Part 3 of "Learn Some History!" Series: Why Italy fought with Germany in World War II

The advent of World War II brought upon the major European alliance of Italy and Germany. The Rome-Berlin Axis formally began in 1936 and lasted until the end of the war in 1945. Benito Mussolini, the fascist dictator in Italy, had aligned with Adolf Hitler in Nazi Germany. This partnership was established because of minor ideological similarities, the geographical conditions of Europe (i.e. the position of Italy and Germany), the complete deterioration of international relations between France/Britain and Italy which in turn led Hitler to exploit Italy’s seclusion by giving them military and economic aid, the military collaboration of Italy and Germany in the Spanish Civil War, and the similitude of the expansive territorial goals each nation desired. While indeed many of these reasons are the main cause of the alliance between the two countries, they were not the reason, or immediate cause for Italy to fight with Germany. The most important motivating factor for Italy to fight alongside of Germany was not any of the above reasons. In fact, it was not until Germany had defeated the French in 1940 that Mussolini had finally decided to enter battle in conjunction with the Germans. Had the Germans lost the campaign against the French, or even still waged a war of attrition with little end in sight, Mussolini would have possibly declared neutrality. Of course, the other reasons for Mussolini aligning with Hitler were also very prominent in the construction of their alliance, yet the French defeat actually brought Mussolini out of his ‘neutrality’ thoughts and in to the battlefield.

Understanding the historical significance of Hitler’s adoration for Mussolini is a crucial premise to the ideological factors of alignment. One must understand however, that by natural causes, fascism and Nazism did not necessarily have to align with one another. The ideological factors simply achieve a deeper understanding between the two sides. Hitler had admired Mussolini ever since he had come to power in 1922. The revulsion of Soviet Bolshevism displayed by Hitler ideologically aligned him with Mussolini and his corporative state. On one occasion, Hitler remarked to his entourage about Mussolini defeating Bolshevism “not by military force but by superior intellect, and we have to thank him by showing for the first time…that even in this twentieth century is it possible to recall a people to a sense of purely national pride.”1 Hitler also compared his regime progress to that of Mussolini as he said, “When I read the history of Fascism I feel as if I’m reading the history of our movement.”2 Hitler remarked in the 1930s, after he had total control over Germany, “…the Duce and I were both working in the building-trade. This explains that there is also a deep bond between us on a purely human level. I have a deep friendship for this extraordinary man.” The alliance between the two countries indeed seemed more masked in the friendship between the two individuals. Evidence of this can be seen when Hitler told his generals in 1939, “If anything happened to [Mussolini], the loyalty of Italy to the alliance would be no longer secure.”3

The only other key aspect of the alliance in terms of assessing the ideological factor of Hitler and Mussolini was the doctrine of denying democracy; exactly what the Western Powers had afforded their people by this time. Mussolini had thought the Peace Treaties at the end of World War I were unfair to Germany. Mussolini recognized that Germans had been coerced to swallow the ‘Immortal Principles’ of western democracy which was not in harmony with German mentality or tradition. Mussolini said, “Fascism denies, in democracy, the absur[d] conventional untruth of political equality dressed out in the garb of collective irresponsibility, and the myth of "happiness" and indefinite progress.”4 Here we see evidence that indeed Mussolini was not a proponent of democracy. The dissatisfaction with the Peace Treaties also led Italy to sympathize with German opposition. Mussolini stated in 1931, “And how then can we not talk of European reconstruction if certain clauses of the Peace Treaties, which have driven whole peoples to the edge of the abyss and of moral despair, are not modified?”5

Also, Hitler had visualized an alliance between Italy and Germany in 1920 as he declared, “Our basic demand is: Off with the [Versailles] Peace Treaty! To this end we must use everything we can. Especially the differences between France and Italy, in order to win Italy over to our side.” 6

Most of Hitler’s interpretation at the time was not that Italy was so perfect to align with Germany, but that France and Italy were in fact so opposite that Mussolini may have no other choice but to side with Germany. And in 1933, when Hitler came to power, ideology remained a backburner for this alliance. In fact, the ideological framework between the two countries did not make them born alliances. As much as Hitler made endearing remarks about Mussolini, there was a clear disconnect between the two leaders. As many perceptive observers noted at the time, the two men essentially lacked a real understanding and comprehension of one another.7 The only reality that lay within their personal bond was the fact that they both were supreme rulers of their respective countries.8 Also, there was a vast difference between the government of Hitler’s National Socialism and Mussolini’s fascistic government.9 When Hitler finally came to power, it proved very difficult for both men to initiate diplomatic relations since both were rampant nationalists, both with imperialistic ambitions.10 One of the most interesting ideological differences between the two leaders was their belief in the “Aryan” race. In 1934, Mussolini emphasized that German ‘Aryanism’ had many flaws and that their anti-Semitic policy was in fact a dangerous mistake that “played into the hands of international Jewry” which harmed Germany’s international reputation.11

Even though it is important to get an understanding of the two dictators countries and rule being more similar to that of the Allied Powers, it would be a massive error to assume that these two powers aligned because of their ideological similarities. The ideological parallels played only a minor role, if any, in developing unity between the nation-states from the early inception of Mussolini and Hitler’s rise to power; it was not until France was defeated did Mussolini actually deploy troops to hopefully take an active part on the winning side of the war.

The geographical composition of these two states also played a small part in the determination of this ‘Axis.’ Italy has the unfortunate location of having no free access to an ocean. The country is positioned by an inland sea which is only connected through the Suez Canal and Straits of Gibraltar, both of which were dominated by the British.12 Mussolini’s Italy was captive to the Mediterranean, and Corisca, Tunisia, Malta, and Cyprus were the “bars of the prison.”13 Mussolini remarked that the purpose of Italian foreign policy “has not and never can have as objectives continental European territory except Albania, is in the first place to break the prison bars.”14 Mussolini further posited that after they had broken these pillars, Italy would ‘march to the ocean.’ Yet Mussolini knew he needed an ally before he commenced such an operation. “To brave the solution of such a problem without having our backs secured on the Continent would be absurd.”15 The ‘security’ which Mussolini ultimately depended upon was that of Nazi Germany, but only after they had destroyed France.

Mussolini wanted to secure an alliance with a strong land power so it could pursue and maintain its colonial conquests in the Mediterranean Sea and Northern Africa. The deep feel for Hitler to acquire Italian friendship was also prevalent in Mein Kampf as Hitler denounced the reclamation of South Tyrol to Germany. South Tyrol was a German-speaking province Italy had taken after World War I. Hitler stated, “All this fuss today is not made for love of the South Tyrol, which it does not help but only harms, but for fear of a possible German-Italian understanding.”16 The strategic placement of Italy and Germany within Europe was convenient in that Italy and Germany were not after the same territories for expansion. In fact, Hitler even acknowledged that Italy or Britain would be the ideal partnerships since Germany could focus on continental Europe, Britain would focus on its overseas imperial dominance, and Italy would stake claim in the Mediterranean. Hitler wrote, “In the predictable future there can be only two allies for Germany in Europe: England and Italy.”17

Yet again, the geographical location of the two countries played only a negligible role in the development of Italy actually going to war alongside of Germany. In fact, it was there very geographical positions in Europe which almost caused them to go to war with each other. One notable historical event between the two countries dealt with the independence of Austria. Austria was located smack in the middle between Italy to its south and Germany to its north. The Austrian government, in 1933, began to model itself off of Italian fascism when Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss essentially dissolved the republic that had existed prior.18 Mussolini was very concerned about the independent Austria falling under the auspices of Nazi Germany at this time. In fact, Dollfuss began executing many Austrian Nazis for the sake of resisting German control.19 It was indeed in the interest of Italy to have Austria maintain their independence so that the country could serve as a buffer state between them and Germany.20

The first meeting between Hitler and Mussolini occurred on June 14th 1934 in Venice. Essentially it was a failure as Hitler demanded a new chancellor and new government in Austria and Mussolini demanded that the Nazi’s stop the terrorist methods of trying to overthrow Chancellor Dollfuss.21 Tensions were rising between the two powers after they met. Roughly one month later, Chancellor Dollfuss was assassinated by Nazi’s, and a coup tried to take over the government. Mussolini was outraged and subsequently sent Italian troops to Austria, the Brenner Pass, in a threatening anti-German gesture.22 After sending the troops to Austria Mussolini remarked, “We have defended and will defend the independence of the Austrian Republic.”23 Germany eventually backed down from this, and the relations became better with both countries after Germany was the only country that did not apply sanctions to Italy after they decided to invade Ethiopia.24 Thus, although Germany later did not share territorial ambitions to that of what Italy may have wanted, they still nonetheless almost warred against each other because of their very location in Europe. Geography could have well turned these two powers against each other which is the very reason why it was not the primary factor in their alliance.

The relationship between France and Italy also, to a much larger degree then the previous two reasons, played a role in the development of a Rome-Berlin Axis. The relationship between the two countries was somewhat of a pendulum, where sometimes Italy was outspoken against France, and often they were in accordance with the French government. One of the crucial issues between the two countries rise to bitterness was that of Tunisia. In 1883, many thousands of Italians had migrated from Sicily to Tunisia. In 1896 a Franco-Italian agreement was signed which permitted the Italians to keep their own nationality, build their own schools and were afforded other privileges.25 However, after WWI in 1918 France decided to revoke this agreement and began treating the Italians poorly while passing regulations on their rights and requiring them to attain French citizenship.26 The discussions about Tunisia represented bitterness between the two powers as many Frenchmen began to think that this territory was on scope for Italy to acquire in their imperialist ambitions.27 Here is evidence that suggests the two countries had difficulty in diplomacy even since the closure of WWI.

In the late 1920s, Italy was on shaky ground with its supposed allies of France. On September 17th, 1927 Count Carlo Nardini, Italian Consul in Paris, was murdered by an Italian Anarchist named Modugno. The court in Paris then sentenced Modugno to only 2 years in prison with a fine of 200 francs.28 This angered the Italian people as Mussolini stated in the Cabinet Council after the incident: “The whole nation has in the last few days been seriously outraged by the verdict of the Paris jury…The government understands the indignant emotion of the Italian people.”29 The relations between countries got better after the French began arresting anti-fascists that were going to kill Italian officials.30 Franco-Italian naval relations were tensing up as well. On March 1, 1931 an agreement was drafted by the British and Italians which maintained Italy’s right to parity in terms of naval rearmaments. France rejected the proposal and insisted that Italy agree to never build up a fleet which is the equivalent of France. The disarmament discussions between the countries dragged on without any definite conclusions.31 This is all not mentioning the fact that British and Italian aims were relatively similar thus producing conflict as well. For example, the Fascist objective of an Italian Mediterranean indeed contrasted sharply to British influence and interests in the region.32

Yet while there was much disagreement between France and Italy, there was still an attempt on both governments to call for peace in Europe. One example of this would be the Briand-Kellogg Pact which called for providing for the “renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy.”33 This pact was signed by France, US, Great Britain and Italy in 1928- to which later Russia adhered to this pact. After this pact was signed Mussolini gave a speech on December 9, 1928 saysing, “ We are all for peace. We have signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact.”34 Mussolini even addressed the American people on Janurary 1st of 1931 stating that “Neither I nor my government, nor the Italian people wish to prepare for war. I have fought in a war as a private soldier, I know what war means.”35 The French government led by Daladier also stated in 1933 that they wished to regain better Italo-Franco relations and requested just an agreement between those two countries.36 The Italians also tried to issue peace through a new pact entitled the Four Powers Pact. This was drafted by Mussolini in 1933 and was signed by, although a more diluted version than the original, France, Britain and Germany.37 Essentially the Four Powers Pact said the following: “a policy of effective co-operation between all powers with a view to the maintenance of peace.”38 This is evidence that Italy and France were not born and hated enemies, but in fact engaged in realist determinations of alliances and sought possible genuine peace in Europe. This all changed when Italy invaded Ethiopia.

As stated, the tip of the iceberg was Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia, which was condemned by the League of Nations.39 Mussolini knew that he had to gain British and French acquiescence before he went and invaded Ethiopia. In fact, Mussolini was rather upset that Italy was condemned to be a second-rate power unless they acquired some colonial powers. Ethiopia was one of the few African territories that had not already been snatched up by other European powers, and since it proved to be rich in raw materials it proved to be a good agricultural industry for Italy.40 The international depression at this time was causing a stagnate Italian economy and colonial acquisitions seemed to be a quick fix in alleviating some of the economic pressures put upon the Italian economy. So by fall of 1933, the diplomatic relations in the Four Powers Pact had fizzled out and Mussolini was becoming restless with nonsensical talk of diplomacy.41 Finally on December 30th, 1934 Mussolini ordered an Italian invasion of Ethiopia.42 Mussolini attempted to downplay there invasion to Britain and France by sparking up heightened fears of a German rearmament and the taking of Austria.43

France and Britain were extremely upset about Italian action in Ethiopia and the League of Nations quickly acted against Italian aggression. They imposed the following sanctions on Italy: an embargo on arms and munitions, a ban on loan and credit, and a prohibition on the export of materials necessary for Italy’s ability to wage war.44 The crumbling of international alternatives for Italy paved the way for its acceptance into the German framework of being an ally. While Mussolini was now economically isolated from Europe, Hitler came along and supplied Italy with arms and materials. German goods were sent to Italy despite the Treaties sanctions.45 This proved to be an instrumental factor in a relationship between the two countries that did indeed last until 1945. However, as previously stated, just because Italy had justification to side with Germany did not ultimately mean they would fight alongside each other. The conquest did catapult the Rome-Berlin Axis in October of 1936 and also the cooperation of military support for Spain from both Italy and Germany. After the war however, Britain still tried not to alienate Italy from the Western powers, so that Mussolini would stay away from an alliance with Hitler. Britain actually lifted the sanctions which applied to Italy during the Ethiopian War by ending the Mediterranean Sea alerts and by withdrawing their warships to home-waters.46 This is important because it signifies that by the end of the Ethiopian War, Italy could have still sided with the Western powers of Europe as opposed to Germany.

The advent of the Spanish Civil War in 1936 also fused these two regimes in a militaristic way. The Nationalists and the Republicans in Spain were battling a civil war which would ultimately determine the fate of their country and the allegiance to certain powers in Europe. The ‘caudillo’ of the Nationalists, Francisco Franco, asked Hitler and Mussolini for help in his struggle.47 Hitler and Mussolini subsequently aided Franco in his war against the Republicans and they solidified some military coordination in the meantime. With this war, Hitler successfully created a partnership with Mussolini when he sent troops to fight what he called "Bolshevism" in Spain alongside the Italians. Hans Frank, Hitler’s personal envoy, arrived in Rome in September to discuss the Spanish conflict with Mussolini. Frank assured Mussolini that the only reason Hitler was intervening militarily in Spain was not because of territorial or imperialist aims but because of respect for Mussolin. The Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Galeazzo Ciano stated about the meeting “the Fuehrer is anxious that we [Mussolini and Ciano] should know that he regards the Mediterranean as a purely Italian sea. Italy has a right to positions of privilege and control in the Mediterranean. The interests of the Germans are turned towards the Baltic which is their Mediterranean."48 The Italian government sent their air force along with 10,000 Germans who were airmen and gunners.49 Mussolini and Hitler’s actions in Spain were against international law at the time, especially against the wishes of the Non-Intervention Committee which was speaking out against action in Spain.50

In the meantime, France was supplying the Republicans with arms. Guns, tanks, and planes arrived in Spain to combat the anti-Republican forces. Hitler convinced Mussolini to increase aid in Spain, and by the end of the war Mussolini had ordered roughly 72,000 Italian troops in Spain in conjunction with many German troops as well.51 Mussolini around the end of 1936 was beginning to see Germany as a formidable ally in international relations. He stated, in a conversation with one of Hitler’s aides, “Between Italy and Germany there is a common fate. This is becoming stronger and stronger. That it cannot be denied. Italy and Germany are congruent cases.” Here we see the alliance beginning to solidify, although again, Mussolini still had reservations with this alliance as he also was wanting to keep it a secret from the rest of Europe. He also said, “We cannot openly show France and England our position towards Germany. Not yet!”52 Interpreting this, Mussolini may not have wanted to induce France and England into thinking that he wanted to align with Germany for the simple reason that he was still open to diplomatic relations, at least to a small degree, with those two countries.

The question of Austria still lingered during 1938. Hitler was exerting his expansionist policies towards the Austrian government, and even knowing that he could have taken Austria over without fear of Italian retaliation, Hitler wanted to remain on good terms with Mussolini so he subsequently asked for his approval. Mussolini approved the Anschluss as soon as he received it.53 Mussolini had no choice in the matter since most of his troops were in Spain at the time, much to the manipulation of Hitler’s aims. So it went that Hitler marched into Austria unopposed and annexed the country to its sovereignty of Germany.54

Yet, in 1939, in the midst of a solidifying alliance between the Axis powers of Spain, Italy, and Germany, Hitler decided to march into Prague, without forewarning Mussolini of his actions. The Italian government was infuriated by Hitler for not giving them an alert that this would be occurring.55 Ciano, speaking about the invasion of Prague remarked in his journal, “What weight can be given in the future to those declarations and promises which concern us more directly? It is useless to deny that all this worries and humiliates the Italian people.”56 Tensions between the two powers arose, and Mussolini then decided to counteract this move and invaded Albania, giving Hitler only one day warning.57 Also, after Hitler took Prague, Mussolini thought the German army would march and invade a weakened Yugoslavia. Thus, prior to Mussolini’s attack on Albania, he ordered the abandoned of the attack in preparation for Hitler’s attack against Yugoslavia.58 However, Germany assured Italy that the Balkans and the Mediterranean were clearly in their sphere of influence and that they had no intentions of disregarding this aspect of the pact.59

During the Spanish intervention, only Germany remained as a potential ally for Italy after the war subsided. Hitler and achieved a somewhat necessary ally in Italy. By convincing Mussolini to intervene in the Spanish conflict, Hitler pulled Italy closer to Germany by exploiting Italy’s increasing economic dependence on Germany, as well as Italy’s seclusion from the Western European powers. In Germany’s and Italy’s pursuit of distinguishable spheres of influence, (i.e. German interest in Austria and Central Europe and Italian interest in Ethiopia and Spain) the context for cooperation was enhanced. The ‘Axis’ was thus secure in large part as an effect of the isolation of Italy from the West, and their separate ambitious territorial goals by each ruler.60 But again, this does not mandate that Italy would wage war for German support. Territorial expansion was also a very principal factor in the alliance of these nations. The insatiable desire for more territory by both leaders put led them into the same line of thinking. Although it has been implicit in the arguments prior, territorial expansion was the convenient scheme that unified Italy and Germany in terms of the motivations for attacking other countries and regions.

The proposal of this paper rests upon the main assumption that all of the above reasons played a minor to major role in establishing the framework for which Italy and Germany came to align upon. However, the primary factor which pitted the two into war against Western democracies was in fact the fatal blow delivered by Germany to the French army. In 1940, Germany invaded France and desecrated their army within less than two months. Prior to the onset of the war in 1940 however, Mussolini wrote to Hitler, “The two European powers need a period of peace lasting not less than 3 years. It is from 1943 onwards that a war effort will have the greatest prospects of victory. Fascists Italy, although convinced that it is inevitable, has no desire to participate in a European War.”61 This is telling, because it signifies that Italy was not prepared to go to war when Germany invaded France. Also, Hitler had no intention of preparing for a major war, and at no time after 1940 did Hitler show any interest in cooperation with the Italian military in the event of a major war.62 The only thought Hitler ever really gave to Italy was that it would serve as a neutralizer to Western European powers in terms of intervention from the Mediterranean or North Africa.

The actual outbreak of the war was completely uncoordinated between Italy and Germany. In fact, Hitler was so unconcerned with German-Italian relations by the end of 1939 that he signed a Nazi-Soviet Pact.63 The first invasion of the German army into Poland was not even laid out before hand with Mussolini and no consultation had been sought on account from Hitler. Mussolini thus declared Italy a “non-belligerency” and remained reluctantly neutral at the outbreak of the war.64 From the early onset of the war, all previous alliances between the Axis were really not solid and the real truth was that the Rome-Berlin Axis was more of a superficiality than an unyielding document with each state pursuing their own interests and their own protection of national security. The original timetable for Italian entrance into the war was 1942 or 1943, but it was all rendered useless after the German army had extremely successful campaigns in Norway and France, and the whole strategic situation had changed for Italy.65 A letter from an old guard member of the Italian Army, Farinacci wrote a letter to Mussolini stating what most of the individuals in the Italian government had believed. He said, “Naturally all those socialistoids, democratoids, and creotoids, are all beginning to say that if we intervene we should intervene on the side of France against Germany. This would be a grave misfortune for Italy since nobody would take us serious anymore and we would lose that prestige which you have secured for us in so many years of struggle.”66

The reasons for Italy aligning with Germany were all there, but the motivation and result of the intervention of Italian troops was only because of the result of French defeat. Even when Hitler received word that Italy was joining the war alongside of them, he had no enthusiasm towards the news.67 Even when Mussolini got involved in the war, he wasn’t involved because of the great vision or outlook Hitler had for Europe after the war, yet rather only because he thought the German armies were invincible and he wanted to maintain and establish territorial conquests in Greece and Egypt after the war.68 Evidence of the lack of solidarity and agreement within the Axis powers was evident when Mussolini decided to not help support German troops against the British, but instead waged a “parallel war” to protect his own interests in Greece.69 Mussolini stated to Ciano, “Hitler always faces me with a fait accompli. This time I am going to pay him back in his own coin. He will find out from the papers that I have occupied Greece. In this way the equilibrium will be reestablished.”70 Hitler was outraged that Mussolini would do this, yet he dare not speak out against Mussolini because it would indicate weakness in the Axis power alliance. Mussolini and Italy essentially waged a war for their personal interests, riding on a German wave of domination that only held up so long. Had France not been defeated so quickly, Mussolini may have declared neutrality and ended up fighting alongside the Allied Powers for fear of losing international reputation and imperial ambitions after the war was over. Whatever the winning side was indicating, that was what it seemed most likely for Mussolini to join.

Thus, in conclusion, factors regarding the alliance indeed weighed heavily upon the set of circumstances prior to the war. The history of ideological similarities, although not binding or perfect, at least opened up a dialogue of what two leaders ‘should’ be acting in accordance since they both looked upon the other as a resemblance of themselves (at least in Hitler’s case). The geographical location of the Italy and how the territorial conquests were in fact not what Germany wanted also played a large development in having Hitler not be belligerent towards Mussolini. The breakdown of relations and the isolation of Mussolini at the end of the 1930s almost made no choice for Italy but to form an alliance with Hitler. The Spanish Civil War which, ultimately led to European powers ostracizing Germany and Italy, aligning them closer together because of the lack of alternatives. Yet, while all of these have weight in determining the alliance, there is no question that the neutrality declared at the onset of the war, and the lack of coordination between the two powers, proved to all that the Axis powers were not bound militarily together. Mussolini was not consulted before Hitler’s attacks, and his army was clearly not ready to attack when they began the war as Hitler disregarded Mussolini’s requests for a war of attrition. The fall of France so quickly pushed Mussolini into the war, and the actions taken by Mussolini afterward, how he fought his own war of imperial aims, signifies that there was no ‘true’ alliance with Hitler, it was merely a way to get on the winning team and seek positive terms of agreement after the war was over. Mussolini fought alongside Hitler because of the effectiveness of blitzkrieg and the total collapse of the French army.

The Rise of American Conservatism: A Brief History

The 1964 presidential election between Barry Goldwater and Lyndon Johnson put a new conservative philosophy in the limelight of public discourse. The Republican candidate Goldwater was running on a revolutionary ‘new’ conservative platform that sought to rollback many of the ongoing liberal policies of the last thirty years in government. At the time of the 1964 election, Goldwater’s views were seen by many as rather extreme and he was handed a crushing loss to Johnson in ‘64. However, Goldwater proved to be the pioneer that led the charge for a new conservative shift in the American populace which reached its zenith with election of Ronald Reagan in 1980.

The principles of conservatism were articulated brilliantly in Goldwater’s essay entitled The Conscience of a Conservative. He argued that conservatism is based upon the principle that freedom is the ultimate maxim of human existence. Personal responsibility for one’s actions and the protection of individual freedom are the essential components of conservatism. Conservatism also argues that government should be as limited as possible, intervening only to keep maintenance and order of the society. Goldwater also believed that conservatives are not only economic beings but also spiritual beings. These beliefs laid the foundation for conservatism to gain its prominence by the late 1970s.

The evolution of conservatism from this era allowed for presidential candidate Ronald Reagan to win the presidency in 1980 against incumbent Jimmy Carter. By the 1980s, conservatism was seen as more mainstream, as opposed to the radical nature of the philosophy in the 1960s. The principles of conservatism for Reagan rest in the calls for new economic policies which combated the Great Society of the 1960s. Reagan advocated a smaller federal government, de-regulation in the business sector, lower taxes, and a strong national defense against communism. For Reagan, Carter’s policies favored too much governmental control which he believed was the cause of the economic crisis in America at that time. Reagan proclaims, “We don’t need Carter’s eight-or 10-point programs to “fix” or fine tune the economy.”

One of the new methods of conservative activism in 1980 was direct mail. One conservative activist stated in 1980, “Without the mail, most conservative activity would wither and die.” Direct mail enabled mobilization and allowed for funding, volunteering, and petitions to surface at the local levels. As Richard Viguerie stated, “Without direct mail, we might have no National Review, no Human Events, no Conservative Digest, no Conservative PACs…” Conservatism was essentially born from the usage of this mechanism which promulgated conservative information and support that allowed for the movement to sustain itself.

Another facet of conservatism in the late 1970s early 1980s was the creation of single issue groups on a national level. After Roe v. Wade legalized abortion, many religious advocates came forth and began speaking out for the ‘right to life’ of an unborn child. Groups like the Right to Life, the National Rifles Association, and the Right to Work Movements all sprung up and mobilized conservatives to vote and elect candidates who adhered to their positions. The religious “awakening” that occurred within some movements of conservatism was mostly a reaction of the Roe v. Wade Supreme Court decision. One of the major religious opponents of this decision was Reverend Jerry Falwell. Falwell rallied fellow Christians to speak out against abortion as he stated about an abortion, “It didn’t matter if her human parents wanted her to live or die. God wanted her to live.” Goldwater’s libertarian ideas somewhat conflicted with that of the religious right and the issue of abortion. Many of these libertarian paleo-conservatives felt that abortion was a matter of personal choice.

The New Right was breaking on the scene in the mid 1970s and it was a seemingly conscious reaction of the politics of the liberal 1960s. With the massive division within the Democratic Party in 1968, the Republicans were able to seize control of the White House with Richard Nixon, who had run on similar policies that Goldwater had advocated. Conservative think tanks began sprouting up as the battle for ideas became an all out war in the public discourse. Organizations like the Heritage Foundation, Young Americans for Freedom, the Leadership Institute all led the New Right movement with policy positions that influenced US domestic and foreign policy for the next decade.

With the advent of this new conservative movement, tensions within the movement itself were very prevalent. For example, the traditionalists and supply-siders within the conservative movement were at odds at each others over the correct role of governmental economic policy. The supply-siders favored permanent tax cuts with a rising deficit while the traditionalists favored some tax increases to alleviate the burden of the rising deficit.The conservative movement solidified a break from New Deal/Great Society politics of liberalism and big government, to a more strict limited government.

The conservative philosophy was brought to the center stage with Goldwater’s campaign in 1964 and it was finally achieved and realized with Reagan ascending to the presidency in 1980 (although some would argue Nixon followed Goldwater’s ideals as well). The conservatism of the 60s, 70s, and 80s was indeed a reactionary phenomenon from the liberal politics of the day; yet, it made its way to organization and structure with the coming of direct mail and single issue groups.

The DePaul Conservative Resistance: A Call for Change

Over two weeks ago, conservative author David Horowitz came to DePaul to speak about the blatant disregard professors have in indoctrinating their students to subscribe to their political agenda. He came under the auspices of the DePaul Conservative Alliance (DCA), and as Vice-President of this organization, I can tell you that Horowitz was not just invited to stir things up at DePaul. Contrary to popular belief, the endgame for the DCA is not drumming up controversy by inviting speakers or hosting bake sales. Rather, we are calling for action to reform this educational institution into a bastion of high intellectual standards while tolerating and informing students of the many conservative ideologies that exist in the world.

This call for change will often seem as though we are devoted to conflict and quarrel, but rest assured, the goals of our operation and existence are not to, in the words of Frederick Douglass, “agitate, agitate, agitate.” Our movement is in essence a reaction to the prevailing tenets and structures in place at DePaul. Like Newton’s Third Law of motion, for every action there is an equal an opposite reaction; only in this case, we hope to go beyond an ‘equal’ reaction. In any event, we are seeking change. The path to reform is never easy, and the DCA fully recognizes this fact. Our progress so far, at least in the last two and a half years, has made considerable headway.

Two and a half years ago there was no DCA. Two and a half years ago the College Republicans were a group of about five people that maybe met once a month to discuss how Clinton should have been impeached and that the ‘weapons of mass destruction’ are still in Syria somewhere. Two and a half years ago, there was no conservative literature or newspaper distributed around campus. Two and a half years ago, conservatism was all but dead at DePaul.

But then, the fraudulent Ward Churchill was invited by the Cultural Center to speak at DePaul on his ‘little Eichman’ college campus tour, and the closet-conservatives at DePaul had finally had enough. Students mobilized and came out in droves to protest the man who said, “Innocent? Gimme a break.” in reference to the Americans who perished on 9/11. After Student Life banned us from protesting the event with posters, then College Republican President Joseph Blewitt found himself on ‘Hannity and Colmes’ discussing DePaul’s ridiculous “anti-propaganda” policy. The name ‘Ward Churchill’ quickly became the conservative rallying cry and catalyst for our movement.

To be fair, the conservative movement had started much sooner than the beginning of 2005. In terms of planning and preparation, some of the conservative students at DePaul, including myself, were mobilizing at the end of 2004 in hopes of creating a conservative newspaper at DePaul. After several months of hard work, our mission was successful and in November of 2005 the Lincoln Park Statesman was born.

The affirmative action bake sale is what put the DCA on the map. As a satirical attempt to protest the policy of affirmative action, the bake sale proved to open up discussion about the once taboo topic, and it also served as a recruiting tool for many conservatives to join our cause. Many called the bake sale ‘racist’ (the ‘McCarthyism’ of today) and in the face of adversity from the administration, the DCA fired back by gaining the media’s attention and threatening legal action with the help of the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE).

Since its inception, the DCA has increased membership from roughly four to twenty-five active members. The College Republicans are now a legitimate organization at DePaul who are also seeking to make a difference on campus. After hearing Horowitz speak, the conservative movement is remided of why we need to subsist and why we must fight the academic status quo. The indoctrination from Lefist professors still permeates the college classroom. As Horowitz pointed out, a college student will go four years in the LA&S dept without ever reading Friedrich Hayek, a conservative and Nobel Prize winner.

The ideological struggle is a difficult one indeed, but success is never achieved unless this struggle exists. The administration has somewhat accomodated our presence on campus, but more needs to be done in the classrooms. The conservative movement continues to grow at DePaul and we are still calling for change.

Abolish the minimum wage

It’s official. Nancy Pelosi and her Democratic cohorts have begun 2007 with a disastrous piece of legislation. The House passed a bill which will increase the minimum wage from the current $5.15 to $7.25 over the next two years. The vote in the House was 315-116, a testament that the 82 Republicans who voted for the bill would know the wrath of their constituents had they voted against it. Not only is raising the minimum wage detrimental to the calculus of the American spirit and founding, but simply having one to begin with is what I find most upsetting.

An increase in the minimum wage is popular with the political masses; just ask the Democrats. This popularity is founded in the actual purpose of raising the minimum wage, not in its realization or practical outcome. Personally, I don’t want any American citizen to not have enough money to support a family, to not afford health care, or to not be able to pay their bills. There is a sense of altruism behind the policy of hiking the minimum wage, and just having one in the books is at least “good” in theory. Yet the theory is irrelevant if the pragmatic implementation of the policy has more negative than positive effects.

Many supporters are in favor of the increase because they want low-income workers to make more money. Yet the statistics tell a different story altogether. The people earning minimum wage, as of 2005, represent only 2.5% of the hourly paid workforce in America. Of these 2.5%, about half of these people are under the age of 25, and a quarter of these workers are ages 16-19. In fact, the average household income for the teenage minimum wage workers is roughly $64,000 per year-well above the poverty level. This means that increasing the minimum wage would force employers to pay teenagers, most of whom are still in school and don’t really “need” the money to live off of, more money an hour. The principle of altruism has lost much of its steam once realizing these statistics.

The negative aspect is not that kids shouldn’t be making more money or that they essentially should never receive money if they work for it. Rather, an increase in minimum wage either significantly increases unemployment, or increases the cost for the consumers.

For example, pretend for a moment that you own a restaurant. Let’s say you need ten people to effectively run this small restaurant and you decide to pay them each $6.00 an hour. Yet, the federal government decides to get involved in the marketplace and subsequently raises the minimum wage to $7.25 an hour. As a business owner, you can do one of three things:

A) You could keep all ten on staff and take a profit-cut for yourself, since the returns will be less now that you are paying your employers a significant amount more. (No capitalist or business owner takes this option, trust me)

B) You could keep all ten on staff and increase the prices for the consumers to retain the same profits you were making when you paid your employers $6.00 an hour.

C) You could fire 2 of your employees and still maintain the same profits as before.
What do B and C, the only two practical outcomes, have in common? They are both negative effects on the economy. One option increases unemployment, the other option increases prices for the consumers. Minimum wage has this disastrous effect on the economy.

Yet raising minimum wage is not the ideological culprit for libertarian minded thinkers. The culprit is the minimum wage itself. The market should be able to dictate the wages of the individual workers. Why does the government have a right to tell me how much I have to pay a certain worker for doing a certain job? The answer is that they should not be given that power. Minimum wage is a fanciful bi-product of government coming to the rescue in the marketplace, when the majority of problems can be solved by letting the marketplace rescue itself.

If Wal-Mart were to open up a store and pay employees $2.00 an hour, what would happen? Nobody would apply and the business would collapse. Kmart would then take over the market by offering their employees much more for an hourly wage. Wal-Mart in return, understanding the market, would begin a competitive bidding process for labor if they wanted to keep their business intact. Since labor is a commodity, the competitive marketplace will position people into jobs that pay good, or else the worker can get up and become employed elsewhere. That is and should be the beauty of a free society.

In the end, raising the minimum wage does nothing to help low-income workers and only brings unemployment and higher consumer prices. Even the supporters of minimum wage acknowledge that too large of an increase in the minimum wage will be harmful, otherwise why not raise the minimum wage to $15 or say $20 an hour?

An abolishment of the minimum wage is necessary to reduce the role of government and to allow the market and business owners maximum freedom in investing their own money.