then College Republican President Joseph Blewitt found himself on ‘Hannity and Colmes’ discussing DePaul’s ridiculous “anti-propaganda” policy. The name ‘Ward Churchill’ quickly became the conservative rallying cry and catalyst for our movement.
To be fair, the conservative movement had started much sooner than the beginning of 2005. In terms of planning and preparation, some of the conservative students at DePaul, including myself, were mobilizing at the end of 2004 in hopes of creating a conservative newspaper at DePaul. After several months of hard work, our mission was successful and in November of 2005 the Lincoln Park Statesman was born.
The affirmative action bake sale is what put the DCA on the map. As a satirical attempt to protest the policy of affirmative action, the bake sale proved to open up discussion about the once taboo topic, and it also served as a recruiting tool for many conservatives to join our cause. Many called the bake sale ‘racist’ (the ‘McCarthyism’ of today) and in the face of adversity from the administration, the DCA fired back by gaining the media’s attention and threatening legal action with the help of the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE).
Since its inception, the DCA has increased membership from roughly four to twenty-five active members. The College Republicans are now a legitimate organization at DePaul who are also seeking to make a difference on campus. After hearing Horowitz speak, the conservative movement is remided of why we need to subsist and why we must fight the academic status quo. The indoctrination from Lefist professors still permeates the college classroom. As Horowitz pointed out, a college student will go four years in the LA&S dept without ever reading Friedrich Hayek, a conservative and Nobel Prize winner.
The ideological struggle is a difficult one indeed, but success is never achieved unless this struggle exists. The administration has somewhat accomodated our presence on campus, but more needs to be done in the classrooms. The conservative movement continues to grow at DePaul and we are still calling for change.
This call for change will often seem as though we are devoted to conflict and quarrel, but rest assured, the goals of our operation and existence are not to, in the words of Frederick Douglass, “agitate, agitate, agitate.” Our movement is in essence a reaction to the prevailing tenets and structures in place at DePaul. Like Newton’s Third Law of motion, for every action there is an equal an opposite reaction; only in this case, we hope to go beyond an ‘equal’ reaction. In any event, we are seeking change. The path to reform is never easy, and the DCA fully recognizes this fact. Our progress so far, at least in the last two and a half years, has made considerable headway.
Two and a half years ago there was no DCA. Two and a half years ago the College Republicans were a group of about five people that maybe met once a month to discuss how Clinton should have been impeached and that the ‘weapons of mass destruction’ are still in Syria somewhere. Two and a half years ago, there was no conservative literature or newspaper distributed around campus. Two and a half years ago, conservatism was all but dead at DePaul.
But then, the fraudulent Ward Churchill was invited by the Cultural Center to speak at DePaul on his ‘little Eichman’ college campus tour, and the closet-conservatives at DePaul had finally had enough. Students mobilized and came out in droves to protest the man who said, “Innocent? Gimme a break.” in reference to the Americans who perished on 9/11. After Student Life banned us from protesting the event with posters, then College Republican President Joseph Blewitt found himself on ‘Hannity and Colmes’ discussing DePaul’s ridiculous “anti-propaganda” policy. The name ‘Ward Churchill’ quickly became the conservative rallying cry and catalyst for our movement.
To be fair, the conservative movement had started much sooner than the beginning of 2005. In terms of planning and preparation, some of the conservative students at DePaul, including myself, were mobilizing at the end of 2004 in hopes of creating a conservative newspaper at DePaul. After several months of hard work, our mission was successful and in November of 2005 the Lincoln Park Statesman was born.
The affirmative action bake sale is what put the DCA on the map. As a satirical attempt to protest the policy of affirmative action, the bake sale proved to open up discussion about the once taboo topic, and it also served as a recruiting tool for many conservatives to join our cause. Many called the bake sale ‘racist’ (the ‘McCarthyism’ of today) and in the face of adversity from the administration, the DCA fired back by gaining the media’s attention and threatening legal action with the help of the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE).
Since its inception, the DCA has increased membership from roughly four to twenty-five active members. The College Republicans are now a legitimate organization at DePaul who are also seeking to make a difference on campus. After hearing Horowitz speak, the conservative movement is remided of why we need to subsist and why we must fight the academic status quo. The indoctrination from Lefist professors still permeates the college classroom. As Horowitz pointed out, a college student will go four years in the LA&S dept without ever reading Friedrich Hayek, a conservative and Nobel Prize winner.
The ideological struggle is a difficult one indeed, but success is never achieved unless this struggle exists. The administration has somewhat accomodated our presence on campus, but more needs to be done in the classrooms. The conservative movement continues to grow at DePaul and we are still calling for change.
Abolish the minimum wage
It’s official. Nancy Pelosi and her Democratic cohorts have begun 2007 with a disastrous piece of legislation. The House passed a bill which will increase the minimum wage from the current $5.15 to $7.25 over the next two years. The vote in the House was 315-116, a testament that the 82 Republicans who voted for the bill would know the wrath of their constituents had they voted against it. Not only is raising the minimum wage detrimental to the calculus of the American spirit and founding, but simply having one to begin with is what I find most upsetting.
An increase in the minimum wage is popular with the political masses; just ask the Democrats. This popularity is founded in the actual purpose of raising the minimum wage, not in its realization or practical outcome. Personally, I don’t want any American citizen to not have enough money to support a family, to not afford health care, or to not be able to pay their bills. There is a sense of altruism behind the policy of hiking the minimum wage, and just having one in the books is at least “good” in theory. Yet the theory is irrelevant if the pragmatic implementation of the policy has more negative than positive effects.
Many supporters are in favor of the increase because they want low-income workers to make more money. Yet the statistics tell a different story altogether. The people earning minimum wage, as of 2005, represent only 2.5% of the hourly paid workforce in America. Of these 2.5%, about half of these people are under the age of 25, and a quarter of these workers are ages 16-19. In fact, the average household income for the teenage minimum wage workers is roughly $64,000 per year-well above the poverty level. This means that increasing the minimum wage would force employers to pay teenagers, most of whom are still in school and don’t really “need” the money to live off of, more money an hour. The principle of altruism has lost much of its steam once realizing these statistics.
The negative aspect is not that kids shouldn’t be making more money or that they essentially should never receive money if they work for it. Rather, an increase in minimum wage either significantly increases unemployment, or increases the cost for the consumers.
For example, pretend for a moment that you own a restaurant. Let’s say you need ten people to effectively run this small restaurant and you decide to pay them each $6.00 an hour. Yet, the federal government decides to get involved in the marketplace and subsequently raises the minimum wage to $7.25 an hour. As a business owner, you can do one of three things:
A) You could keep all ten on staff and take a profit-cut for yourself, since the returns will be less now that you are paying your employers a significant amount more. (No capitalist or business owner takes this option, trust me)
B) You could keep all ten on staff and increase the prices for the consumers to retain the same profits you were making when you paid your employers $6.00 an hour.
C) You could fire 2 of your employees and still maintain the same profits as before.
What do B and C, the only two practical outcomes, have in common? They are both negative effects on the economy. One option increases unemployment, the other option increases prices for the consumers. Minimum wage has this disastrous effect on the economy.
Yet raising minimum wage is not the ideological culprit for libertarian minded thinkers. The culprit is the minimum wage itself. The market should be able to dictate the wages of the individual workers. Why does the government have a right to tell me how much I have to pay a certain worker for doing a certain job? The answer is that they should not be given that power. Minimum wage is a fanciful bi-product of government coming to the rescue in the marketplace, when the majority of problems can be solved by letting the marketplace rescue itself.
If Wal-Mart were to open up a store and pay employees $2.00 an hour, what would happen? Nobody would apply and the business would collapse. Kmart would then take over the market by offering their employees much more for an hourly wage. Wal-Mart in return, understanding the market, would begin a competitive bidding process for labor if they wanted to keep their business intact. Since labor is a commodity, the competitive marketplace will position people into jobs that pay good, or else the worker can get up and become employed elsewhere. That is and should be the beauty of a free society.
In the end, raising the minimum wage does nothing to help low-income workers and only brings unemployment and higher consumer prices. Even the supporters of minimum wage acknowledge that too large of an increase in the minimum wage will be harmful, otherwise why not raise the minimum wage to $15 or say $20 an hour?
An abolishment of the minimum wage is necessary to reduce the role of government and to allow the market and business owners maximum freedom in investing their own money.
An increase in the minimum wage is popular with the political masses; just ask the Democrats. This popularity is founded in the actual purpose of raising the minimum wage, not in its realization or practical outcome. Personally, I don’t want any American citizen to not have enough money to support a family, to not afford health care, or to not be able to pay their bills. There is a sense of altruism behind the policy of hiking the minimum wage, and just having one in the books is at least “good” in theory. Yet the theory is irrelevant if the pragmatic implementation of the policy has more negative than positive effects.
Many supporters are in favor of the increase because they want low-income workers to make more money. Yet the statistics tell a different story altogether. The people earning minimum wage, as of 2005, represent only 2.5% of the hourly paid workforce in America. Of these 2.5%, about half of these people are under the age of 25, and a quarter of these workers are ages 16-19. In fact, the average household income for the teenage minimum wage workers is roughly $64,000 per year-well above the poverty level. This means that increasing the minimum wage would force employers to pay teenagers, most of whom are still in school and don’t really “need” the money to live off of, more money an hour. The principle of altruism has lost much of its steam once realizing these statistics.
The negative aspect is not that kids shouldn’t be making more money or that they essentially should never receive money if they work for it. Rather, an increase in minimum wage either significantly increases unemployment, or increases the cost for the consumers.
For example, pretend for a moment that you own a restaurant. Let’s say you need ten people to effectively run this small restaurant and you decide to pay them each $6.00 an hour. Yet, the federal government decides to get involved in the marketplace and subsequently raises the minimum wage to $7.25 an hour. As a business owner, you can do one of three things:
A) You could keep all ten on staff and take a profit-cut for yourself, since the returns will be less now that you are paying your employers a significant amount more. (No capitalist or business owner takes this option, trust me)
B) You could keep all ten on staff and increase the prices for the consumers to retain the same profits you were making when you paid your employers $6.00 an hour.
C) You could fire 2 of your employees and still maintain the same profits as before.
What do B and C, the only two practical outcomes, have in common? They are both negative effects on the economy. One option increases unemployment, the other option increases prices for the consumers. Minimum wage has this disastrous effect on the economy.
Yet raising minimum wage is not the ideological culprit for libertarian minded thinkers. The culprit is the minimum wage itself. The market should be able to dictate the wages of the individual workers. Why does the government have a right to tell me how much I have to pay a certain worker for doing a certain job? The answer is that they should not be given that power. Minimum wage is a fanciful bi-product of government coming to the rescue in the marketplace, when the majority of problems can be solved by letting the marketplace rescue itself.
If Wal-Mart were to open up a store and pay employees $2.00 an hour, what would happen? Nobody would apply and the business would collapse. Kmart would then take over the market by offering their employees much more for an hourly wage. Wal-Mart in return, understanding the market, would begin a competitive bidding process for labor if they wanted to keep their business intact. Since labor is a commodity, the competitive marketplace will position people into jobs that pay good, or else the worker can get up and become employed elsewhere. That is and should be the beauty of a free society.
In the end, raising the minimum wage does nothing to help low-income workers and only brings unemployment and higher consumer prices. Even the supporters of minimum wage acknowledge that too large of an increase in the minimum wage will be harmful, otherwise why not raise the minimum wage to $15 or say $20 an hour?
An abolishment of the minimum wage is necessary to reduce the role of government and to allow the market and business owners maximum freedom in investing their own money.
Monday, November 20, 2006
On the Role of Courts in Foreign Affairs
Throughout American history, disputes between the executive and legislative branch, in regard to foreign affairs, have often been arbitrated by the federal court system. The established role of the courts in foreign affairs has been rather transient, where the majority opinion has often been determined by the prevailing ideology of that particular court. It is without question that the function of the courts is to determine the validity of the foreign action taking place by either the President or the Congress. The Framers did not textually outline the appropriate role of the courts in foreign affairs within the Constitution; the sole reason was because they were more focused on the proper relationship between the federal government and the state governments with respect to the individual.
The Constitution does not apportion all foreign policy power into only the executive or only the legislative. Furthermore, there is no constraint on the role of courts within the Constitution. When the courts are called upon to adjudicate America’s constitutional role abroad, there is no established precedent in our founding document as to how the courts should react to these controversies. Hence, the role of the courts in foreign relations must be permitted to deviate from any and all precedent and they should be considered on a case by case basis. It seems that more often than not, judicial deference should have been ruled by court system. For when Congress and the President are in collaboration with the policy that is being pursued, it seems as though the role of the court should only be minimal. Judicial deference is pertinent to the American polity because it sustains the natural balance in the Constitution that the President and Congress are the sole proprietors of foreign relations. Yet, the one instance where judicial deference may never be applicable is when fundamental liberties of citizens are at stake.
It is interesting to note that while the Framers may have wanted to create a system of governance intended to limit the role of the President’s authority, the courts have for the most part, decidedly acted in the President’s favor in foreign decision-making. Perhaps the Founding Fathers had intended for this when they scrapped the Articles of Confederation and instead adopted a Constitution which gave the executive branch a stronger role. The Constitution details the President’s clout as having “executive Power” and that “he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”
The Prize Cases, decided in 1862, illustrates how the President first began to accumulate power in foreign affairs in the eyes of the Supreme Court. In April of 1861, President Lincoln ordered a blockade on the southern ports of states that had seceded, even though Congress had not yet issued a formal declaration of war. Four ships were then seized before July 13th, the day Congress formally recognized a state of war. The owners of the ships sued for redress claiming that in the absence of war, the President had no authority to issue a blockade. Justice Grier wrote for the majority opinion, “Whether the President in fulfilling his duties, as Commander-in-chief, in suppressing an insurrection…will compel him to accord them the character of belligerents, is a question to be decided by him.”
The courts simply decided that the President ultimately has the final authority when it comes to the security of our nation. Even when Congress has not formally recognized the state of war between enemy belligerents, the Grier ruled that “The President was bound to meet it in the shape it presented itself, without waiting for Congress to baptize it with a name.” Here is evidence that the early decisions regarding the courts role in foreign affairs is one which abdicates most of the authority into the hands of the executive branch. In my estimation, the verdict was appropriate because Congress had authorized the President the authority to suppress insurrection in 1795 and in 1807. However, I would also go so far to say that the court had no jurisdiction in hearing this case. The ships seized were found with an enemy and belligerent insurrection of the state. The court should have issued judicial deference in this case and established a precedent that challenging the validity of a proclamation from a belligerency that attacked gives to much credence to those who have attacked. The dearth of a declaration of war from Congress was not relevant in this case because the President had an Act of Congress which allowed him jurisdiction in seizing the ships.
In U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. (1936), the Supreme Court again ruled not only in the President’s favor, but also in the Congress’s as well. The defendants of the case, Curtiss-Wright Export Corp, sold arms to the Bolivian government after Congress passed a Joint Resolution which stated “it shall be unlawful to sell any arms or munitions of war to the countries now engaged in that armed conflict…if the [President] makes a proclamation to that effect…” The armed conflict in question was between that of Bolivia and Paraguay. President Roosevelt issued a proclamation supporting the Congressional Resolution therefore making the sale illegal. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. claimed that Congress had unconstitutionally delegated legislative authority to the executive branch. Justice Sutherland argued the majority opinion and claimed “It results that the investment of the federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution” In other words, the federal government has inherent or implied power in the realm of foreign affairs which is not expressly written in the Constitution. Indeed, I not only hold the belief that this decision was appropriate, but I also believe that judicial deference would have been in fact more fitting for this case. Under the circumstances prescribed, whereby the Congress has passed a Joint Resolution and the President, pursuant to the Resolution, issued a proclamation affirming it, the Supreme Court should have deferred the case and not have granted it certiorari.
A comparable case to Curtiss was Hirabayashi v. U.S. (1943). After the United States entered World War II in 1941, President Roosevelt issued an executive order which authorized military commanders to have authority over particular military areas around the United States. Congress then passed legislation making it a crime to violate any order issued by the military commanders. Subsequently, General DeWitt issued a “curfew order” for all “alien Japanese, alien Germans, …” After this order, a University of Washington student, Kiyoshi Hirabayashi, was found to have violated the curfew law and was then convicted of a criminal offense. Here is an instance where the President and Congress have once again acted in joint cooperation to determine the rule of law within the United States.
Applying the measures I have stated in the Curtiss case, it may seem that judicial deference would be the adequate role of the court in this situation. However, this case has two distinctive variables. First and foremost, Hirabayashi is an individual citizen that is arguing for fundamental liberties which our Framers intended us to have not restricted from the government. Second, the case in question revolves solely on the basis of national security during a time of war. Considering the weight of these two factors, the Supreme Court is obligated to hear the case in question. Even if this instance does affirm the government to lawfully convict this man, it is crucial to the sustenance of our republic that all personal liberties be processed accordingly through all three branches of government. Checks and balances are essential here so that not one branch may exert power and influence over the populace. The role of the courts is to not abstain, but to legitimize the other two branches of government by ruling in their favor. If the judicial branch were to defer in the controversy of restricting personal liberties during war, then the precedent set will inevitably expand the power and clout to within the executive and even legislative branches of government.
Although the courts have ruled in favor of the federal government the vast majority of instances, particularly the President, there is the occasion where the President has lost some authority. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v Sawyer the Supreme Court ruled that President Truman could not seize the steel mills for national security purposes in the midst of the Korean War. In 1950, North Korea invaded the Republic of Korea. President Truman, without a declaration of war, authorized the deployment of troops and air strikes on North Korea for these actions, and received some support from the United Nations. At this time, a crisis and strike was fermenting amongst the steel workers in America. Truman, realizing a strike could hamper the war efforts, issued a seizure of all steel mills into the government’s directives under the guise of national security.
Justice Black wrote the majority opinion and decided that what President Truman authorized was not stated in the Constitution or expressly granted from Congress. Therefore, Truman was unable to take control of the steel mills. Justice Black says in the majority, “The President’s power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act of Congress of from the Constitution itself.” Clearly, there is no act of Congress which permits the president to authorize these actions and there is also no provision in the Constitution which allocates this power to the President. While this case is not one which should be decided by judicial deference, it is one which should grant Truman the power to seize the steel mills.
As Justice Vinson noted in his dissent, “But neither did [the Framers] create an automaton impotent to exercise the powers of Government at a time when the survival of the Republic itself may be at stake.” In short, the role of the court is to allow certain prudence into legal thought when our nation is at war. To rely on the text and statute alone would be to handcuff the President in defending this nation at all costs. The court needs to realize that the Framers could not have foreseen the extraconstitutional powers needed for the executive branch in a growing global world of interconnectedness. Thus, the Supreme Court ruled improperly in this decision, and was liable for the inadequate supplies abroad if our troops were fighting without the necessary components to survive.
A well-thought out concurring opinion was delivered by Justice Jackson. He broke the authority of the President down into three categories: 1) Congress is in agreement, 2) Congress is silent, and 3) Congress is opposed. He believed that this case belonged in the third category. Justice Jackson says, “[The Fifth Amendment signifies] about all there is of the principle that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and that we submit ourselves to rulers only if under rules.” Jackson is correct in determining that the role of the court in foreign affairs is to adjudicate under existing rule of law, yet this absolutist viewpoint, as stated earlier, restricts even the most bizarre circumstances which can never be foreseen. It is in this regard that I disagree with Jackson and argue that the courts should allow for leniency and prudence when ruling on the President’s authority during wartime or national security crises.
In Dellums v Bush the District Court under Harold H. Greene’s opinion made the correct decision in judicial deference. Fifty three members from Congress and one Senator requested that the court issue them an injunction forbidding President Bush to authorize an offensive attack on Iraq. Greene did not issue the injunction and argued that, “In short, unless Congress as a whole, or by a majority, is heard from, the controversy here cannot be deemed ripe; it is only if the majority of the Congress seeks relief from an infringement on its constitutional war-declaration power that it may be entitled to receive it.” By all accounts, this was not only the proper decision to make regarding the case, but it was a necessary one as well. Had the court issued the injunction, the legitimacy of the whole of Congress and the President’s authority to be “Commander-in-Chief” of the Armed Forces would be in jeopardy. In fact, roughly one month after the judge denied the injunction, Congress authorized the use of force in Iraq in conjunction with the UN Resolution. This authorization is exactly why Judge Greene did not usurp Congressional authority and deem it relevant when only 53 House Representatives and one Senator had come forth with the request. The judicial deference in this case was appropriate to the responsibilities of the court and upheld what the Framers had intended.
In the instances where the government detains an enemy combatant during a time of war, the Supreme Court has the inherent right to determine the legality of the detainment. During the Civil War, Lambdin Milligan and four other individuals were accused of planning to steal Union weapons and free Confederate prisoners of war in Indiana. They were sentenced to hang from a military court but were able to bring their case to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court basically ruled that the suspension of ‘habeas corpus’ was legal, yet if there were civilian courts operating upon his detainment he could not be tried by a military tribunal. The role of the court in this case was intriguing. It seems as though they overstepped their boundary and authority by ruling that the suspension of habeas corpus was legal, considering Congress and the President had authorized it together.
The Supreme Court was in fact in its proper jurisdiction when rendering the decision upon where Milligan was to be tried at. Justice Davis argues for the majority, “One of the plainest constitutional provisions was, therefore, infringed when Milligan was tried by a court not ordained and established by Congress, and not composed of judges appointed during good behavior.” Justice Davis is making the argument that a military tribunal is not apt for trial of a citizen when civilian courts are operating. This decision was exactly appropriate for the courts to decide as there was no statue given by Congress and there was no Constitutional provision for it giving the President the enumerated power.
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the role of the court was accurate in its decision to rule and negate judicial deference. Hamdi was a US citizen before being picked up in the battlefield in Afghanistan fighting for the terrorists. President Bush deemed Hamdi an “unlawful enemy combatant” and sought to detain him indefinitely. The Supreme Court held that Hamdi as a U.S. citizen could be held as an unlawful enemy combatant in indefinite detention. However, they also ruled that Hamdi be allowed to challenge the factual basis of his classification as an enemy combatant. Justice O’Connor argues, “Our opinion finds legislative authority to detain under the AUMF once it is sufficiently clear that the enemy is, in fact, an enemy combatant.” The Supreme Court could not have been more correct in its verdict. Establishing the authority for the president to suspend habeas corpus using an interpretive Congressional Resolution (a Resolution which could or could not be relevant to President Bush’s case) was in fact in the perfect jurisdiction for the court to rule a verdict upon. Judicial deference is impossible in this situation because of the differences of opinion in the actual legislative goal of the AUMF, as it was considered irrelevant by four other justices.
The Supreme Court was also correct in establishing its presence in regard to Hamdi being able to challenge the authority of the President in a court of law. It is only solely up to the President when Congress has in fact ruled by statue that citizens’ cannot challenge the validity of their status as unlawful enemy combatants. Since this is not the case, the jurisdiction and role of the federal court system is to determine whether or not the President has the inherent authority to deny Hamdi a chance to refute his charge as an enemy combatant.
Justice Thomas, a dissenter, argues “That is, although it is appropriate for the Court to determine the judicial question whether the President has the asserted authority, we lack the information and expertise to question whether Hamdi is actually an enemy combatant, a question the resolution of which is committed to other branches.” It seems as though Thomas is circumventing the outcome of the decision in which Justice O’Connor prescribed. The courts role is not whether to determine if Hamdi is in fact an enemy combatant, but rather to determine upon whether Hamdi can challenge this essential opinion of the federal government. It is a dangerous path to embark upon when the Supreme Court uses judicial deference in determining the outcome of civil liberties for US citizens. The other branches will still be determining Hamdi’s status, only they will be doing so in a court of law where Hamdi is to mount a defense for his actions. The idea of judicial deference in the Hamdi case is absurd and the Supreme Court acted with precise and accurate rulings.
In conclusion, the role of the federal court system should be one based upon some restraint. While it is important to adjudicate controversies to maintain the checks and balances, the court should not assert its role as a foreign affairs dictator when Congress and the President have both granted the policy in collaboration. The Framers did not intend for the judicial branch to exert major foreign affairs decisions, and that is why the roles are distributed between the executive and legislative branch respectively. Judicial deference should play a bigger role in the realm of the judicial system, unless it is of extenuating circumstances of civil liberties that permit the court to mandate a decision and not abstain from granting it certiorari. Judicial deference is vital to preserve the Framers intention on government, and to allow the executive and legislative deal with foreign matters which affect our national security.
The Constitution does not apportion all foreign policy power into only the executive or only the legislative. Furthermore, there is no constraint on the role of courts within the Constitution. When the courts are called upon to adjudicate America’s constitutional role abroad, there is no established precedent in our founding document as to how the courts should react to these controversies. Hence, the role of the courts in foreign relations must be permitted to deviate from any and all precedent and they should be considered on a case by case basis. It seems that more often than not, judicial deference should have been ruled by court system. For when Congress and the President are in collaboration with the policy that is being pursued, it seems as though the role of the court should only be minimal. Judicial deference is pertinent to the American polity because it sustains the natural balance in the Constitution that the President and Congress are the sole proprietors of foreign relations. Yet, the one instance where judicial deference may never be applicable is when fundamental liberties of citizens are at stake.
It is interesting to note that while the Framers may have wanted to create a system of governance intended to limit the role of the President’s authority, the courts have for the most part, decidedly acted in the President’s favor in foreign decision-making. Perhaps the Founding Fathers had intended for this when they scrapped the Articles of Confederation and instead adopted a Constitution which gave the executive branch a stronger role. The Constitution details the President’s clout as having “executive Power” and that “he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”
The Prize Cases, decided in 1862, illustrates how the President first began to accumulate power in foreign affairs in the eyes of the Supreme Court. In April of 1861, President Lincoln ordered a blockade on the southern ports of states that had seceded, even though Congress had not yet issued a formal declaration of war. Four ships were then seized before July 13th, the day Congress formally recognized a state of war. The owners of the ships sued for redress claiming that in the absence of war, the President had no authority to issue a blockade. Justice Grier wrote for the majority opinion, “Whether the President in fulfilling his duties, as Commander-in-chief, in suppressing an insurrection…will compel him to accord them the character of belligerents, is a question to be decided by him.”
The courts simply decided that the President ultimately has the final authority when it comes to the security of our nation. Even when Congress has not formally recognized the state of war between enemy belligerents, the Grier ruled that “The President was bound to meet it in the shape it presented itself, without waiting for Congress to baptize it with a name.” Here is evidence that the early decisions regarding the courts role in foreign affairs is one which abdicates most of the authority into the hands of the executive branch. In my estimation, the verdict was appropriate because Congress had authorized the President the authority to suppress insurrection in 1795 and in 1807. However, I would also go so far to say that the court had no jurisdiction in hearing this case. The ships seized were found with an enemy and belligerent insurrection of the state. The court should have issued judicial deference in this case and established a precedent that challenging the validity of a proclamation from a belligerency that attacked gives to much credence to those who have attacked. The dearth of a declaration of war from Congress was not relevant in this case because the President had an Act of Congress which allowed him jurisdiction in seizing the ships.
In U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. (1936), the Supreme Court again ruled not only in the President’s favor, but also in the Congress’s as well. The defendants of the case, Curtiss-Wright Export Corp, sold arms to the Bolivian government after Congress passed a Joint Resolution which stated “it shall be unlawful to sell any arms or munitions of war to the countries now engaged in that armed conflict…if the [President] makes a proclamation to that effect…” The armed conflict in question was between that of Bolivia and Paraguay. President Roosevelt issued a proclamation supporting the Congressional Resolution therefore making the sale illegal. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. claimed that Congress had unconstitutionally delegated legislative authority to the executive branch. Justice Sutherland argued the majority opinion and claimed “It results that the investment of the federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution” In other words, the federal government has inherent or implied power in the realm of foreign affairs which is not expressly written in the Constitution. Indeed, I not only hold the belief that this decision was appropriate, but I also believe that judicial deference would have been in fact more fitting for this case. Under the circumstances prescribed, whereby the Congress has passed a Joint Resolution and the President, pursuant to the Resolution, issued a proclamation affirming it, the Supreme Court should have deferred the case and not have granted it certiorari.
A comparable case to Curtiss was Hirabayashi v. U.S. (1943). After the United States entered World War II in 1941, President Roosevelt issued an executive order which authorized military commanders to have authority over particular military areas around the United States. Congress then passed legislation making it a crime to violate any order issued by the military commanders. Subsequently, General DeWitt issued a “curfew order” for all “alien Japanese, alien Germans, …” After this order, a University of Washington student, Kiyoshi Hirabayashi, was found to have violated the curfew law and was then convicted of a criminal offense. Here is an instance where the President and Congress have once again acted in joint cooperation to determine the rule of law within the United States.
Applying the measures I have stated in the Curtiss case, it may seem that judicial deference would be the adequate role of the court in this situation. However, this case has two distinctive variables. First and foremost, Hirabayashi is an individual citizen that is arguing for fundamental liberties which our Framers intended us to have not restricted from the government. Second, the case in question revolves solely on the basis of national security during a time of war. Considering the weight of these two factors, the Supreme Court is obligated to hear the case in question. Even if this instance does affirm the government to lawfully convict this man, it is crucial to the sustenance of our republic that all personal liberties be processed accordingly through all three branches of government. Checks and balances are essential here so that not one branch may exert power and influence over the populace. The role of the courts is to not abstain, but to legitimize the other two branches of government by ruling in their favor. If the judicial branch were to defer in the controversy of restricting personal liberties during war, then the precedent set will inevitably expand the power and clout to within the executive and even legislative branches of government.
Although the courts have ruled in favor of the federal government the vast majority of instances, particularly the President, there is the occasion where the President has lost some authority. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v Sawyer the Supreme Court ruled that President Truman could not seize the steel mills for national security purposes in the midst of the Korean War. In 1950, North Korea invaded the Republic of Korea. President Truman, without a declaration of war, authorized the deployment of troops and air strikes on North Korea for these actions, and received some support from the United Nations. At this time, a crisis and strike was fermenting amongst the steel workers in America. Truman, realizing a strike could hamper the war efforts, issued a seizure of all steel mills into the government’s directives under the guise of national security.
Justice Black wrote the majority opinion and decided that what President Truman authorized was not stated in the Constitution or expressly granted from Congress. Therefore, Truman was unable to take control of the steel mills. Justice Black says in the majority, “The President’s power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act of Congress of from the Constitution itself.” Clearly, there is no act of Congress which permits the president to authorize these actions and there is also no provision in the Constitution which allocates this power to the President. While this case is not one which should be decided by judicial deference, it is one which should grant Truman the power to seize the steel mills.
As Justice Vinson noted in his dissent, “But neither did [the Framers] create an automaton impotent to exercise the powers of Government at a time when the survival of the Republic itself may be at stake.” In short, the role of the court is to allow certain prudence into legal thought when our nation is at war. To rely on the text and statute alone would be to handcuff the President in defending this nation at all costs. The court needs to realize that the Framers could not have foreseen the extraconstitutional powers needed for the executive branch in a growing global world of interconnectedness. Thus, the Supreme Court ruled improperly in this decision, and was liable for the inadequate supplies abroad if our troops were fighting without the necessary components to survive.
A well-thought out concurring opinion was delivered by Justice Jackson. He broke the authority of the President down into three categories: 1) Congress is in agreement, 2) Congress is silent, and 3) Congress is opposed. He believed that this case belonged in the third category. Justice Jackson says, “[The Fifth Amendment signifies] about all there is of the principle that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and that we submit ourselves to rulers only if under rules.” Jackson is correct in determining that the role of the court in foreign affairs is to adjudicate under existing rule of law, yet this absolutist viewpoint, as stated earlier, restricts even the most bizarre circumstances which can never be foreseen. It is in this regard that I disagree with Jackson and argue that the courts should allow for leniency and prudence when ruling on the President’s authority during wartime or national security crises.
In Dellums v Bush the District Court under Harold H. Greene’s opinion made the correct decision in judicial deference. Fifty three members from Congress and one Senator requested that the court issue them an injunction forbidding President Bush to authorize an offensive attack on Iraq. Greene did not issue the injunction and argued that, “In short, unless Congress as a whole, or by a majority, is heard from, the controversy here cannot be deemed ripe; it is only if the majority of the Congress seeks relief from an infringement on its constitutional war-declaration power that it may be entitled to receive it.” By all accounts, this was not only the proper decision to make regarding the case, but it was a necessary one as well. Had the court issued the injunction, the legitimacy of the whole of Congress and the President’s authority to be “Commander-in-Chief” of the Armed Forces would be in jeopardy. In fact, roughly one month after the judge denied the injunction, Congress authorized the use of force in Iraq in conjunction with the UN Resolution. This authorization is exactly why Judge Greene did not usurp Congressional authority and deem it relevant when only 53 House Representatives and one Senator had come forth with the request. The judicial deference in this case was appropriate to the responsibilities of the court and upheld what the Framers had intended.
In the instances where the government detains an enemy combatant during a time of war, the Supreme Court has the inherent right to determine the legality of the detainment. During the Civil War, Lambdin Milligan and four other individuals were accused of planning to steal Union weapons and free Confederate prisoners of war in Indiana. They were sentenced to hang from a military court but were able to bring their case to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court basically ruled that the suspension of ‘habeas corpus’ was legal, yet if there were civilian courts operating upon his detainment he could not be tried by a military tribunal. The role of the court in this case was intriguing. It seems as though they overstepped their boundary and authority by ruling that the suspension of habeas corpus was legal, considering Congress and the President had authorized it together.
The Supreme Court was in fact in its proper jurisdiction when rendering the decision upon where Milligan was to be tried at. Justice Davis argues for the majority, “One of the plainest constitutional provisions was, therefore, infringed when Milligan was tried by a court not ordained and established by Congress, and not composed of judges appointed during good behavior.” Justice Davis is making the argument that a military tribunal is not apt for trial of a citizen when civilian courts are operating. This decision was exactly appropriate for the courts to decide as there was no statue given by Congress and there was no Constitutional provision for it giving the President the enumerated power.
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the role of the court was accurate in its decision to rule and negate judicial deference. Hamdi was a US citizen before being picked up in the battlefield in Afghanistan fighting for the terrorists. President Bush deemed Hamdi an “unlawful enemy combatant” and sought to detain him indefinitely. The Supreme Court held that Hamdi as a U.S. citizen could be held as an unlawful enemy combatant in indefinite detention. However, they also ruled that Hamdi be allowed to challenge the factual basis of his classification as an enemy combatant. Justice O’Connor argues, “Our opinion finds legislative authority to detain under the AUMF once it is sufficiently clear that the enemy is, in fact, an enemy combatant.” The Supreme Court could not have been more correct in its verdict. Establishing the authority for the president to suspend habeas corpus using an interpretive Congressional Resolution (a Resolution which could or could not be relevant to President Bush’s case) was in fact in the perfect jurisdiction for the court to rule a verdict upon. Judicial deference is impossible in this situation because of the differences of opinion in the actual legislative goal of the AUMF, as it was considered irrelevant by four other justices.
The Supreme Court was also correct in establishing its presence in regard to Hamdi being able to challenge the authority of the President in a court of law. It is only solely up to the President when Congress has in fact ruled by statue that citizens’ cannot challenge the validity of their status as unlawful enemy combatants. Since this is not the case, the jurisdiction and role of the federal court system is to determine whether or not the President has the inherent authority to deny Hamdi a chance to refute his charge as an enemy combatant.
Justice Thomas, a dissenter, argues “That is, although it is appropriate for the Court to determine the judicial question whether the President has the asserted authority, we lack the information and expertise to question whether Hamdi is actually an enemy combatant, a question the resolution of which is committed to other branches.” It seems as though Thomas is circumventing the outcome of the decision in which Justice O’Connor prescribed. The courts role is not whether to determine if Hamdi is in fact an enemy combatant, but rather to determine upon whether Hamdi can challenge this essential opinion of the federal government. It is a dangerous path to embark upon when the Supreme Court uses judicial deference in determining the outcome of civil liberties for US citizens. The other branches will still be determining Hamdi’s status, only they will be doing so in a court of law where Hamdi is to mount a defense for his actions. The idea of judicial deference in the Hamdi case is absurd and the Supreme Court acted with precise and accurate rulings.
In conclusion, the role of the federal court system should be one based upon some restraint. While it is important to adjudicate controversies to maintain the checks and balances, the court should not assert its role as a foreign affairs dictator when Congress and the President have both granted the policy in collaboration. The Framers did not intend for the judicial branch to exert major foreign affairs decisions, and that is why the roles are distributed between the executive and legislative branch respectively. Judicial deference should play a bigger role in the realm of the judicial system, unless it is of extenuating circumstances of civil liberties that permit the court to mandate a decision and not abstain from granting it certiorari. Judicial deference is vital to preserve the Framers intention on government, and to allow the executive and legislative deal with foreign matters which affect our national security.
Monday, November 13, 2006
Marxism According to Stalin
Historical Context:
With the abdication of Nicholas II and the successful Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, a new, radical government was emerging in Russia. Influenced on Marxian principles and led by a radical revolutionary named Vladimir Lenin, this vast empire would soon be known as the Soviet Union. Lenin’s brilliance was acknowledged by all who came in contact with him and he soon would reach the highest stature of integrity a leader could achieve with his fellow Russian people. Yet, his tenure as a leading figure in the creation of a communist state was short-lived, and just seven years after he instigated the revolution, he died of a stroke in the early part of 1924. This led to a series of political infighting in the Bolshevik Party, where ultimately one man emerged as victorious and sole leader of the party: Josef Stalin.
Stalin’s ‘Revolution From Above’: Perversion of Marxism
Although Stalin claimed to be a Marxist, and indeed studied and wrote about Marxism in the years prior to the revolution, Stalin was anything but one. Through his programs and policies Stalin had managed to go against many of the aspects which contributed to the heart and soul of Marxist theory. Stalin’s Marxism consisted of a literal, somewhat distorted realization of this ideological philosophy in which his treacherous ambition clouded all rational judgment.
The persona of Stalin portrays an interesting psychological component to Stalin’s interpretation and execution of his version of Marxism. Early on in Stalin’s life, Stalin had developed an idealized image of himself, an image which displayed his search for glory and his need to triumph over his enemies.[1] Stalin envisioned himself as the next Lenin, and even adopted the name “Stalin” because of its meaning “steel one.”[2] For Marxist theory, the characteristic of a selfish hero amongst the proletariats was to its contrary. Indeed, Stalin’s vision for a new Russia came from his mentality of trying to “outdo” or “emulate” an exalted Russian hero of the past, whether it be Lenin or Peter the Great.[3] And as Stalin so notably makes clear to all, where Peter the Great had failed in his “revolution from above” Stalin would succeed. Stalin’s pretentious attitude and his own altercation of Marxism led him on a new project. This grandiose project which would ensue under Stalin’s self-idolatry reign was his “revolution from above.”
When Stalin rose to power after Lenin’s death, Stalin quickly parted into the Right camp of the Communist Party. The main difference within the two camps in the Communist Party was the belief in the world revolution was the only way to bring about a successful socialistic state. The Left of the party, where Stalin’s archenemy Leon Trotsky ideologically lay, believed that future Communist revolutions were a “precondition for building a completely socialist society in Russia.”[4] Yet Stalin offered a plan contrary to the Left of the Party. Stalin had believed that national modernization, not international revolution, was the primary objective of the Soviet Communist Party. He firmly believed that the Bolsheviks did not need European countries to ignite revolutions in order for Russia to have a successful proletariat revolution.[5] Trotsky and many in the Communist Party felt this was a betrayal of strict Marxist interpretation. In essence, Trotsky thought that the Old Bolsheviks were internationalists, and he began criticizing Stalin for having a dangerous sense of national chauvinism in Russia.[6] To almost any strict reader of Marx or Engel, Trotsky’ position seems to be most precise. In the Principles of Communism, Friedrich Engels proclaims “the communist revolution will not merely be a national phenomenon but must take place simultaneously in all civilized countries – that is to say, at least in England, America, France, and Germany. It will develop in each of these countries more or less rapidly…”[7] Here is evidence which suggests that even before Stalin was to come to power, his notion of “socialism in one country” was already contradictory of Marxist teachings.
So it followed that in 1927, Stalin utilized his slogan of “socialism in one country” to enact his Five-Year Plan. This plan essentially sped up the industrialization and development of heavy industry, and also the collectivization of the agricultural sector of the economy. The prevailing justifications given by Stalin were to help the Soviet Union become self-sufficient; to help the Soviet Union to become adequately prepared to defend itself; and to help the Soviet Union straighten out its own backwardness.[8] According to Stalin, ridding the farms of the semi-private commercial economy under the New Economic Policy (NEP) enacted by Lenin was vital to the socialistic state which Marxists had soon hoped to achieve.[9] Yet, the strict interpretation of Marxist-Leninist theory falls directly contrary to this notion of fast industrialization and collectivization. From this Marxist perspective, the mass collectivization of farms came entirely too early. Lenin had envisioned a state which was much more advanced in its technological output capacity and a state that had transpired culturally through a theoretical “cultural revolution” of socialism and even further, communism.[10] Stalin defended his position against the Old Bolsheviks by taking a Lenin quote out of context, and began criticizing his opponents, such as Trotsky, saying they cared less about Russia than about Europe.[11]
The drive and rationalization for heavy industrialization could only silence the dissenting and opposing masses if Stalin instilled fear within the Russian people. This fear was based on Stalin’s fabricated theory of a looming global war, for which the Soviet Union must be prepared at all times to protect its people. In his 1928 Central Committee speech, Stalin asserted that it would be “impossible to uphold the independence of our country without having an adequate industrial base for defense.”[12] The “war card” was only being used to exploit a political advantage over his foe Trotsky, and Stalin amplified this war scare over and over to all the people of the Soviet Union.
Again, we see a direct contradiction between the actions of Stalin and the writings of Marx. Besides the fact that Marx believed in no one man attaining absolute political power of the state, as Stalin was attempting to achieve, but Marx also was against the psychological manipulative part in which Stalin placed over the people. Marx pictured a state where there would be absent a ruler who seeks prey upon the masses only to place them under his control. Stalin completely threw Marxism out the window with his clever exploitation of the people for his personal gain and power. The exploitation was not one of labor, but of intelligence. The frame of reference for which Stalin sought to rule from existed only because of his ability to regulate his people to adhere to his word; this was the exploitation of the mind and heart of the people.
The other aspect of Stalin’s Five-Year Plan was the collectivization of all farms. While this decision proved to be disastrous for the Russian peasants, the most interesting factor surrounding his rationale is his actual interpretation of Marxist theory. Stalin had believed that expropriating the land of the peasants must be done so by a use of coercion from the state itself. He had taken what Marx said literally, and many in the Party believed, including Trotsky and Lenin, that this was not true Marxist teaching.[13] If we observe what Marx actually wrote on the subject, Stalin’s decision to collectivize the farms was indeed an aspect of Marxist teachings.
In the Communist Manifesto Marx proclaims “Of course, in the beginning, this cannot be effected except by means of despotic inroads on the rights of property…”[14] Marx goes on further and says “The proletariat will use its political supremacy…to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the State…and to increase the total of productive forces rapidly.”[15] At first glance, it would seem that what Stalin actually did was exactly what Marx was preaching; that is, taking away private property which the NEP had given them and to centralize the production in the hands of the state, all the while attempting to rapidly overproduce heavy industry. However, if one were to take Stalin’s interpretation, it would mean one would have to ignore the foundation Marx had laid for this process to even come about. Prior to Marx declaring these statements above, he set the pre-requisite for this change to occur, which included the proletariat already in the position of the ruling class. Marx says “…the first step in the revolution by the working class, is to raise the proletariat to the position of the ruling class, to win the battle for democracy.”[16] Not only had the Soviet Union not had a proletariat revolution, but the Soviet Union lacked the essential component in having one; they lacked an actual proletariat. For Stalin to being to collectivize and force the peasants off their private land, without the first step having been achieved in the transformation to a socialistic state, would mean disaster to any strict Marxist follower. Hence, it follows that Stalin had taken what Marx had said in the Communist Manifesto completely out of context; proof again that Stalin exploited the words and philosophy of Karl Marx.
In conclusion, Stalin warped Marxist philosophy in many ways which proved detriment to the existence of the Soviet state. His lust for power and his idealized image of himself made Stalin believe that he was above the proletariat revolutionary state, and this would play out in his authoritarian tactics of deceit and ruthlessness. With his “socialism in one country” mantra, Stalin enacted his Five-Year Plan to bring about a better Soviet Russia with heavy industrialization and farm collectivization. The coercion used to kick peasants off their farms was premature for Marxist –Leninist teachings, and he misinterpreted Marxist writings for the purpose of his own personal gain. Exploiting the masses in his need to stabilize a war defense mechanism for the Soviet Union, Stalin manipulated the Russian people to adhere to his despotic principles, something Marx only referred to as a transitional process against the bourgeois. In the end, Stalin took no part in true Marxist teaching, and for that the Soviet Union began its path toward authoritarianism and repression for the people under Stalin. Stalin’s Marxism was anything but true Marxism and for that, the people suffered.
[1] Robert C. Tucker, Stalin In Power: The Revolution From Above, 1928-1941 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990) 4.
[2] Robert C. Tucker, Stalin In Power: The Revolution From Above, 1928-1941 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990) 4.
[3] Robert C. Tucker, Stalin In Power: The Revolution From Above, 1928-1941 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990) 60.
[4] Robert C. Tucker, Stalin in Power: The Revolution From Above, 1928-1941 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990) 45.
[5] Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) 114.
[6] Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) 114-115.
[7] Friedrich Engels, “The Principles of Communism” Selected Works, Volume One, November 1847 http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1847/11/prin-com.htm (ACCESSED: October 26th, 2006)
[8] Robert C. Tucker, Stalin in Power: The Revolution From Above, 1928-1941 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990) 70.
[9] Robert C. Tucker, Stalin In Power: The Revolution From Above, 1928-1941 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990) 73.
[10] Robert C. Tucker, Stalin In Power: The Revolution From Above, 1928-1941(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990) 73.
[11] Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) 114-115.
[12] Robert C. Tucker, Stalin In Power: The Revolution From Above, 1928-1941 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990) 74.
[13] Robert C. Tucker, Stalin In Power: The Revolution From Above, 1928-1941 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990) 57.
[14] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “Communist Manifesto” (1848) Marx-Engels Reader (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978) 490.
[15] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “Communist Manifesto” (1848) Marx-Engels Reader (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978) 490.
[16] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “Communist Manifesto” (1848) Marx-Engels Reader (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978) 490.
With the abdication of Nicholas II and the successful Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, a new, radical government was emerging in Russia. Influenced on Marxian principles and led by a radical revolutionary named Vladimir Lenin, this vast empire would soon be known as the Soviet Union. Lenin’s brilliance was acknowledged by all who came in contact with him and he soon would reach the highest stature of integrity a leader could achieve with his fellow Russian people. Yet, his tenure as a leading figure in the creation of a communist state was short-lived, and just seven years after he instigated the revolution, he died of a stroke in the early part of 1924. This led to a series of political infighting in the Bolshevik Party, where ultimately one man emerged as victorious and sole leader of the party: Josef Stalin.
Stalin’s ‘Revolution From Above’: Perversion of Marxism
Although Stalin claimed to be a Marxist, and indeed studied and wrote about Marxism in the years prior to the revolution, Stalin was anything but one. Through his programs and policies Stalin had managed to go against many of the aspects which contributed to the heart and soul of Marxist theory. Stalin’s Marxism consisted of a literal, somewhat distorted realization of this ideological philosophy in which his treacherous ambition clouded all rational judgment.
The persona of Stalin portrays an interesting psychological component to Stalin’s interpretation and execution of his version of Marxism. Early on in Stalin’s life, Stalin had developed an idealized image of himself, an image which displayed his search for glory and his need to triumph over his enemies.[1] Stalin envisioned himself as the next Lenin, and even adopted the name “Stalin” because of its meaning “steel one.”[2] For Marxist theory, the characteristic of a selfish hero amongst the proletariats was to its contrary. Indeed, Stalin’s vision for a new Russia came from his mentality of trying to “outdo” or “emulate” an exalted Russian hero of the past, whether it be Lenin or Peter the Great.[3] And as Stalin so notably makes clear to all, where Peter the Great had failed in his “revolution from above” Stalin would succeed. Stalin’s pretentious attitude and his own altercation of Marxism led him on a new project. This grandiose project which would ensue under Stalin’s self-idolatry reign was his “revolution from above.”
When Stalin rose to power after Lenin’s death, Stalin quickly parted into the Right camp of the Communist Party. The main difference within the two camps in the Communist Party was the belief in the world revolution was the only way to bring about a successful socialistic state. The Left of the party, where Stalin’s archenemy Leon Trotsky ideologically lay, believed that future Communist revolutions were a “precondition for building a completely socialist society in Russia.”[4] Yet Stalin offered a plan contrary to the Left of the Party. Stalin had believed that national modernization, not international revolution, was the primary objective of the Soviet Communist Party. He firmly believed that the Bolsheviks did not need European countries to ignite revolutions in order for Russia to have a successful proletariat revolution.[5] Trotsky and many in the Communist Party felt this was a betrayal of strict Marxist interpretation. In essence, Trotsky thought that the Old Bolsheviks were internationalists, and he began criticizing Stalin for having a dangerous sense of national chauvinism in Russia.[6] To almost any strict reader of Marx or Engel, Trotsky’ position seems to be most precise. In the Principles of Communism, Friedrich Engels proclaims “the communist revolution will not merely be a national phenomenon but must take place simultaneously in all civilized countries – that is to say, at least in England, America, France, and Germany. It will develop in each of these countries more or less rapidly…”[7] Here is evidence which suggests that even before Stalin was to come to power, his notion of “socialism in one country” was already contradictory of Marxist teachings.
So it followed that in 1927, Stalin utilized his slogan of “socialism in one country” to enact his Five-Year Plan. This plan essentially sped up the industrialization and development of heavy industry, and also the collectivization of the agricultural sector of the economy. The prevailing justifications given by Stalin were to help the Soviet Union become self-sufficient; to help the Soviet Union to become adequately prepared to defend itself; and to help the Soviet Union straighten out its own backwardness.[8] According to Stalin, ridding the farms of the semi-private commercial economy under the New Economic Policy (NEP) enacted by Lenin was vital to the socialistic state which Marxists had soon hoped to achieve.[9] Yet, the strict interpretation of Marxist-Leninist theory falls directly contrary to this notion of fast industrialization and collectivization. From this Marxist perspective, the mass collectivization of farms came entirely too early. Lenin had envisioned a state which was much more advanced in its technological output capacity and a state that had transpired culturally through a theoretical “cultural revolution” of socialism and even further, communism.[10] Stalin defended his position against the Old Bolsheviks by taking a Lenin quote out of context, and began criticizing his opponents, such as Trotsky, saying they cared less about Russia than about Europe.[11]
The drive and rationalization for heavy industrialization could only silence the dissenting and opposing masses if Stalin instilled fear within the Russian people. This fear was based on Stalin’s fabricated theory of a looming global war, for which the Soviet Union must be prepared at all times to protect its people. In his 1928 Central Committee speech, Stalin asserted that it would be “impossible to uphold the independence of our country without having an adequate industrial base for defense.”[12] The “war card” was only being used to exploit a political advantage over his foe Trotsky, and Stalin amplified this war scare over and over to all the people of the Soviet Union.
Again, we see a direct contradiction between the actions of Stalin and the writings of Marx. Besides the fact that Marx believed in no one man attaining absolute political power of the state, as Stalin was attempting to achieve, but Marx also was against the psychological manipulative part in which Stalin placed over the people. Marx pictured a state where there would be absent a ruler who seeks prey upon the masses only to place them under his control. Stalin completely threw Marxism out the window with his clever exploitation of the people for his personal gain and power. The exploitation was not one of labor, but of intelligence. The frame of reference for which Stalin sought to rule from existed only because of his ability to regulate his people to adhere to his word; this was the exploitation of the mind and heart of the people.
The other aspect of Stalin’s Five-Year Plan was the collectivization of all farms. While this decision proved to be disastrous for the Russian peasants, the most interesting factor surrounding his rationale is his actual interpretation of Marxist theory. Stalin had believed that expropriating the land of the peasants must be done so by a use of coercion from the state itself. He had taken what Marx said literally, and many in the Party believed, including Trotsky and Lenin, that this was not true Marxist teaching.[13] If we observe what Marx actually wrote on the subject, Stalin’s decision to collectivize the farms was indeed an aspect of Marxist teachings.
In the Communist Manifesto Marx proclaims “Of course, in the beginning, this cannot be effected except by means of despotic inroads on the rights of property…”[14] Marx goes on further and says “The proletariat will use its political supremacy…to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the State…and to increase the total of productive forces rapidly.”[15] At first glance, it would seem that what Stalin actually did was exactly what Marx was preaching; that is, taking away private property which the NEP had given them and to centralize the production in the hands of the state, all the while attempting to rapidly overproduce heavy industry. However, if one were to take Stalin’s interpretation, it would mean one would have to ignore the foundation Marx had laid for this process to even come about. Prior to Marx declaring these statements above, he set the pre-requisite for this change to occur, which included the proletariat already in the position of the ruling class. Marx says “…the first step in the revolution by the working class, is to raise the proletariat to the position of the ruling class, to win the battle for democracy.”[16] Not only had the Soviet Union not had a proletariat revolution, but the Soviet Union lacked the essential component in having one; they lacked an actual proletariat. For Stalin to being to collectivize and force the peasants off their private land, without the first step having been achieved in the transformation to a socialistic state, would mean disaster to any strict Marxist follower. Hence, it follows that Stalin had taken what Marx had said in the Communist Manifesto completely out of context; proof again that Stalin exploited the words and philosophy of Karl Marx.
In conclusion, Stalin warped Marxist philosophy in many ways which proved detriment to the existence of the Soviet state. His lust for power and his idealized image of himself made Stalin believe that he was above the proletariat revolutionary state, and this would play out in his authoritarian tactics of deceit and ruthlessness. With his “socialism in one country” mantra, Stalin enacted his Five-Year Plan to bring about a better Soviet Russia with heavy industrialization and farm collectivization. The coercion used to kick peasants off their farms was premature for Marxist –Leninist teachings, and he misinterpreted Marxist writings for the purpose of his own personal gain. Exploiting the masses in his need to stabilize a war defense mechanism for the Soviet Union, Stalin manipulated the Russian people to adhere to his despotic principles, something Marx only referred to as a transitional process against the bourgeois. In the end, Stalin took no part in true Marxist teaching, and for that the Soviet Union began its path toward authoritarianism and repression for the people under Stalin. Stalin’s Marxism was anything but true Marxism and for that, the people suffered.
[1] Robert C. Tucker, Stalin In Power: The Revolution From Above, 1928-1941 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990) 4.
[2] Robert C. Tucker, Stalin In Power: The Revolution From Above, 1928-1941 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990) 4.
[3] Robert C. Tucker, Stalin In Power: The Revolution From Above, 1928-1941 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990) 60.
[4] Robert C. Tucker, Stalin in Power: The Revolution From Above, 1928-1941 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990) 45.
[5] Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) 114.
[6] Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) 114-115.
[7] Friedrich Engels, “The Principles of Communism” Selected Works, Volume One, November 1847 http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1847/11/prin-com.htm (ACCESSED: October 26th, 2006)
[8] Robert C. Tucker, Stalin in Power: The Revolution From Above, 1928-1941 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990) 70.
[9] Robert C. Tucker, Stalin In Power: The Revolution From Above, 1928-1941 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990) 73.
[10] Robert C. Tucker, Stalin In Power: The Revolution From Above, 1928-1941(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990) 73.
[11] Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) 114-115.
[12] Robert C. Tucker, Stalin In Power: The Revolution From Above, 1928-1941 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990) 74.
[13] Robert C. Tucker, Stalin In Power: The Revolution From Above, 1928-1941 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990) 57.
[14] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “Communist Manifesto” (1848) Marx-Engels Reader (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978) 490.
[15] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “Communist Manifesto” (1848) Marx-Engels Reader (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978) 490.
[16] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “Communist Manifesto” (1848) Marx-Engels Reader (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978) 490.
Wednesday, November 08, 2006
Democrats Win Defensive Victory
Democrats win the House. Democrats are going to win the Senate. To many Republicans, defeat and sorrow has overcome the core of their well-being, and to many Democrats, victory and hope saturate their once disheartening mentality of continuing loss over the last 12 years. It doesn’t take an expert to understand that the voting public overwhelmingly voted for change on November 7th; a seemingly subconscious national referendum on Dubya, where voters gathered inspiration from their frustration of Bush to oust his Republican cohorts. Oddly enough, the credence granted to the Democrats in the House, and possibly the Senate, was only a defensive victory.
The robust republic our Founders created made sure that a system of ‘checks and balances’ precluded any one branch from exerting too much power in the arena of federal government. Indeed, while the Democrats may have made major gains in both Houses, the Republicans should still be holding their heads up high. The presidential mandate given to Bush two years ago was not up for election, therefore the Democratic victory was marred by the fact that the Republicans still maintain the executive branch. Therefore, the only victory the Democrats inherited was a meager defensive victory; that is to say, a victory which simply disables the Republicans from passing legislation which adhered to their party principles (or what’s left of them). The offensive triumph for the Democrats can only be determined in the ’08 election where the executive branch will be up for grabs, presumably for Obama or McCain to seize.
With Bush still at the helm of government, it is safe to say that the use of his veto power will without a doubt be much greater in these next two years of office. Democrats will not have near enough voting power to overturn any of their legislative goals in the Senate, therefore the Democrats will ultimately achieve nothing for the next two years. That is the nature of representative democracy. Divided government ensures nothing will ever get done, or if something does get done, there is a cosmic compromise made between parties. This is not necessarily a negative attribute of our American polity, but rather an inevitable one which ensures our political system is working. As Madison so brilliantly noted in “Notes on Confederacy,” division in government promulgates a healthy balance and sustenance for liberty and individual freedom to be upheld. That was one of the primary reasons Madison chose a republic over the ‘mobocracy’ tendencies of direct democracy.
All in all this election established a definitive tone to the prevailing disposition of this country: change. The Democrats may very well deserve a mandate in legislating change, however this is not practical. The presence of Bush assures a Republican check on legislation coming from Congress and subsequently will obstruct the “new direction” Democrats so aspired to take America upon. Blocking the Republicans from putting through legislation is essentially all the Democrats got out of this election. This win is one which should come with some dissatisfaction, but don’t tell them that.
So to sum up, cheer up Republicans, and go easy on the celebrations Democrats, the direction of the country is not going to change with a subtle defensive victory, no matter how big.
The robust republic our Founders created made sure that a system of ‘checks and balances’ precluded any one branch from exerting too much power in the arena of federal government. Indeed, while the Democrats may have made major gains in both Houses, the Republicans should still be holding their heads up high. The presidential mandate given to Bush two years ago was not up for election, therefore the Democratic victory was marred by the fact that the Republicans still maintain the executive branch. Therefore, the only victory the Democrats inherited was a meager defensive victory; that is to say, a victory which simply disables the Republicans from passing legislation which adhered to their party principles (or what’s left of them). The offensive triumph for the Democrats can only be determined in the ’08 election where the executive branch will be up for grabs, presumably for Obama or McCain to seize.
With Bush still at the helm of government, it is safe to say that the use of his veto power will without a doubt be much greater in these next two years of office. Democrats will not have near enough voting power to overturn any of their legislative goals in the Senate, therefore the Democrats will ultimately achieve nothing for the next two years. That is the nature of representative democracy. Divided government ensures nothing will ever get done, or if something does get done, there is a cosmic compromise made between parties. This is not necessarily a negative attribute of our American polity, but rather an inevitable one which ensures our political system is working. As Madison so brilliantly noted in “Notes on Confederacy,” division in government promulgates a healthy balance and sustenance for liberty and individual freedom to be upheld. That was one of the primary reasons Madison chose a republic over the ‘mobocracy’ tendencies of direct democracy.
All in all this election established a definitive tone to the prevailing disposition of this country: change. The Democrats may very well deserve a mandate in legislating change, however this is not practical. The presence of Bush assures a Republican check on legislation coming from Congress and subsequently will obstruct the “new direction” Democrats so aspired to take America upon. Blocking the Republicans from putting through legislation is essentially all the Democrats got out of this election. This win is one which should come with some dissatisfaction, but don’t tell them that.
So to sum up, cheer up Republicans, and go easy on the celebrations Democrats, the direction of the country is not going to change with a subtle defensive victory, no matter how big.
Tuesday, November 07, 2006
Election Prediction
My Prediction for the 2006 midterms:
House: Democrats pick up 18 seats.
Senate: Democrats pick up 5 seats.
All in all, Democrats retake the House and just miss taking back the Senate.
House: Democrats pick up 18 seats.
Senate: Democrats pick up 5 seats.
All in all, Democrats retake the House and just miss taking back the Senate.
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